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Re-unification posed multiple challenges to the societies, economies, and polities 
of East and West Germany. On a political, legal, cultural and symbolic level, 
strategies needed to be found to incorporate the divided – and potentially divisive 
– past into a forward-looking historical narrative. This study locates the ‘border 
guard trials’ in the wider context of post-Socialist transitional justice in East 
Germany since 1989 and asks how they were historically framed by the complex 
history of German attempts of ‘Vergangenheitspolitik’ (Norbert Frei) with regard to 
Nazi crimes. Moreover, this dissertation examines how the criminal proceedings 
were ideologically shaped by Cold War confrontations, and how competing 
conceptions of illegality and state crime mirrored those ideological and historical 
contestations. In studying the political and societal echoes of these criminal trials, 
my study finally also contributes to a better understanding of fractured views on 
and memories of German re-unification in contemporary Germany. 
In chapter 1, the Zentrale Erfassungsstelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen will be 
portrayed as an institutional embodiment of West German contestations of the 
legitimacy and legality of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and its border 
regime during the Cold War. In chapter 2, legislative proceedings of 1992/93 are 
examined as a proxy debate on the appropriateness and legitimacy of criminal 
trials against former GDR officials. Chapter 3 studies the brief period of East 
German transitional justice between November 1989 and October 1990 and argues 
that criminal trials against former elites were widely demanded by East German 
citizens. Chapter 4 analyses the border guard trials as a case study into judicial 
practice, its limits, and its achievements, and contrasts them with the proceedings 
presented in the previous section. Chapter 5 explores societal echoes of the trials 
and explores why and how they largely failed to give legitimacy to the new 
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Chris Gueffroy’s dream of driving across the Golden Gate Bridge in San 
Francisco came to a sudden end on the night of 5 February 1989 at the Berlin Wall 
in the city’s district of Treptow. Just before midnight, a bullet from a Kalashnikov 
rifle pierced his heart, just as the twenty-year-old was helping his friend Christian 
Gaudian to climb the final fence of the Berlin Wall. Gueffroy collapsed 
immediately and Gaudian, even though only his foot had been hit by a bullet, fell 
to the ground. Gueffroy died instantly, while Gaudian was captured and later 
sentenced to prison. Like hundreds before them, they saw their attempt to flee the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) ending in a hail of bullets.1 
In May 1991, less than a year after German re-unification, Gueffroy's slayer Ingo 
Heinrich and his border guard comrades were charged with manslaughter. Two of 
the four men were eventually given prison sentences, one of which was suspended. 
In its decision, the Landgericht Berlin argued that any regulation which allowed for 
the use of fatal weapons to prevent the illegal crossing of the border ‘deserved no 
respect, and that obedience to this regulation had to be refused.’ In the eyes of the 
court, killing a citizen for the sake of securing the existence of the GDR’s 
‘totalitarian system’ constituted a grave violation of ‘fundamental principles of law 
and humanity.’2 
The verdict in the Gueffroy case provoked huge opposition. Approximately forty 
citizens felt prompted to write letters to the Federal President Richard von 
Weizsäcker, asking him to pardon the convicted. Commentators in newspapers 
 
1  Ahonen, Pertti: Death at the Berlin Wall, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, 240-251. 
2 Erstinstanzliches Urteil des Landgerichts Berlin vom 20.1.1992, Az. (523)2 Js 48/90 (9/91), in: 
Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds.): Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht. Dokumentation in sieben 







feared that the verdict was a case of hanging the small men and letting the big men 
run (see chapter 9). For the PDS, the political successor of East Germany’s state 
party SED, this was a telling incident of victor’s justice. In March 1992, after the 
first two verdicts against border guards had been handed down, the PDS claimed 
that the history of the GDR could not be told without coming to terms with ‘the 
history of German National Socialism and capitalism, German division by the allied 
forces and the West German capital.’  This suggested link between National 
Socialism and the GDR was an exculpatory claim of former GDR elites and their 
latter-day acolytes in the PDS, claiming that the GDR's aim was to curb and root 
out fascism. However, the link was twofold, as this study will show, as post-
socialist transitional justice after 1989 also took place in the shadow of the 
precedent of West German efforts to 'come to terms' with the Nazi past.  
With the path of transitional justice the country had chosen – at this stage, this 
clearly had to be understood as a reference to the first two border guard cases – the 
PDS feared, any ‘critical and emancipatory potential of the GDR’  was supposed to 
be dissolved and rendered ineffective.3 However, the verdicts also attracted ringing 
endorsements. Two years later, after the Federal Constitutional Court had 
confirmed prison sentences against members of the GDR’s National Defence 
Council (NVR), a press comment hailed the verdicts against the former leaders as 
‘a prime example of the only correct way to come to terms with the past in 
Germany’ and thought that the ruling was a decisive step ‘on the way to the final 
realisation of Germany's inner unity.’ 4  It is indicative of the centrality and 
sensitivity of these cases that debates about how to deal with the Communist 
 
3 ADN-report, ‚PDS-Vorstand: Deutsche Geschichte kritisch aufarbeiten’, March 1992, BArch 
B141 / 116719. 
4 'Musterbeispiel für einzig richtigen Weg der Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland‘ , ‘nicht 
zu unterschätzender Schritt auf dem Weg zur endgültigen Verwirklichung der inneren Einheit 
Deutschlands’, both quotes from: Jörg Respondek, ‘Denkwürdige Urteile in Berlin’, in: 






dictatorship’s legacy, which were always also about the current political culture and 
future direction of reunited Germany, tended to crystallise around them. 
 
Re-unification posed multiple challenges to the societies, economies, and 
polities of East and West Germany. On a political, legal, cultural and symbolic 
level, strategies needed to be found to incorporate the divided – and potentially 
divisive – past into a forward-looking historical narrative. This study locates the 
‘Border Guard Trials’ in the wider context of post-socialist transitional justice in 
East Germany since 1989 and asks how they were historically framed by the 
complex history of German attempts of ‘Vergangenheitspolitik’ (Norbert Frei) with 
regard to Nazi crimes. Moreover, this dissertation examines how the criminal 
proceedings were ideologically shaped by Cold War confrontations, and how 
competing conceptions of illegality and state crime mirrored those ideological and 
historical contestations. Finally, in studying the political and societal echoes of 
these criminal trials, my study also contributes to a better understanding of fractured 
views on and memories of German re-unification in contemporary Germany. 
How is this research project original? It is the first historiographical study to link 
the Border Guard Trials, and criminal proceedings against former GDR officials 
more broadly, to the conceptual field of transitional justice. It explores societal and 
political reverberations of the proceedings, and describes how and why the trials 
have failed to give legitimacy to the new political, social and economic order. 
Moreover, it is the first extensive historiographical interrogation of court 
judgements in the Border Guard Trials which studies how courts have tried to 
accommodate the tensions inherent in transitional justice processes. Lastly, it is the 
first anglophone research project that studies how the proceedings were 
foreshadowed and shaped by the ideological confrontations of the cold war, and 
how the trials were related to the history of German efforts to 'come to terms' with 







The Gueffroy case5 marked the first of the so-called border guard cases. Between 
1991 and 2005, 466 persons were charged with manslaughter or murder for firing 
fatal shots at the Berlin Wall or the Inner German border during the forty years of 
German division (1949-1989/90). Of those, 275 were convicted, usually of 
manslaughter, rarely of murder.6 These trials formed a part of a larger series of 
criminal investigations and trials against former officials of the German Democratic 
Republic (and in rare cases other persons). After German reunification, 75,000 
criminal investigations were launched against approximately 100,000 persons. 
Most cases were closed at an early stage. During these fourteen years from 1991 to 
2005, 1,737 individuals were officially charged in 1,021 trials. Of these, fifty-four 
per cent were officially convicted, just under one quarter of defendants were 
acquitted. As for the remaining defendants, the cases had to be closed, often due to 
poor health or insufficient evidence. This means that every 133rd person of those 
100,000 accused individuals was eventually convicted and sentenced.7 
The above-mentioned Gueffroy case was undoubtedly the first trial of a former 
GDR border guard. But it was by no means the first trial of any former GDR official. 
Criminal investigations against former state and party leaders of the GDR were 
launched within weeks of the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. From 
that time until German reunification on 3 October 1990, at least 124 criminal 
investigations were launched. The focus of these proceedings was exclusively on 
cases of voter fraud and crimes like corruption or abuse of office. The latter two 
categories of crime predominantly referred to claims that former GDR elites had 
misappropriated public funds for personal use. During these eleven months, fifteen 
persons were convicted, and another eleven individuals received penalty orders. 
 
5 In cases with individual victims, their names will be used through this study as an identifier for 
the trial in question. 
6 For comprehensive statistics, see Marxen, Klaus/Werle, Gerhard/Schäfter, Petra, Die 







Numerous other investigations were later continued by re-united Germany’s state 
prosecutors, or judgements delivered in the late GDR served as a basis for later 
court proceedings after reunification. Therefore these trials, small as their number 
may seem at first glance, were hugely important: they expressed the will of GDR 
state prosecutors to hold former elites to account and recorded their firm belief that 
not everything that former leaders had done was automatically legal or legitimate.8 
Criminal prosecution of former GDR officials therefore can be divided into two 
periods: the early phase of trials against former elites for economic crimes and voter 
fraud (November 1989 – October 1990) and the much longer period (1990 – 2005) 
of comprehensive trials for a broader variety of crimes, including border-related 
violence, abuse of justice, and espionage of the GDR’s secret service Stasi (Amt 
für Staatssicherheit).9 
Any transformation on the scale which East Germany experienced poses 
multiple challenges to a body politic and a society. It has been argued that in ancient 
times, forced oblivion or comprehensive gesture of ‘forgive and forget’ were 
common strategies at the end of internal conflicts or wars.10 With the development 
of international humanitarian law since the nineteenth century, a stronger emphasis 
has been put on the legality – and potential illegality – of certain acts in conflicts. 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials of the late 1940s and the gradual development of 
a system of international criminal law since then clearly mark that the idea of 
bringing perpetrators of grave war-crimes to court has had its breakthrough in the 
past century.11 
 
8 ibid., 54 and 11-14. 
9 ibid. 
10 Meier, Christian: Vom Gebot zu Vergessen und der Unabweisbarkeit des Erinnerns. Vom 
öffentlichen Umgang mit schlimmer Vergangenheit, Siedler: München 2010; Connerton, Paul: 
'Seven types of forgetting', in: Memory Studies 1 (2008), pp. 59-71. 
11 von Lingen, Kerstin: ‘Crimes against Humanity’. Eine Ideengeschichte der Zivilisierung von 
Kriegsgewalt 1864-1945, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh 2018; Weinke, Annette: Vom '"Nie 
wieder“ zur diskursiven Ressource. Menschenrechte als Strukturprinzip internationaler Politik seit 







The 1989 moment gave birth to ’transitional justice’, a legal term intended to 
capture system transformations in a broad array of contexts, including the former 
GDR. Different ways of addressing violent pasts were chosen in Central and 
Eastern European countries, in South America and post-Apartheid South Africa.  
Transitional justice (TJ) has since been used both as a normative or prescriptive 
concept and as an analytical category. If used in an analytical way, it might even be 
used retrospectively in analysing transformative processes avant la lettre.12 The 
ultimate aim of transitional justice (if used in such an anachronistic way) is to ensure 
peace by securing a new regime and equipping it with legitimacy and popular 
support. This forward-looking aim of transitional justice potentially entails certain 
backward-facing means, such as identifying perpetrators of an old regime and 
punishing them for the sake of restoring justice and de-legitimising the old order.13 
Measures deployed towards this aim often include, but are not limited to: criminal 
trials or tribunals; lustrations of public services; public acknowledgements of guilt 
and suffering; reparations and rehabilitations; amnesties; truth and reconciliation 
commissions, and many more.14 
After the demise of the GDR, a wide array of transitional justice tools was 
deployed in Germany’s efforts of 'Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung', to use the 
contemporary term. Expropriated properties were restituted to their former owners 
(or their heirs), the civil service was extensively lustrated, the files of the secret 
 
Menschenrechtspolitik und Völkerrecht seit 1945, Göttingen: Wallstein 2013, pp. 12-39; 
Bauerkämper, Arnd: Die lange Debatte über ‘Crimes against Humanity’. Völkerrecht, die Rolle 
von Experten und zivilgesellschaftliche Mobilisierung, in: Neue Politische Literatur 63 (2018), 
No. 3, pp. 377-384; Meier, Gebot; Elster, Jon: Closing the books. Transitional Justice in historical 
perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004. 
12 Weinke, Annette: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland – ein Fall von Transitional Justice avant la 
lottre?, in: Mihr, Anja / Pickel, Gert / Pickel, Susanne (eds.), ‘Handbuch Transitional Justice. 
Aufarbeitung von Unrecht – hin zur Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie, Wiesbaden, Springer 
2019, pp. 249-274. 
13 Mihr, Anja / Pickel, Gert / Pickel, Susanne, ‘Einführung in Transitional Justice’, in: Mihr, Anja / 
Pickel, Gert / Pickel, Susanne (eds.), ‘Handbuch Transitional Justice. Aufarbeitung von Unrecht – 







service Stasi were made accessible for the public and former political prisoners 
were rehabilitated. This was flanked with symbolic steps such as the re-naming of 
buildings, squares and streets, public ceremonies on the anniversaries of the fall of 
the Wall and German reunification, and by removing socialist memorials from the 
public sphere.15 As we can see, criminal justice against former GDR officials was 
merely one tool of post-socialist transitional justice in re-united Germany. But it 
was a crucial measure that linked criminal judgements in individual cases to 
historical, legal, and political contestations of the Cold War, and to transformative 
experiences after re-unification. 
Hence, criminal trials, and the Border Guard Trials more particularly, will form 
the focus of this dissertation. When writing the history of such criminal trials, it is 
important to understand them not as a dimension of human life that is opposed to 
or sealed off from other spheres such as politics, culture, or society. Rather, the law 
has to be understood as an aspect of human life that is deeply intertwined with 
politics, culture and society. It is, in many ways, their product – but it also shapes 
these dimensions of human life. Studying criminal trials against former GDR 
officials therefore necessarily implies understanding these proceedings in a legal, 
political, social and/or cultural way and to ask how these dimensions of the trials 
are intertwined and intermingled.  
This study aims to historicise criminal trials against former GDR officials as a 
political, legal, and social subject. More precisely, it will be asked how these trials 
emerged as a product of politics, law, and society, and, conversely, what 
ramifications and repercussions these trials had in the spheres of politics, society, 
 
15 Simon, Vera Caroline: ‘Tag der Deutschen Einheit: Festakt und Live-Übertragung im Wandel’, 
in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 2015, B 33-34, pp. 11-17; Saunders, Anna : ‘The Politics of 
Memory in Berlin’s Freiheits- und Einheitsdenkmal’, in: Saunders, Anne / Pinfold, Debbie (eds.): 
Rembembering and Retinking the GDR. Multiple Perspectives and Plural Authenticities, 
Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan 2013, pp. 164-178; Griffins, Courtney Glore: 'Reinterpreting 
the Soviet War Memorial in Berlin’s Treptower Park after 1990’, in: Clarke, David / Wölfe, Ute 
(eds.): Remembering the German Democratic Republic. Divided Memory in a United Germany, 






and the law. Lastly, it will also be important to examine what sort of frictions 
between these societal dimensions surrounded the trials, and how relevant actors 
have responded to these tensions or tried to reduce them. 
In service of this aim, this study will explore the origins of post-socialist criminal 
trials in West German legal practice between 1961 and 1989, and in East German 
judicial practice between the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and German 
re-unification in October 1990. I will then move on to study legislative initiatives 
in the early 1990 which secured continued criminal investigations for an 
exceptionally long period of time, as well as political debates which served as a 
proxy political justification for the chosen path of transitional justice. I will then 
turn to judicial practice and ask how the judiciary attempted to develop a coherent 
and legally waterproof jurisprudence that also – at least to a minimal extent – 
satisfied expectations from the public and political sphere. Lastly, this study will 
explore how the public sphere (both journalists and the wider public) viewed 
criminal trials as such, as well as specific jurisprudence in the context of transitional 
justice, and to what extent jurisprudence might have satisfied – or not – the public’s 
expectations. 
 
In the case of criminal trials against former GDR officials, the criminal law was 
used to regulate inherently political questions. It will be shown that these trials were 
a de-centralised form of transitional justice which, in terms of how it was carried 
out, de-politicised the fundamental political question of such a transitional period: 
what to do with former regime perpetrators. As a transitional justice measure, the 
trials failed to equip the new political, social, and economic order with legitimacy 
or political support. Rather, despite the courts’ various attempts to act in a way 
which accommodated popular expectations regarding the outcome of such trials, a 
majority of Germans – especially in the East – viewed the proceedings as a burden 






The courts, eager to accommodate public and political outcome expectations 
towards the trials, developed a jurisprudence that was sensitive to different levels 
of responsibility for state crimes. However, this jurisprudence failed to gain public 
support for a number of reasons: the jurisprudence was only developed over time 
and a taxonomy only became obvious in hindsight; moreover, courts were limited 
to the rules of the ‘ordinary’ law (as opposed to a revolutionary tribunal), and were 
limited by their role in communicating potentially political considerations which 
might have underpinned their judgements. 
These shortcomings were due to the genesis of these trials. They were not a 
carefully considered expression of a unified and consistent philosophico-politcal 
position. Rather, they came to pass in an ad-hoc fashion, and were to an extent 
determined and constrained by the triple lines of continuity from (1) legal 
proceedings and political desires during the GDR's revolutionary period; (2) West 
German legal and ideological framings, and especially the collection of 
investigative files; and (3) historical efforts to 'come to terms' with the Nazi past. 
* * *  
My study integrates a historiographical examination of the law into political and 
social history, drawing on the pioneering theoretical suggestions of Siemens, 
Habermas and Suntrup.16 Along these lines, law is understood as a ‘fundamental 
dimension of historical analysis’17 – rather than something separate from, let alone 
opposed to it. To situate my study of the wall-shooter trials historiographically 
requires a survey of four distinct albeit interrelated fields: the cultural history of 
law, the interdisciplinary research field of transitional justice, the history of post-
 
16 Siemens, Daniel: Towards a New Cultural History of Law, in: InterDisciplines 3 (2012), No. 2, 
pp. 18-45; Habermas, Rebekka: Diebe vor Gericht. Die Entstehung der modernen Rechtsordnung 
im 19. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt a.M. / New York: Campus 2008; Sintrup, Jan Christoph: Umkämpftes 
Recht. Zur mehrdimensionalen Analyse rechtskultureller Konflikte durch die politische 
Kulturforschung (= Schriftenreihe des Käte Hamburger Kollegs ‘Recht als Kultur’, vol. 22), 
Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann 2018. 






socialist transitional justice in Germany, in the context of contemporary German 
history since 1990 more broadly; and, lastly, the history of (West) German efforts 
concerning 'Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung' of the Nazi past. 
Law and History  
For some time, 'law' and 'history' as research fields have been separated. For 
instance, the historian Otto-Gerhard Oexle made a strong case for understanding 
legal history as a specific branch of history.18 Social historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler 
has insisted that political rule, economy and culture are the ‘fundamental 
dimensions’ or ‘axes’ of a society. In Wehler’s view, law was not among them.19 
They both viewed the law to be something that was factually separated from other 
social phenomena. 
  Especially legal historians (that is, trained lawyers) were among the early 
proponents of a more integrative approach towards history and law in recent 
decades. Stolleis asserted that a history of ideas could not be separated from a 
history of hard historical facts.20 The former German Federal Constitutional Justice 
Dieter Grimm, emeritus professor of public law and a valued public intellectual, 
has crucially claimed that legal historians must get used to ‘attributing the same 
relevance to starvation, religious schisms, and the invention of the steam engine as 
it normally does to the legal system of Savigny, the Magna Carta’ and other legal 
phenomena.21 Recently, this integrative approach of understanding 'the law' as an 
 
18 Oexle, Otto Gerhard: Rechtsgeschichte und Geschichtswissenschaft, in: Simon, Dieter (ed.): 
Akten des 26. Deutschen Rechtshistorikertages (Frankfurt am Main, 22 – 26 September 1986), 
Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann 1987, pp. 77-107. 
19 Siemens, Cultural History of Law, 24. 
20 Stolleis, Michael: Verfassungs(ge)schichten (= fundamenta Juris Publici, vol. 6), Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck 2017, pp. 32-38. 
21 ‘Wirkungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen weisen das Fach freilich über die Grenzen des genuin 
Juristischen endgültig hinaus. Die Forschung muß sich angewöhnen, einer Hungersnot, der 
Glaubensspaltung, der Erfindung der Dampfmaschine nicht weniger rechtshistorische Relevanz 
beizumessen als dem System Savignys, der Magna Charta oder dem Müller-Arnold-Prozeß. 







analytical category and a historiographical research field has been fruitful in various 
fields of historiographical, including political history,22 the history of knowledge,23 
the history of crime,24 and when studying the ‘performativity of law’.25 
 
 
Grimm, Dieter: Recht und Staat der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1987, p. 418 
(translation from Siemens, Cultural History of Law, 23). 
22 Gehrig who argues that the GDR used domestic and international law to pressure West Germany 
into recognising the GDR’s sovereignty during the Cold War, meaning the law has been used as a 
tool to facilitate politically desired outcomes, cf. Gehrig, Sebastian: ‘Cold War Identities: 
Citizenship, Constitutional Reform, and International Law between East and West Gremany, 
1967-75’, in: Journal of Contemporary History 49 (2014), No. 4, pp. 794-814. Duranti has shown 
how after the World War II, conservative political forces in France and Britain have advanced 
work on the European Convention of Human Rights out of fear of communism, resulting in 
political fears immediately fuelling legislative work. See Duranti, Marco: ‘Conservatives and the 
European Convention on Human Rights’, in: Frei, Norbert / Weinke, Annette (eds.): Toward a 
new moral order? Menschenrechtspolitik und Völkerrecht seit 1945, Göttingen: Wallstein 2013, 
pp. 82-93. 
23  For an approach to include the law into the study of history of knowledge, see e.g. Wetzell, 
Richard F.: Inventing the Criminal: A History of German Criminology, 1880-1945. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 
24  For examples of intriguing studies from the research field of history of crime, see for example 
Habermas, Rebekka: Diebe vor Gericht. Die Entstehung der modernen Rechtsordnung im 19. 
Jahrhundert, Frankfurt a.M. / New York: Campus 2008, who examines the transformation of 
Germany’s legal order with respect to property or Wetzell, Richard F.: Crime and Criminal Justice 
in Modern Germany, New York: Berghahn Books, 2014, who includes perspectives on gender and 
sexuality in relation to crime. 
25 Studies into the ‘performativity of law’ include Grunwald, Henning: Courtroom to 
Revolutionary Stage. Performance and Ideology in Weimar political trials, Oxford: OUP 2012 as 
well as Jakiša, Miranda: Postdramatischer Bühnen-Tribunal: Gerichtstheater rund um das ICTY, 
in: Gephart, Werner et al. (eds.): Tribunale. Literarische Darstellung und juridische Aufarbeitung 
von Kriegsverbrechen im globalen Kontext (=Schriftenreihe des Käte Hamburger Kollegs ‘Recht 
als Kultur’, vol. 4), Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann 2014, pp. 223-242; also see Karahasan, 
Dževad: Tribunal, Theater und das Drama des Rechts, in: ibid., pp. 151-156; Sintrup, Jan 
Christoph: Einleitung – Über die rechtliche, kulturelle und literarische Bedeutung von Tribunalen, 
in: ibid., pp. 9-26; Brokoff, Jürgen: Übergänge. Literarisch-juridische Interferenzen bei Peter 






New historiographical approaches such as a ‘new cultural history of law’26 are 
based on the axiomatic assumption that ‘the law’ is not an anthropological (let alone 
ontological) category in itself, but is deeply intertwined with facets of human life 
such as politics, economy, culture, and society. This applies to ‘the law’ in all of its 
‘physical states’, be it, for example, as a contested draft bill in legislative processes 
that reflects competing political aims; as statutory law regulating the property order, 
or as a tool of social discipline with respect to policing drugs and prostitution; 
debates about ‘just’ punishments of criminals, or references to professional legal 
language in pub banter. In all of these examples, ‘the law’ touches upon dimensions 
of human life such as politics, culture, economy or society. They reflect, as Siemens 
has put it, that ‘even traditional legal ideas and practices are [deeply] grounded in 
spheres other than the law itself’ 27  and therefore deserve close attention by 
historians. In his words, law is ‘(…) a complicated mixture of political action, legal 
reasoning, and social needs’.28  
However, law is not only a product of society in a broad sense, but also an 
influence upon it. A legal system can be seen as ‘a kind of societal self-definition, 
a definition that would both reflect and help define a society’s moral values and the 
distribution of power and influence’.29 Understood in such a way, law is ‘transitive’ 
and ‘constructed in discourses’ which reflect ‘social structure’ as ‘facts’, as Tomlin 
argues.30 Law may therefore ‘be regarded as a knowledge that records the play of 
social relations, but which also dynamically reproduces them in (…) institutions 
and ideologies’. 31  This entails that, although any legal order is a ‘constantly 
 
26 Siemens, Cultural History of Law. Alternatively, Habermas speaks of ‘anthropology of law’, 
Habermas, Rebekka: Diebe vor Gericht. Die Entstehung der modernen Rechtsordnung im 19. 
Jahrhundert, Frankfurt a.M. / New York: Campus 2008, p. 19. 
27 Siemens, Cultural History of Law, 26. 
28 ibid., 23; Cf. Grimm, Staat und Recht, 413.  
29 Siemens, Cultural History of Law, 24. 
30 Tomlins, Christopher: ‘Subordination, Authority, Law: Subjects in Labor History’, in: 
International Labor and Working-Class History 47 (1995), pp. 56-90, [p. 64]. 






changing interplay of norms, actors and institutions’, 32  legal systems usually 
purport to possess a certain static quality, a limited changeability, and an adherence 
to their own immanent rules and procedures. The most important rules are usually 
laid down in constitutions which themselves become part of identity politics and 
quests for allegiance.33 
 
This constant negotiation has been described as ‘Doing Law’.34 Following this 
line of thought, criminal sanctions, and even the question of what is lawful and what 
is not, are permanently negotiated by various actors.35 According to Habermas, this 
includes witnesses, those who report a criminal offence, defendants, prosecutors 
and judges, journalists, and politicians.36 It needs to be added that the wider public 
also has to be seen as such an actor: as recipients of media coverage, as potential 
campaigners for changes to the legal system or – potentially – as a mob craving 
revenge, or as an electorate who could oust a sitting government if it fails to react 
to popular demands. Arguably, fear of such popular sentiments alone can motivate 
actors such as judges, politicians, or journalists to refer or to defer to a public’s 
legal consciousness. Likewise, ‘normative frameworks, procedural structures, 
interrogation methods, protocol types, legal trainings, [and] self-images of judge’ 
 
32 ‘sich ständig verändernden Zusammenspiel von Normen, Akteuren und Institutionen’, 
Habermas, Diebe, 20. 
33 Gephart, Werner: Constitution as Culture. Constitutional Universalism and Pluralism of legal 
Culture (= Working Paper of the Käte Hamburger Kolleg ‘Recht als Kultur’), 2016, online 
accessible at: < http://www.recht-als-
kultur.de/de/download/66/364/1819/Werner%20Gephart%20WP%20Constitutions%20as%20Cult
ure.pdf>, last access: 1 August 2019, pp. 1-5. 
34 ‘Doing Recht’, Habermas, Diebe, 20. 
35 Habermas, Diebe,  20f. 






have to be seen as important factors shaping how the law is applied, even though 
one does not necessarily have to understand them as ‘actors’ in their own right.37 
Finally, studying how ‘law is done’ then also implies taking into account power, 
conflict and performativity. The relevance of power and power differences in 
negotiations of the law is obvious: a defendant has significantly less power in 
deciding what is legal and illegal than the judges presiding over his or her trial.  In 
other cases, power differences might be less obvious. Moreover, it is crucial to note 
that conflicts are central to ‘doing law’:38 conflicts between courts can normally be 
solved by resorting to hierarchy. Conflicts between defendants and presiding judges 
over his or her guilt can be resolved by a ruling of the latter, but that does not end 
the conflict. Other conflicts, however, cannot be resolved by applying force or by 
resorting to institutional hierarchies.  
On a large scale, fundamentally differing views of appropriate sentences 
between competent courts and the wider public might undermine the legitimacy of 
the legal system and cause political uproar. A legal system therefore not only has 
to ‘produce sentences that must be – grosso modo – predictable’, as Siemens 
argues.39 It is also bound to produce sentences that are – by and large – accepted by 
the wider public. Ultimately, the legal system is in need of legitimacy.  
 
'Legitimacy' as a social political phenomenon is the topic of many empirical and 
theoretical studies. For the purpose of this study, it suffices to say that in the realm 
of politics, legitimacy is at the very least a two-dimensional term. It can be used (1) 
to describe the claim of a political and legal order to be legitimate, i.e. rightful. It 
is, however, also used to describe (2) the faith of a population that a given societal 
 
37  Habermas does that. For the preceding quote, see Habermas 20: ‘Das Normengerüst, die 
Verfahrensstruktur, die Muster der Verhörmethoden, die Arten des Protokollierens, die juristische 
Ausbildung, die Ausformung des Expertenhabitus, und das Selbstverständnis des Richters spielen 
ebenso eine wichtige Rolle (…)’.  
38 So far, see Habermas, Diebe, 20-22. 






order is rightful.40 This second dimension of legitimacy has also been defined as ‘a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions’.41 Conceived in such a descriptive sense, legitimacy is not 
only a prerequisite of democracies, but for all kinds of political rule. It has to be 
understood as a ‘basic condition of rule because without at least a minimal amount 
of legitimacy, governing regimes would face deadlock or collapse’.42 Blatter has 
hence rightly outlined that every system of government, including dictatorial 
regimes, seek to ‘justify its reign, and this justification can be based on various 
concepts’. Among those sources of legitimacy are the ideas of input legitimacy and 
output legitimacy.43 They refer to the notion of a political decision being seen as 
legitimate either because given political outcomes satisfy the public (output 
legitimacy) or because the way in which competing political interests have been 
introduced into the government is accepted as rightful, as democracies would claim. 
(input legitimacy). 
In their attempts to understand a population’s belief in a system’s legitimacy, 
political scientists have distinguished between specific support and diffuse support 
of a political order. Specific support would depend on the system’s performance 
and would be dependent on the satisfaction of political demands. Diffuse support is 
understood as a fundamental buttress of the political system because the system in 
itself is seen as rightful/legitimate.44 It is believed that a lack of specific support 
 
40 Nohlen, Dieter: ‘Legitimität’, in: Nohlen, Dieter / Schultze, Rainer-Olaf (eds.): Lexikon der 
Politikwissenschaft, vol. 1 A-M, München: C.H. Beck 42010, pp. 544-546. 
41 Suchman, Mark C.: ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’, in: The 
Academy of Management Review 20 (1995), no. 3, pp. 571-610, [p. 574];  cf. Considine, Mark / 
Afzal, Kamran Ali: Legitimacy’, in: Bevir, Mark (ed.): The SAGE Handbook of Governance, 
London et al.: Sage 2011, pp. 369-385, [p. 371]. 
42 Blatter, Joachim K.: ‘Legitimacy’, in: Bevir, Mark (ed.): Encyclopedia of Governance, Vol. II, 
London et al.: Sage Publications 2007, pp. 518-521, [p. 518]. 
43 Blatter, Legitimacy, 518. 
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does not immediately impair the ‘stability and performance’ of a political system, 
if diffuse support is high. However, it has been suggested that, in the long run, 
‘notorious deficits in government performance’ may cause severe ‘crises of trust 
and legitimacy’. 45  Conversely, it seems fair to assume that, in political 
transformations, a certain record of 'performative', i.e. output successes of a 
political system are a prerequisite for diffuse support, i.e. a belief that the given 
body politic is rightful and legitimate, to be developed. 
In a wider sense, the legal order is a branch of a country’s political system. It 
therefore also depends on legitimacy. Where the support of courts or specific trials 
is contested and weak, it is particularly important for courts to claim legitimacy. 
This is particularly the case in post-conflict situations. The 1990s, when most GDR 
officials were sentenced in national courts, also saw a high tide of international 
tribunals in the wake of internal conflicts or wars. In The Hague (Netherlands), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established 
in 1993. In Arusha (Tanzania), The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) was founded in 1994. In 1998, 160 states resolved to establish the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, which was a caesura in the 
gradual development of an international criminal law. Proceedings for state crime 
are in need of justification and explanation, particularly if carried out by 
international ad-hoc tribunals.46 Therefore, it has convincingly been argued that 
actors in such trials, such as prosecutors ‘(…) do more than engage in investigation 
and the collection of evidence. They ground their interventions by framing their 
prosecutions in a language aimed at justifying the decision to pursue individual 
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criminal accountability’. 47  This aims at ensuring that ‘(…) other institutional 
players and external audiences [see] these prosecutions’ as legitimate.48 Where the 
acceptance of courts and trials is low and contested, as in the case of international 
tribunals – or arguably the GDR – such claims for legitimacy become a central 
element not only of the work of state prosecutors, but also of the judges who hand 
down a verdict.49 Trials against former GDR officials, by contrast, could not resort 
to such extraordinary means. They were restricted by the procedural rules of 
Germany's Rechtsstaat. In other words: legally speaking, the revolutionary moment 
had passed once the Eastern Länder had acceded to the Federal Republic. 
 
When Germany re-united, two different realities of political legitimacy clashed. 
In the West, the political, legal, economic, and social system could rely on 
significant diffuse support. When the five Länder of the GDR acceded to the 
Federal Republic and its political and legal system, East Germans did not 
necessarily share their western compatriots’ diffuse support of the body politic.50 
Grave economic and social realities in the decade following the fall of the GDR 
most certainly did not help deliver this degree of fundamental legitimacy. However, 
as I have argued above, delivering legitimacy for a new political order is one of the 
key objectives of transitional justice measures.  
This study will argue that as a branch of the political order, the legal system 
faced a three-fold challenge after German re-unification. Firstly, it had to conduct 
highly contested trials against former GDR officials. These proceedings themselves 
did not enjoy undivided popular support. Rather, the classification of fatal shots as 
 
47 ibid., 59f. 
48 ibid. 
49 Levi/Dezalay/Amiraslani, Prosecutional Strategies, 59f. 
50 Gabriel, Oscar W.: ‘Demokratische Einstellungen in einem Land ohne demokratische 
Traditionen? Die Unterstützung der Demokratie in den neuen Bundesländern im Ost-West-
Vergleich’, in: Falter, Jürgen/Gabriel, Oscar W./Rattinger, Hans (eds.): Wirklich ein Volk? Die 
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'crimes' was contested. The chronological sequence of trials, which saw some rank-
and-file border guards convicted before most senior leaders could be seen in the 
dock, contributed to claims of 'hanging the small men and letting the big men run'. 
These trials were, secondly, difficult, as the ‘imported’ legal system did not benefit 
from much diffuse support, as it had not had much time to gain it. Rather, it was 
perceived as a foreign legal system. Thirdly, even though the legitimacy of the 
specific trials as well as the legal system as such was contested, the courts faced the 
challenge of producing legitimacy for the wider new political system through the 
way they carried out the proceedings and through the verdicts. This was 
demonstrated in public debate by politicians and journalists, who emphasised the 
importance of the trials for 'coming to terms' with German Socialism.  
This dissertation contributes to the emerging research field of a cultural history 
of law by investigating how the use of the criminal law as a transitional justice 
measure was intertwined with political needs and desires. It will examine how 
politicians, courts, defendants and the public have negotiated the legitimacy, 
legality and usefulness of criminal trials as a measure of 
Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung, or – to use an internationally-used term – transitional 
justice.  
Transitional Justice  
The research field of post-conflict transitional justice has grown significantly 
over the three decades. The phenomena that are addressed in the literature, however, 
are not new at all. Questions of how to manage a successful and lasting transition 
from a violent or authoritarian political system to a more inclusive system of 
governance and/or peace can already be witnessed in ancient Athens in the 400s 
B.C. As the classicist Christian Meier has argued, for most of the time since 
antiquity, human societies resorted to a mix of amnesty, oblivion, and repression of 
memory as a strategy to deal with violent pasts and memories of suffering in 
wartime. With the exception of restorative measures and purges after the end of the 






the paradigm shift away from oblivion and amnesty to the imposition of sweeping 
retributions on Germany by the allied powers and the forced acknowledgement of 
Germany’s sole responsibility for the War. It was, however, the seminal impact of 
World War II which entailed that collective and individual responsibility for large-
scale crimes against humanity became subject to legal, educative, and political 
measures that have become the global norm of transitional justice.51 The law plays 
a dominant role in these processes. The post-Nuremberg period has therefore also 
been described as the era of ‘judicalisation’ of the past.52 
However, it must be noted that this paradigm shift was not a sole consequence 
of the mass violence experienced in the twentieth century. Rather, it has been 
foreshadowed, both intellectually and legally, since the nineteenth century. Rich 
international debates demonstrate that the idea of holding governments to account 
for atrocities is a product of emerging humanitarianism in the late nineteenth 
century.53 
Transitional justice is a multifaceted term that has been defined in various ways. 
In the past few years, the emphasis of the scholarship has shifted away from a 
narrower understanding that sees legal measures at the core of transitional justice54 
 
51 Elster, Jon: Closing the books. Transitional Justice in historical perspective, Cambridge: 
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to a wider conception of transitional justice as ‘an approach seeking to achieve 
justice by a set of judicial and non-judicial measures implemented in order to 
redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses’, as the Center for Transitional 
Justice has put it.55 But what is the purpose of transitional justice? According to 
Mihr, Pickel and Pickel, it has a ‘two-dimensional reference frame’, i.e. it has two 
different objectives.56 (1) It is backward facing in that it aims at ‘working through’ 
past wrongfulness. It has been argued that prosecuting and convicting regime 
perpetrators helps to de-legitimise a regime overcome. Arguably, all of this serves 
(2) to support the forward-looking objective of transitional justice, namely to 
legitimise a new (democratic) regime. Transitional justice measures such as 
lustrations, trials, public acknowledgements and ceremonies etc. serve to foster 
transparency and accountability in the name of stabilising the new political order.57 
Arguably, even the development of international human rights law can be seen as a 
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The term ‘transitional justice’ is used both in normative and in descriptive ways. 
The assumption that transitional justice measures create stable democracies and 
foster the rule of law is a normative claim. 59  Likewise, the research field of 
transitional justice is cultivated both by academics, but also by practitioners, and 
therefore bears strong normative connotations.60 Sober examinations of societal 
impacts of transitional justice measures are challenging. They rely on comparative 
cross-national studies of aggregated data. In some cases, however, a correlation 
between sweeping transitional justice measures and a democratisation could be 
shown. 61  However, doubts have been uttered as to whether state-mandated 
‘Diktaturbewältigung’ (overcoming of dictatorships) can be of service for the 
establishment of democratic structures, especially in the light of ‘participative 
dictatorships’. Moreover, it has been questioned what exactly ‘justice’ or ‘historical 
justice’ can mean in the light of up to millions of murdered victims in genocides.62 
Moreover, it is important to note that political scientists use the term ‘transition’ not 
only to describe regime changes from dictatorships to democracies, but also vice 
versa.63 Transitions as such are therefore not limited to a project of liberalisation 
and democratisation. The term transitional justice, however, implies a normative 
dimension through the ambiguous word justice. However, it is also used as a merely 
descriptive and analytical term.  
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As ‘transitional justice’ is ambiguous, both as a term and as a concept,64 it is 
important to note that in this study, it will only be used as a descriptive term and as 
an analytical tool. This study neither subscribes to normative claims underpinning 
much of the research in the field, nor does it wish to further any such normative 
assumptions inadvertently. Therefore, in this study, ’transitional justice’ is used as 
a general term to describe a range of institutional measures – legal, political, 
symbolic – deployed by a post-revolutionary or post-conflict government in order 
to stabilise the new political order by de-legitimising the overthrown (form of) 
government. The success of such transitional justice measures will be measured in 
accordance with the degree to which they have helped to deliver legitimacy to the 
new body politic and to pacify the divisive potential of the past. Success is therefore 
only understood in a utilitarian way. 
When used in this capacity, the term may also be used retroactively as an 
analytical term.65 In the German case, the terms Vergangenheitsbewältigung and 
Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung have played key roles in historical debates. Germany 
is often held up as an example of successful transitional justice induced externally. 
However, such celebrations of Germany rarely refer to the conceptual tools of 
transitional justice, but remain in the language of Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung or -
bewältigung.66 In fact, during the thirteen years of its existence, The International 
Journal of Transitional Justice has only published one case study of the GDR, while 
several other countries have been featured  multiple times.67 
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The law, most notably the criminal law, plays a specific role in processes of 
transitional justice. As in the case of the Nazi dictatorship or the GDR, the law itself 
has often been entangled with past state crimes, and therefore needs rehabilitation.68 
At the same time, it is used as a vital tool to ‘overcome’ those very crimes. 
Competing aims of transitional justice processes can place the legal system in a 
dilemma, as Teitel claims: ‘In its ordinary social function, law provides order and 
stability, but in extraordinary periods of political upheaval, law maintains order 
even as it enables transformation.’69 But to do so, a balance has to be struck between 
satisfying popular expectations of justice and the principles of the rule of law.70 
This study contributes to the research field of transitional justice by providing an 
in-depth case study into the these very conflicts over the use of the criminal law as 
a measure of transitional justice. It also examines procedural deficiencies of those 
trials, and investigates how the wider public has engaged with them. 
 
Post-Socialist Criminal Trials 
Criminal prosecution of former GDR officials for alleged state crime was a 
major policy of transitional justice, as the brief overview of criminal trials and 
investigations above has shown. State crimes prosecuted included cases of voter 
fraud, perversion of justice 71 , economic crimes such as corruption and 
misappropriation of public funds, espionage, physical abuse of prisoners, doping, 
and, as a key case group, killings at the Inner German border and the Berlin Wall. 
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These have been labelled as ‘border guard cases’, even though the term is 
sometimes also synonymously used for all trials against former GDR officials.72 
Around the turn of the millennium, a major research project led by academic 
lawyers Klaus Marxen and Gerhard Werle has provided invaluable fundamental 
work on the practice of criminal prosecution after the end of the GDR.73 This 
research project has published edited primary sources, especially criminal 
judgments, and so provided invaluable groundwork for this dissertation.74 
Partially as an offspring from Marxen’s and Werle’s research project, a series of 
legal academic publications has extensively studied the legal practice of state crime 
prosecution in various fields, including cases of killings at the Inner-German 
Border75 ; voter fraud76; abuse of justice;77  corruption, abuse of office and the  
misappropriation of public funds.78 Other publications investigate the public debate 
on criminal trials against former GDR officials79 and an overview on the ‘politics 
of the past’ (Norbert Frei) between the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and German 
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reunification in 1990. 80  This body of literature relieves this study from the 
obligation of providing detailed and in-depth descriptions of the jurisprudence as 
such, as we will be able to draw on the literature for quantitative overviews of case 
groups.81  
 
Naturally, academic lawyers ask different research questions from historians. 
Their debates have gravitated around questions of the legality, constitutionality, and 
moral legitimacy of criminal trials against border guards and other former GDR 
officials. The prohibition of retroactive punishment, an ancient legal principle going 
back to the Roman formula of ‘nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege’, was a 
particularly important point in these considerations.82 This body of literature is a 
rich potential seed for future research into how contested the ‘border guard cases’ 
were in the legal sphere. 
Owing to temporal proximity, historical scholarship is only just beginning to 
investigate these proceedings, their pre-history, and their societal ramifications. 
Around the millennium, transitional justice in East Germany attracted the attention 
of political scientists. These texts provide meaningful overviews of the measures 
taken, and also offer instructive chronologies of the development of jurisprudence 
 
80 Bock, Petra: Vergangenheitspolitik im Systemwechsel. Die Politik der Aufklärung, 
Strafverfolgung, Disqualifizierung und Wiedergutmachung im letzten Jahr der DDR, Berlin: 
Logos 2000. 
81 Marxen/Werle/Schäfter, Strafverfolgung provides an updated quantitative overview of criminal 
investigations and legal proceedings from 1989 until 2005. 
82 For example: Buchner, Silke: Die Rechtswidrigkeit der Taten von ‚Mauerschützen‘ im Lichte 
von Art. 103 II GG unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Völkerrechts. Ein Beitrag zum Problem 
der Verfolgung von staatlich legitimiertem Unrecht nach Beseitigung des Unrechtssystems, 
Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang 1996; Geiger, Rudolf: ‘The German Border Guard Cases and 
International Human Rights’, in: European Journal of International Law, 9 (1998), pp. 540-49; 
Gabriel, Manfred J.: ‘Coming to Terms with the East German Border Guards Cases’, in: 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 38 (1999), pp. 375-418; Quint, Peter E.: ‘Judging the 
Past: The Prosecution of East German Border Guards and the GDR Chain of Command’, in: The 






on the border guard cases.83 Jan-Werner Müller is highly critical of almost every 
tool of transitional justice chosen, especially of the border guard cases, for their 
failure to take into account the needs of the East Germans, despite neglecting a 
detailed examination of the historical background and the cultural ramifications of 
these processes. 84  This desideratum has partly been met by one rather short 
sociology-of-law-study, albeit at the price of equating public opinion with press 
coverage.85  
More recently, historians have started to approach the proceedings. A series of 
shorter articles on the development of the jurisprudence has made the 
comprehensive findings of academic lawyers more accessible for a wider 
audience.86 Likewise, Pertti Ahonen studies the killings at the Berlin Wall and 
devotes his final chapter to the commemoration and afterlife of the deadly border, 
including a cursory discussion of the border guard cases. By looking at a few test 
cases and the Politbüro-Prozess, he particularly pays attention to the defence 
strategies of defendants and their lawyers. Another focus of this chapter is the public 
commemoration through memorial sites like the East Side Gallery or the 
Gedenkstätte Berliner Mauer. 87  Recently, these publications have been 
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complemented by a handbook on the victims of the wall88 and a handbook on the 
‘forgotten’ victims of the Wall – those who had died at the Inner German border 
before the Berlin Wall was built: at least thirty-seven people died at the hands of 
East Berlin’s border regime between 1948 and 1961. Of those, thirty-six died 
through excessive use of firearms, while one victim drowned trying to cross the 
sector border.89  
The only major historical study on criminal prosecution as a measure of re-united 
Germany’s Vergangenheitspolitik has been written by French historian Guillaume 
Mouralis.90 His study covers criminal trials in East Germany between 1989 and 
1990, as well as in West Germany. Mouralis focusses almost exclusively on the 
(undoubtedly important) first two test cases which also feature prominently in my 
study. Apart from looking at the trial against Honecker, however, Mouralis passes 
over the other high-profile cases (most notably: the Politbüro case) and the high 
court decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of 
Justice. He does, however, provide an extensive section of almost seventy pages on 
criminal investigations and trials against GDR officials between the fall of the Wall 
and German reunification. 91  Mouralis also examines the roots of this form of 
transitional justice in West Germany’s trials against Nazi perpetrators and in the 
work of the Federal Republic’s Zentrale Erfassungsstelle der 
Landesjustizverwaltungen (ZESt), a state prosecutor’s office designed to keep track 
of grave human right abuses in East Germany. He rightly identifies the work of this 
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authority as a ‘un legs contraignant’ – ‘a binding legacy’ – whose work must not 
be overlooked when examining the roots of criminal trials as a measure of post-
socialist transitional justice.92  Unfortunately, the breadth of Mouralis’ study is 
sometimes marred by a lack of detail;  moreover his work has been all but neglected 
in German debates. Finally, a few non-academic books deserve a mention, most 
notably Roman Grafe’s ‘Deutsche Gerechtigkeit’, in which he offers summaries of 
twenty trials against border guards, the Politbüro der SED and the National Defence 
Council. Moreover, the volume documents seven interviews with survivors, state 
prosecutors and judges.93 
Post-Socialist Transitional Justice in Re-united Germany 
Even though the term ‘transitional justice’ had not been coined in the early 
1990s, a comprehensive set of transitional justice tools was deployed after German 
reunification. These measures included compensatory, symbolic, and legal 
measures, truth inquiries and purges, even though all these forms of public 
Aufarbeitung were, of course, intertwined. A notorious example of reparative 
measures was the restitution of expropriated properties to their former owners – the 
principle of restitution before compensation is thought to have caused sustained 
legal uncertainty and widespread frustration and anger among East Germans who 
lost their homes.94 On the symbolic level, many memorials have been established 
to commemorate the victims at the Inner German border, German division itself, 
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the daily oppression through the Stasi, or the fates of many thousand political 
detainees at notorious prisons.95 Two parliamentary inquiry committees – the so-
called ‘Enquete-Kommissionen – attempted to ‘work through’ the past of the 
GDR.96  Moreover, it was decided to open the Stasi files to the public and to 
establish an authority that would administer access to Stasi files for the affected 
individuals and researchers – this Gauck Authority, as the institution has been 
called, was initially a unique feature of the East German transition, and has since 
become an example to other East European states.97 Purges of former party and 
Stasi members, that is, lustrations of the public service, were sweeping and often 
unsettling, even though they granted individuals more rights to challenge the 
outcomes than most other post-socialist countries did.98 In all these measures of 
state-mandated transitional justice, the ideological role allocation was as clear as 
day. It was the Eastern part of the country that underwent transition in various forms 
in order to be made fit for reunification with the West. 
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A crucial aspect of East Germany’s transformation may not normally be 
considered to be a transitional justice tool in the strict sense. But the history of 
German re-unification cannot be told without mentioning the Treuhand. This public 
trust was charged with keeping the so-called volkseigenes Vermögen (public assets), 
most notably factories, companies, and stores. It was founded on 1 March 1990 and 
closed on 31 December 1994. Until today, the Treuhand remains a polarising topic 
among many East Germans, while it is widely unknown to most West Germans.99 
Most recent public debates in Germany about the Treuhand demonstrate that in East 
Germany, it is one of the most prominent aspects of German reunification. On the 
eve of potentially disrupting state elections in Thüringen, Sachsen, and 
Brandenburg in autumn 2019, some politicians have even demanded that the work 
of the Treuhand itself demands Aufarbeitung. 100  In his remarkable and 
comprehensive study on the Treuhand, Böick has convincingly described the trust 
as a ‘entrepreneurial revolutionary regime’ that ‘shaped a far-reaching market and 
social revolution’. 101 If we follow Böick’s argument that the Treuhand is a ‘bad 
bank’ in terms of ‘memory culture’,102 it will be important to take into account how 
debates about and experiences of the prosecution of former GDR officials might 
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have been affected by or intertwined with those experiences of privatisation, 
shutdown, and unemployment for which the Treuhand has become emblematic.103 
 
‘Coming to Terms’ with the Nazi Past 
As we will see, the process of transitional justice after the fall of the GDR cannot 
be understood without recourse to the process of transitional justice in West 
Germany after World War II. This endeavour, with its weak spots as well as its 
accomplishments, served as a comparison and, more importantly, as a source of 
legitimacy. 
In the case of post-war West Germany, immediate post-war policies of the allies, 
such as prosecuting regime elites, re-educating the citizenry, de-nazification and 
de-militarisation, were only the beginning of decades of societal attempts to 
‘master’ the Nazi past. The case of West Germany after 1945 has been described as 
a potential case of transitional justice avant la lettre.104 
Ever since the end of the war, the Allied Powers and West German authorities 
had to balance conflicting demands: enabling prosecution of suspected war 
criminals, distancing the new Germany from the Nazi period in a plausible way, 
and integrating millions of former Nazi partisans into the new society. Paving the 
way for scholarship in the 1990s, Norbert Frei argued that a relatively vast amnesty 
of former NSDAP party members and other collaborators of the Nazi regime and 
their subsequent integration into society and public service stabilised the young 
 
103 For criminal trials in cases of economic crimes during East Germany’s economic 
transformation, see Boers, Klaus / Nelles, Ursula / Theile, Hans (eds.): Wirtschaftskriminalität und 
die Privatisierung der DDR-Betriebe, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2010. 
104 Weinke, Annette: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland – ein Fall von Transitional Justice avant la 
lottre?, in: Mihr, Anja / Pickel, Gert / Pickel, Susanne (eds.), ‘Handbuch Transitional Justice. 
Aufarbeitung von Unrecht – hin zur Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie, Wiesbaden, Springer 






Federal Republic significantly in 1949 and the early 1950s.105 In his study, he set 
out to examine political and judicial ways of ‘amnesty, integration and 
demarcation’106 for which he coined the term Vergangenheitspolitik (politics of the 
past). These were legislative measures which enabled the rehabilitation and 
amnesty of millions of Germans; political debates about war criminals, and judicial 
attempts to demarcate the new body politic from remainders of Nazi ideology.  
These measures were, of course, preceded by the allied policy of de-nazification, 
as well as by the international Nuremberg trials where alleged German war 
criminals were prosecuted.107 After those leaders of the Nazi state, the NSDAP and 
the Wehrmacht who had survived the war had been convicted – and often executed 
– in Nuremberg, the West German authorities were rather reluctant to go after those 
who had participated in the mass murder of the European Jews and other victims. 
It was not until the late 1950s that a wave of trials against former SS men started:  
the Ulmer Einsatzgruppenprozess (1958), the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials (1963-65) 
and the Majdanek trials (1975-81). Despite the huge public attention to these trials 
– and the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem – the judgements were very modest and, in 
the eyes of many contemporary witnesses as well as in hindsight, disappointing. 
Until a few years ago, the German judiciary insisted on proof of individual 
involvement in acts of killing as a basis for the conviction of assistance to 
manslaughter. This jurisprudence has since been overruled. Recently, former KZ 
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guards have been convicted solely for being part of the system which ran the 
extermination camps.108 
Scholars have shed doubt on the notion that post-war West Germany really was 
such a convincing forerunner of international humanitarianism. After 1949, when 
the Federal Republic (and the GDR) was established, trials against former Nazi 
perpetrators were based solely on German domestic criminal law, not on the 
international foundations of the Nuremberg trials. This has been interpreted as a 
rejection of the universal concepts of the Western allies, and as an attempt to 
rehabilitate the idea of the German Rechtsstaat.109  
These ‘politics of the past’ were accompanied by other transitional justice 
measures taken by West German authorities after 1945. On the international plane, 
the Adenauer government was keen on seeking reconciliation with the Western 
powers, especially France, and on establishing a relationship with Israel which 
included compensation agreements, the so-called Wiedergutmachung.110 On the 
domestic plane, the Federal and Bavarian governments agreed to establish and co-
fund the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, originally called the Deutsches Institut für 
Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, a key institution in academic attempts to 
‘come to terms with the past’. Another step was the establishment of the Central 
Office of the State Justice Administrations for the Investigation of National 
Socialist Crimes (abbreviated as Central Office / Zentrale Stelle) in 1958 in 
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Ludwigsburg – this office was designed to concentrate criminal investigations 
against those who had participated in Nazi crimes.111  
A mirror institution was established in 1961 after the Berlin Wall had been 
constructed and the Inner German border had become hermetically sealed. The 
‘Central Registration Office of State Judicial Administrations’ (Central 
Registration Office, Zentrale Erfassungsstelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen; ZESt) 
in Salzgitter had the task of documenting all potential crimes committed by GDR 
officials for future criminal prosecution (see chapter 1). The establishment of the 
ZESt alongside the Central Office was, self-evidently, motivated by the 
contemporary concept of totalitarianism and an implicit (moral) equation of Nazism 
and Fascism with Socialism. The establishment of the ZESt, therefore, has to be 
understood as a reaffirmation of claims to the political legitimacy of the Federal 
Republic in contrast to the – in the Western view – totalitarian and illegitimate 
GDR. The latter not only accounted for crimes allegedly comparable to Nazi 
atrocities, but would also be bound to perish at some point in the future when 
criminal prosecution became both necessary and possible. Putting Nazi Germany 
aside, and equating the other part of Germany with Fascism, either actually or 
morally, became central features of both German states’ claims for legitimacy and 
their quests for identity. 112  The ZESt became an important constitutional and 
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procedural precursor to the path of post-socialist transitional justice eventually 
taken after the end of the GDR. It also demonstrates how closely post-1945 
transitional justice measures were linked with political and normative demarcations 
towards the GDR. 
The process of coming to terms with the Nazi past, of course, went beyond 
political and legal steps, and continues to do so to date. Debate and examination of 
the past, that is, of complicity, of seeking justice and truth, and of the consequences 
to be drawn from this have been at the centre of social and cultural negotiations of 
identity in West Germany ever since 1945, despite the omnipresent absence – or as 
Hermann Lübbe put it, ‘kommunikatives Beschweigen’ (‘communicative silence’) 
–  of the Holocaust in the public life of the early Federal Republic.113 The Holocaust 
was by no means the central topic of debates in the early years. In the perception of 
many Germans, the almost total annihilation of European Jewry, amounting to 
about six million victims, was seen as merely one of the many catastrophes of the 
Second World War II with its fifty-five million deaths. After Germany had been 
defeated and the instruments of unconditional surrender had been signed on 7 May 
and 9 May 1945 respectively, a feeling of defeat and victimhood was widespread. 
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The total war that the Third Reich had brought to Europe had returned, and had 
made almost every German family a victim of the war. Aerial bombardment, 
occupation, expulsion, and escape had led to destruction and material hardship, and 
people’s minds were occupied by experiences of internment and the humiliation of 
defeat.114 In the months and years to come, at least 800,000 women and an unknown 
number of men were to become victims of rape, sexual assault, and torture by Allied 
troops in all four zones of Germany – a fact that was suppressed by the German 
public in the period immediately following, but which later became a prevalent 
theme in relativistic narratives.115 In the years to come, it remained difficult for the 
German public to acknowledge, in Eugen Kogon’s words, that ‘defeat and freedom 
form a unity’.116 It was only after forty years, in 1985, that 8 May was publicly 
declared a day of liberation rather than a day of defeat.117 Still in the 1960s, Rolf 
Hochhuth could spark a fierce and unprecedented public debate with his play Der 
Stellverteter on the complicity of Pope Pius XII. As for the academic discipline of 
history, it was telling that the huge success of the TV series ‘Holocaust' in 1979 was 
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considered a ‘black day for historical scholarship’. 118  ‘Holocaust’ marked the 
beginning of a new trend in public negotiations of the war, as it triggered a shift in 
attention away from the perpetrators and onto the victims of the German genocide, 
even though the seminal shift in opinion that has often been ascribed to the series 
must be questioned with regard to private and family memory.119 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and German reunification in 1990, 
debates about the genocide of European Jews and other victim groups have retained 
their central character in German collective memory. Even though debates about 
history and national identity have been persistent since 1945 and ‘have at times 
reached almost obsessive proportions’,120 the search for national identity and the 
struggle to incorporate the contested German past into constructive narratives 
remains a contested issue to date. Since the late 1990s, German victimhood during 
and after the war has especially gained increased intention, both in scholarship and 
in popular culture.121 
My study will contribute to this debate by exploring how the West German 
history of mastering the past informed the transition from socialism to liberal 
democracy and capitalism in East Germany. By studying the work and the public 
perception of the ZESt, we can gain insight into how this institution’s role 
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foreshadowed the path of transitional justice chosen after 1989/1990.122 By looking 
at debates about the ZESt, we can learn how political actors and public servants 
have constructed their views on German reunification against the backdrop of West 
German ways of mastering the Nazi past. Exploring political debates about 
prosecution, amnesty, and lapse of time after 1990 can show us how politicians, 
activists, and the media have related the post-1989 transition to the legacy of the 
Third Reich in both German states. In short: my study will show how discourses 
and strategies of mastering the Nazi past in West Germany shaped transitional 
justice after 1989/90. Thus, negotiations of collective memory and national identity 
with regard to Nazi Germany will be related to those discourses on, and practices 
of, transitional justice which shaped contemporary Germany after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. 
 
History of Re-United Germany 
In the long run, re-unification changed and challenged all aspects of German 
society. But the transformation was experienced sooner and more fiercely in the 
East. The Constitution and laws changed; newspapers, money and brands 
disappeared, and not a single stone was left unturned in the transformation of the 
economy, which left hundreds of thousands unemployed or thrown into new 
professions. 123  Finding a new point of orientation for a forward-looking and 
inclusive narrative of a cohesive national identity, therefore, became an urgent 
matter in the spheres of politics, culture and society. Many works have framed their 
findings as a conflict between top-down public or state-mandated memory and the 
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bottom-up collective memory of the wider public. 124  In fact, state-mandated 
memory has left no doubt as to the moral qualities of both German states. As argued 
above, all measures of state-mandated memory or transitional justice – be they 
criminal proceedings, the establishment of memorials,125 the Bundestag inquiry 
commissions, or the Gauck authority – have relied on the clear normative 
proposition that the GDR and its regime were reprehensible. 
This has also been reflected in the development of central commemorative 
celebrations of re-unification anniversaries. Initially, these were held quite soberly 
on 3 October. Ever since, however, both ceremonial acts as well as public 
broadcasting have grown increasingly festive. 126  Despite commemorative 
ambiguity, 9 November has effectively become a second, if unofficial, 
commemoration day. Over the years, the anniversary celebrations have become 
bigger and bigger. An ostentatious celebration on the twentieth anniversary of the 
fall of the Wall featured state leaders from the UK, USA, France, and Russia, with 
the entertainer Thomas Gottschalk as presenter.127 9 November 1989 has not come 
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to overshadow the Shoah as a core element of German public memory. It may, 
however, be seen as ‘eine Art stellvertretende Rehabilitierung aller Deutschen’.128 
Apart, perhaps, from the Wirtschaftswunder, with the ‘peaceful revolution’ of 1989, 
it is the first time since World War II that a positive story has been canonised in 
(West) German public memory. 
This raises the question of how effective such uplifting celebrations may have 
been in addressing the country’s challenge of finding some degree of national 
cohesion. 129 As far as this is comprehensible in empirical data, we know that 
political and citizen apathy is a much bigger problem in the former East than in the 
West: Church and party affiliations are lower, civil society is weaker, and the 
potential for political radicalisation is higher. It is only in the days of PEGIDA and 
the ‘refugee crisis’ that it becomes clear how fragile civic cohesion is in large parts 
of the former GDR.130 In the words of a press officer from Klaus Pohl’s play 
Wartesaal Deutschland Simmenreich (1995): 
‘One has to ask whether it’s really right that we’ve basically taken a different system 
and forced it on these people. I don’t know how the “Wessis” would have reacted, 
whether they would have been able to show as much, let’s call it endurance, as some 
of the “Ossis” have had to have. It’s as if the Japanese had invaded West Germany 
and announced, from tomorrow you are under Japanese law, everything you have been 
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doing up until now is irrelevant, whether it’s traffic regulations or tax law, even the 
constitution, forget it!’131 
 Phenomena like Ostalgie, a made-up word from Ost (East) and Nostalgie 
(nostalgia), the popularity of former GDR brands, or narratives about greater 
solidarity in the former GDR suggest that joyful perceptions of German 
reunification do not catch the whole picture.132  Likewise, it is important to take 
linguistic concepts like the buzzword Wende into account, through which images 
and narratives are negotiated and established.133 Recent studies confirm that the 
magnitude of political, societal, and economic transformation which East Germans 
experienced can hardly be overestimated:134 gender roles were challenged on both 
sides of the former border, 135  and the scale of uncertainty felt by many East 
Germans can only be gauged, for instance by looking at the steep fall in divorce 
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rates in East Germany after 1990, as a current PhD project does. 136  These 
transformative processes lay at the heart of the country’s quest for identity in the 
1990s.137 
* * * 
This dissertation contributes to the history of re-united Germany by providing 
an in-depth case study of the legal repercussions of conflicting claims of legitimacy 
and criminality between East and West Germany during the Cold War and beyond. 
Drawing on the theoretical premises of transitional justice research, it aims to fill a 
gap in the way how historians have hitherto studied the process of post-socialist 
Vergangenheitspolitik by providing a case study of the border guard trials as a 
measure of transitional justice, and by situating them in the longer history of 
German efforts of 'coming to terms' with Nazi atrocities.    
Structure 
Based on primary sources from state and federal governments, chapter 1 will 
examine the pre-history of the 'border guard cases' by historicising political debates 
in Cold War West Germany about the criminal nature of border-related killings. 
The conceptual novelty of this section lies in the demonstration of how these 
debates and institutional continuities have shaped transitional justice practices in 
re-united Germany. Chapter 2 will provide the first in-depth analysis of 
parliamentary proceedings and debates on criminal trials as a transitional justice 
measure. Chapter 3 will explore popular demands regarding criminal trials in the 
late GDR by taking a look at correspondence between GDR citizens and the 
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judiciary. Moreover, this chapter will depict judicial practice between November 
1989 and October 1990, based on secondary literature. Chapter 4 surveys the 
judicial practice of post-socialist criminal trials between 1991 and 2005, and 
provides a detailed case study of trials against former border guards and their 
military and political superiors. It analyses how the courts attempted to counter the 
contradictions between political expectations and procedural requirements. Finally, 
chapter 5 explores how the public has reacted to the trials, and whether they have 
been successful as a means of transitional justice. This chapter is based on a mix of 







1. Setting the Frame: Law, Politics, and the 
power of historical continuities, 1961-1989 
Stabsgefreiter Fritz Hanke was renowned as an adept rifleman. On 5 June 1962, 
he received the order to fire on a Grenzverletzer, a man trying to breach the Inner-
German border near Schierke in the Harz mountains. The sergeant who ordered 
Hanke to fire had already missed the fugitive several times, as had another sergeant 
– even though they stood significantly closer to the target than Hanke. Hanke aimed 
at the target’s torso – and hit nineteen-year-old Peter Reisch’s head. Reisch died 
five weeks later in a hospital in Magdeburg. Hanke subsequently fled the GDR, but 
was later identified by West German authorities. He was charged with, and 
convicted of, manslaughter (Minder schwerer Fall des Totschlags) and was 
sentenced to fifteen months in prison by Stuttgart's regional court (Landgericht, LG) 
in October 1963 (see infra). This case became a precedent – both judicially and 
conceptually – for West Germany’s view of killings at the Inner-German border.138 
This chapter examines how, during the Cold War, the paradigm that GDR 
government acts could be seen as criminal was established in West Germany and 
how politicians, courts, and academics have negotiated questions of legality and 
legitimacy of criminal trials against GDR officials, and how these debates and 
practices have set the frame for criminal trials as a measure of  transitional justice 
after the fall of Socialism in 1989/90. 
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The 1960s mark the peak of the first phase of major Nazi trials in West Germany. 
In the wake of not only the Ulmer Einsatzgruppenprozess in 1958 and the first 
Auschwitz trial in 1963-65, but also the widely-publicised Eichmann trial in 
Jerusalem, the period of re-integration and assimilation of former Nazi officials and 
perpetrators had come to an end–at least to a certain extent.139 In the mid to late 
1940s, criminal trials against former Nazis had arguably been a case of foreign law: 
the Nuremberg trials were conducted based on norms of Public International Law 
which had not existed until those very trials. Likewise, the Denazification trials 
were considered equally intrusive into German society. Since the late 1950s, 
however, criminal trials had become an integral means of confronting the Nazi past 
in West Germany. Assigning not only symbolic, but also personal, responsibility 
for grave crimes became an important strategy of 'mastering' the Nazi past.140 
At the same time, all facets of the German question were subjected to a major 
political re-alignment; a broad consensus emerged in the early 1960s after the SPD 
addressed these issues. In the early 1950s, and especially after the Stalin Note of 
March 1952,141 the SPD rejected Adenauer’s policies of re-gaining sovereignty by 
establishing firm ties to the Western powers. Social Democrats believed that 
Westbindung sacrificed German unity, and hence rejected the Paris Treaty of 1954 
that sought to establish the European Defence Community (EDC). They also 
rejected the General Treaty of 1952 which established West Germany’s – albeit 
limited – sovereignty.  In 1959, however, the party approved new fundamental 
policy statements (Grundsatzprogramm). This Godesberger Programm marked the 
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culmination of a gradual re-formulation of Social Democratic political values as 
well as concrete policy ideas. This programme became a turning point in the party’s 
self-identity and  its role in West German politics. The central revolution on matters 
of foreign policy was formulated by Herbert Wehner on 30 June 1960 in a famous 
Bundestag speech. Herbert Wehner, then deputy chairman of the SPD as well as 
influential chairman of the parliament’s committee on Gesamtdeutsche und 
Berliner Fragen and head of the SPD’s committee for foreign policy and 
Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, conceded that the Social Democrats would henceforth 
tolerate Adenauer’s policy of Westbindung while continuing to fight for German 
unity.142 For almost ten years – until Willy Brandt took office as Federal Chancellor 
in 1969 – all major parliamentary forces in West German politics supported 
Adenauer’s course of establishing firm ties to the Western powers while 
maintaining the long-term goal of German unity, as well as claims of 
Alleinvertretung. 
 
In this decade, which also witnessed the equation of Socialism and Nazism in 
the term totalitarianism,143 the criminal law was a key concept in West Germany 
for framing and reacting to GDR government act which violated common-sense 
perceptions of justice.  This consensus was first expressed in autumn 1961, when 
the Zentrale Erfassungsstelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen was established in 
Salzgitter. Its tasks touched upon questions of legality, legitimacy and diplomacy; 
hence, it is unsurprising that this institution would soon become contested. 
However, in the autumn of 1961, after the first dead had to be mourned at the Berlin 
Wall, there was broad consensus in establishing the office. 
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Erik Blumenfeld, leader of Hamburg’s CDU parliamentary group, was the first 
to mention a special prosecutor’s office for GDR government crimes in early 
September 1961. He proposed to assign this task to the Zentrale Stelle der 
Landesjustizverwaltungen in Ludwigsburg, an office originally designed to support 
and facilitate investigations against former Nazi perpetrators. 144  West-Berlin’s 
mayor Willy Brandt (SPD), picked this idea up. On 5 September 1961, he sent a 
telegram to West Germany’s other Ministerpräsidenten, suggesting the 
establishment of an office that aimed at providing ‘the organisational basis for a 
uniform West German prosecution ‘…der Untaten der Gewalthaber der SED (…)’, 
possibly, and for the time being, only in order to secure evidence.145 This referred 
to those ‘organs and agents of the Pankow regime (the GDR government, PE) who 
had committed crimes (sic!) in relation to the most recent violent acts’.146  Its 
purpose was to clearly demonstrate that all deeds were recorded and brought to 
justice. Notably, Brandt used the term ‚crimes’ in an every-day manner, arguably 
communicating an ideological framing, but also uncritically implying that border-
related violent acts had – or could – be seen as ‘criminal’ under West German law. 
Brandt also followed Blumenfeld’s proposal in suggesting  that this task be assigned 
to the Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen in Ludwigsburg. Brandt posited 
a remarkable equalisation of the GDR regime with Shoah, euthanasia, and other 
Nazi crimes. In his words, he identified a ‘nahezu völlig[e] Identität der jetzt vom 
SED-Regime in der Zone und in Ostberlin angewandten Methoden mit denen des 
Nationalsozialismus’147, which is surprising given his later policy of détente. 
From 25-27 October 1961, the West German Ministers of Justice (Länder and 
federal level) convened at the Justizministerkonferenz (conference of Ministers of 
Justice) in Wiesbaden where they discussed, among other things, Brandt’s proposal 
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and the details of such an authority. Baden-Württembergs Justice Minister, 
Wolfgang Haußmann (FDP), suggested assigning the task to a Generalstaatsanwalt 
or Oberstaatsanwalt in Niedersachsen. Hessen’s Ministerpräsident and Justice 
Minister, Georg-August Zinn (SPD), emphasised the important psychological role 
of the office, and West-Berlin’s justice senator additionally hoped that a visible 
central authority would deter ‘many’ Volkspolizisten from committing violent acts, 
out of fear of prosecution in the West. Federal Minister of Justice Fritz Schäffer 
(CDU) made what appeared at the time to be a theoretical point: the acts in question 
constituted crimes in a legal sense (Offizialdelikte) – as opposed to less severe forms 
of breaching the law (e.g. Vergehen) – and would oblige public prosecutors to 
investigate. These remarks reflected a broad consensus on the question whether 
public prosecutors ought to keep a record of alleged GDR government crimes. 
Hence, eventually, the Justice Ministers voted unanimously in favour of an 
independent office, and requested Lower Saxony’s Justice Minister to establish 
such an office on their behalf.148 
In this light, and following the request of his colleagues, Lower Saxony’s Justice 
Minister, Arvid von Nottbeck (FDP), established the Zentrale Erfassungsstelle in 
Salzgitter on 15th November 1961.149 Its tasks were defined as ‘to record the acts 
of violence committed in connection with the political events of recent months in 
East Berlin and in the Soviet Zone and to ensure that they can be atoned for in due 
course'.150 This included collecting information and securing evidence for all such 
acts which did not fall into the jurisdiction of a local prosecutor’s office in the 
Federal Republic or in West-Berlin. 151  Paragraph 5 stated that, if a local 
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prosecutor’s competence could be identified – or would be established by the 
Federal Court of Justice (BGH) at a later point in time – the Office had to forward 
the documents to the competent office.  
The institutional set-up and work of the Central Registration Office 
When we study the office’s routine reports to Niedersachsen’s Minister of 
Justice, it becomes evident that the Central Registration Office was a foreign body, 
so to speak, in the Federal Republic’s legal system. Other than normal prosecutors, 
the institution’s work was impeded by a lack of evidence and witnesses – in most 
cases, witnesses, victims, and evidence remained on East German soil and could 
only be gathered and registered very slowly.152 Its legal competences were limited 
in that it could not bring charges;  it had to rely on local state prosecutors to do that. 
Thus, the ZESt's primary task was to collect and register pieces of evidence until 
arraignment could be justified. Then a case could be submitted to the 
Generalbundesanwalt with the request to assign a competent local prosecutor in 
accordance with § 13 a StPO. Another aspect rather alien to normal judicial 
proceedings was that the Landesjustizverwaltungen were asked to forward 
information on all relevant preliminary and court proceedings to the Central 
Registration Office so that the Office could get an overview on all activities in its 
field, even if a local jurisdiction had already been established in the Federal 
Republic. 153  When discussing how the Central Registration Office gained its 
information, the director argued that it worked less like a law enforcement agency 
and more like a ‘Nachrichtensammler’. Its sources were: reports of Berlin’s police 
superintendent; daily reports of the Grenznachrichtensammelstellen (Offices for 
collecting news on the border) in Niedersachsen, Schleswig-Holstein, Hessen and 
Bayern; the German border police (Bundesgrenzschutz, BGS); financial 
authorities; federal police authorities and secret services like the Federal Criminal 
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Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA), the Federal Office for the Protection of 
the Constitution (Bundesamt for Verfassungsschutz, BfV) and federal ministries; 
daily newspapers, and, lastly, clues from East German citizens.154 
The director also discussed the office’s effect and previous successes. Despite 
the lack of any previous convictions, he claimed it could be hoped that offensive 
PR work might deter border guards from further killings. In this diplomatic respect, 
the office’s role far exceeded that of a normal judicial office. It also aimed at 
collecting material like the Schießbefehl, as well as testimony regarding oral orders 
such as ‘ten dead at the Wall better than one fugitive in the West’.155 This, along 
with secret service information, could later help to identify Schreibtischtäter as the 
ones carrying out violent acts which were merely considered to be tools of their 
regime. Notably, he drew a parallel to contemporary trials against former Nazi 
perpetrators, arguing that the same insight guided these proceedings.156 
But the Central Registration Office was not only a foreign body in West 
Germany’s legal architecture. It was also perceived as something else: more than a 
mere technical judicial office. It was seen as a contact point for all sorts of 
testimonies and lamentations about the socialist regime in East Germany, exceeding 
the ZESt’s initially rather limited field of competence. In his first report, the office’s 
head discussed how numerous citizens reported unjust acts committed by GDR 
authorities which were seen as a ‘general expression of [the GDR’s] 
Unrechtsherrschaft.’157  This often included abuse of justice, physical abuse by 
police and Stasi officials, torture, and extortion. Although the desire for atonement 
was quite evident, the ZESt’s head deplored that the office had no competence to 
deal with the issues brought forward. This rather narrowly-defined field of 
competence was due to a specification of the authority’s sphere of competence 
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which had become necessary after its establishment. According to the institutional 
head’s first report, violent acts were being registered which aimed at sustaining and 
supporting the rulers’ measures against the free movement of persons.158 The only 
acts which were seen as violent for the purpose of the ZESt’s work were those 
committed by humans against humans. The more general political pressure coming 
from the regime had to be excluded. Hence, ‘violent acts’, as mentioned in the 
decree which established the office, were defined as ‘particularly brutal assaults of 
predominantly armed organs of the SBZ, committed in and around Berlin or at the 
Zonengrenze (Inner-German border), when these acts violate the basic right (sic!) 
of free movement.’159  
Statistics from the office’s work during the initial years of its activity reveal a 
significant discrepancy between proceedings initiated and cases that could be 
submitted to the Generalbundesanwalt and subsequently to an ordinary prosecutor. 
In 1962, 940 proceedings were launched, and only five were submitted for further 
investigation and possible arraignment.160  Evidently, the office’s work was not 
effective in the short run, as numerous proceedings generated only few outcomes. 
This made the trial against Fritz Hanke in Stuttgart in October 1963 all the more 
important, as it became the first, attention-grabbing trial against a former GDR 
border guard. For the first time, the Central Registration Office’s work would come 
to fruition. 
* * * 
Until the opening of the trial against Fritz Hanke, the work of the Central 
Registration Office had been predominantly symbolic. Legal, moral or political 
challenges to the claim of punishability of violent acts by GDR border guards – or 
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other GDR officials – had remained a secondary concern. The institution and its 
work had served West Germany’s political and societal need for ideological 
clarification and demarcation, and had answered a comprehensible demand for 
common-sense justice. In the Hanke case, however, Stuttgart's regional court had 
to find justifications for convicting Fritz Hanke under West German law, which 
proved a challenge. The criminal code and, more importantly, the Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz, GG), West Germany’s constitution, prohibit retroactive punishment 
(Art. 103 (2) GG; §1 StGB). This made it impossible to prosecute a person for a 
deed that had not been criminal at the time of the act. So the key question was: why 
would Hanke’s shooting have been criminal all the while? Both this question, and 
the defendant's response to it, turned out to resemble judicial challenges faced by 
contemporary criminal trials against former Nazi perpetrators. 
Not surprisingly, Hanke claimed that he had acted under orders. For the LG 
Stuttgart to be able to punish Hanke under West German law, justification had to 
be found for disregarding his command, which not only granted him permission to 
use his weapon, but obliged him to do so. In short, the court found three arguments 
in three different sources of law for justification of punishment: firstly, the 
prohibition against trespassing over the Inner-German border would violate the 
West German constitution and could consequently not be accepted; secondly, the 
prohibition would even conflict with the East German constitution; thirdly, it 
violated supra-positive human rights.161  
 
In the media, the Hanke case, and the role of the ZESt as the most visible 
embodiment of West Germany’s claim to moral and legal superiority over the GDR, 
had been received with broad approval. However, the changing international scene 
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led to both major political camps in West Germany slowly drifting apart over the 
German question. 
In previous years, the international system had been constantly fragile. The 
construction of the Berlin Wall, for instance, had marked the conclusion of 
continuous crises in the relationship between the West and the East, with the 
preliminary climax of a confrontation between American and Soviet tanks in 
October 1961.162 This development had even been surpassed in October 1962 with 
the Cuban crisis, when the United States and the USSR were on the brink of nuclear 
war. Against this backdrop, U.S. president John F. Kennedy increasingly sought 
détente with the Eastern powers.163 This also spilled over into German politics, and 
led to a gradual stratification in matters of Deutschlandpolitik. During the 1965 
Bundestag election campaign, for instance, SPD-front runner Willy Brandt 
suggested negotiating a peace treaty which included the USSR if he were elected 
chancellor.164 After his bid was unsuccessful, he became Foreign Minister in Kurt 
Georg Kiesinger’s (CDU) ’Grand Coalition’. In this role, Brandt sought a 
rapprochement with the Eastern powers in order to normalise relationships. Initially 
in secret, Brandt’s foreign policy increasingly made it clear to the public that the 
federal government – and, more importantly both major Volksparteien –
increasingly disagreed on the German question. For example, as early as 1968, 
Willy Brandt suggested that the Federal Republic should recognise the Oder-Neiße-
Grenze, thereby recognising the irrecoverable loss of the Eastern territories which 
were now part of Poland.165 
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 An Academic Debate 
With this political consensus eroding, it is little wonder that the verdict in the 
Hanke case, and the plausibility of those legal assumptions underpinning the 
judgement, were equally called into question within the legal academy. Initially, 
Gerald Grünwald, a law professor at Bonn University, opened the debate with fierce 
criticism of the court’s reasoning in the Hanke case in 1966. Grünwald 
endeveaoured to prove that border-related shootings and similar acts on East 
German soil could not be criminal under West German law. He contended that it 
was legally impossible under West German laws to prosecute either GDR officials 
who had issued the Schießbefehl, or border guards who acted on it. Following his 
article, a controversy arose in the legal academy as to whether or not the GDR 
government could be punishable under West German law. 
The legal debate centred on the four arguments that Stuttgart's regional court had 
relied on in its verdict on Hanke in order to establish its own competence: the 
positive law of the GDR; the question of the GDR’s sovereignty; the validity of 
West Germany’s basic law for East German officials, and the relationship between 
codified/written (positive) and unwritten natural (supra-positive) law. 
As for the violation of supra-positive human rights, the question was how such 
supra-positive rights could be ascertained. The court in Stuttgart had argued that the 
freedom to leave one’s country was part of the 'the inviolable foundation and core 
of the law as it lives in the legal consciousness of all civilised peoples'.166 Grünwald 
argued that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which indeed 
acknowledges a right to leave any country including one’s own (Art. 13 (2)), was 
merely an expression of political intentions and not legally binding. 167 
Consequently, the prohibition against leaving the GDR without a passport would 
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not violate supra-positive natural law. Walter Rosenthal was the head of the 
Untersuchungsausschuß freiheitlicher Juristen, an influential non-governmental 
organisation that had documented Soviet and GDR state crimes in East Germany 
since 1949, long before the ZESt was established.168 Rosenthal defended the court 
in assuming that the reference to Art. 13 (2) UDHR was the only evidence for the 
assumption that freedom to leave the country (Ausreisefreiheit ) indeed formed part 
of that ‘core area of the law’ (Kernbereicht des Rechts). There was no need for the 
Declaration to be a binding law with direct effect; violent acts at the border would 
violate supra-positive law, according to Rosenthal. 169  Another question was 
whether such a norm of supra-positive law could trump a legally-positive 
permission ('Erlaubnissatz'). For Grünwald, punishability could not be based on 
rules of natural law. The basic principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege 
(no crime, no punishment without a previous penal law) held that the criminal 
liability had to be established in statute. 'Whoever acts in accordance with positive 
statutory laws cannot be punished', was Grünwald’s conclusion.170 Rosenthal came 
to a different conclusion. In his rather legalistic argumentation, punishability was 
already a given in positive GDR law, which resembled the relevant paragraphs in 
the Federal Republic. For him, the contested point was whether a positive 
Erlaubnissatz could be valid if it violated supra-positive law. Thus, the prohibition 
of retroactive punishment – both a basic legal principle and as a constitutional 
provision in West German law – would not even apply in this case.171 
Seeking an additional layer of legitimacy, the LG Stuttgart had argued in the 
Hanke case that the prohibition to trespass the Inner-German border would even 
violate the GDR constitution. The court referred to Article 8 of the GDR 
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constitution, which held that everyone had the right to settle in any place. According 
to the GDR constitution, such a basic right could only be limited by a law and could 
not infringe upon the core of the right itself. The contested point, of course, was 
whether the prohibition to leave the country violated the right itself. The court and 
Grünwald disagreed on this issue, and Grünwald argued that it was not the court’s 
place to decide on the constitutionality of GDR laws and orders – nor was it 
appropriate to prosecute officials who act on a rule that might violate the 
constitution.172 Grünwald remained the only author studying East German law with 
this level of scrutiny, as most other authors were perhaps still – or already – very 
much influenced by the assumption that GDR powers and laws were illegal and 
illegitimate. 
As for the question of whether the Basic Law demanded punishment, it was 
crucial to define how West and East Germany would relate to each other legally. 
The central question was whether East Germany could be seen as Inland or not. To 
legally communicate between different legal systems, two legal doctrines could be 
applied: either international criminal law or unwritten inter-local law (interlokales 
Recht). The former regulates how courts deal with perpetrators of a crime 
committed on foreign soil; the latter defines how this can be done in a unitary state 
with regionally differing criminal laws. In both cases, the law of the crime scene 
plays a central role in ascertaining punishability, as well as any penalties. The 
question, then, was which aspects of GDR law could be disregarded under the Basic 
Law, and how. Not doing so would have had the perverse consequence of West 
German courts sentencing East Germans for Republikflucht – an obviously 
undesirable and unimaginable scenario.173 In international criminal law, the legal 
principle of ordre public constitutes a legal safeguard against such absurd 
outcomes. In effect, it means that, for a deed committed in country A to be 
punishable in country B, the act had to be criminal in both countries. Otherwise, 
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county B’s ordre public would protect the accused from unjust laws if they violated 
the country’s fundamental legal values. Now, while this was uncontested in 
international criminal law, it was not so clear in inter-local criminal law, which 
hitherto had been the basis for cases where East Germans were accused in West 
German courts.   
Now, the point in question was whether the Basic Law’s fundamental principles, 
the  West German ordre public, could intervene only in order to protect a 
perpetrator – as with the case of Republikflucht, where East German law would be 
suspended – or whether it could also intervene at the expense of a culprit, that is, 
make a deed punishable that would not be criminal under East German law. While 
Grünwald denied this, Rosenthal was positive that the ordre public could justify 
charging a GDR official as well.174 Moreover, Rosenthal and Niewerth believed 
that the ordre public would not only correct statutory offenses, but also statutory 
permissions ['Erlaubnissätze']. Thus, if a permission under GDR law had to be 
disregarded under West German law, a culprit would be punishable under both 
German laws, as his permission in East Germany would be inapplicable.175 
A final question was put forward by Hans Hermann Dichgans, a Christian-
Democrat politician and member of Bundestag. In essence, he came to the same 
conclusion that Grünwald had reached earlier:  GDR regime actions could not be 
criminal under West German law. However, he derived this from his argument that 
any laws and any political or actual power in the GDR still derived from the USSR 
as the occupying power, and would therefore be exempt from West German 
jurisdiction.176 
The relevance of this debate was that it not only called into question the legality 
and legitimacy of the verdict against Fritz Hanke, but also, and perhaps more 
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importantly, challenged the role of the ZESt. More broadly, this debate marks a 
point at which the normative ideological concept of the unlawfulness and 
illegitimacy of the GDR became contested in the legal sphere, as well as the point 
at which West Germany’s legal profession started to accommodate itself to the idea 
of a more permanent German division. 
* * * 
This contestation soon spilled over into the political sphere, where it became all 
the more relevant. In April 1967, Peter Schulz (SPD), Hamburg's Minister of 
Justice, asked the state secretary in the Federal Ministry of  Justice, Horst Ehmke 
(SPD), how the effects of the ZESt on Inner-German relations could be assessed, 
and whether the office would have any deterrent effect on GDR border guards and 
other officials.177 Ehmke affirmed the necessity of assessing the work of the ZESt, 
and forwarded the question to the Federal Minister for Questions concerning 
Germany (gesamtdeutsche Fragen) (BMG), Herbert Wehner (SPD).178  In May 
1967, Niedersachsen’s Justice Minister, Gustav Bosselmann (CDU), urged the 
Federal Minister of Justice, Gustav Heinemann (SPD), to make a statement 
regarding the legality of the Central Registration Office, as this had recently been 
questioned in public after the publications of Grünwald’s and Dichgans’ articles.179 
In a letter dated 24 July 1967, Federal Minister for gesamdeutsche Fragen, 
Herbert Wehner (SPD) asked the Federal Ministers of Defence and of the Interior 
to comment on the question of whether the Central Registration Office should be 
dissolved. The answer to this question, Wehner continued, would also depend on 
legal questions regarding the culpability of the use of firearms by ‘mitteldeutsche 
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Grenzposten an der Demarkationslinie’. Wehner added that he believed that 
arguments against the office’s closure were currently more convincing.180 
In order to enable an informed and serious debate, the Federal Ministry of Justice 
produced a twenty-nine page memorandum which discussed the different legal 
arguments surrounding the key question of the culpability of border-related 
shootings on East German soil before West German courts. This text discussed the 
concurring arguments presented by the aforementioned legal scholars in academic 
journals over the past months, and the jurisprudence of German courts in relevant 
cases. This paper reflected a surprisingly high degree of respect for – or at least 
implicit acceptance of – the GDR’s laws and constitution, which stands in sharp 
contrast to the ideological demarcation still sought by West German politicians in 
the 1960s, in some cases up until 1989. In some sense, this already foreshadowed 
Willy Brandt’s Neue Ostpolitik and the general period of détente of the 1970s, even 
though the Staatssekretär was still disposed to insert inverted commas every time 
the GDR was named as DDR. This paper was presented to the Federal and Länder 
Ministers of Justice and some other federal ministries, and provided the basis for a 
meeting in August 1968.181 
On 20 August 1968, civil servants of the Federal Ministry of Justice met the 
ZESt's head and representatives of West German Landesjustizverwaltungen. In their 
meeting, they discussed legal questions concerning the still-contested punishability 
of the killings at the Inner-German border.182 According to the minutes, the meeting 
was mostly characterised by consensus. The participants were astonishingly 
concerned with taking East German law seriously, given the still contested 
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statehood of the ‘SBZ’. They agreed that not all means of control and coercion 
which were used in order to enforce the prohibition against leaving the GDR could 
be seen as standing in conflict with supra-positive law. This included warning 
shouts, warning shots, arrests, and bodily harm. They did, however, agree that 
intentional homicides violated 'the core area of the law'.183 Likewise, it was agreed 
that the prohibition against leaving the GDR ('Republikflucht' in the language of the 
GDR) was in accordance with the GDR's new constitution of 1968. Thus, a judge 
who convicted a GDR citizen of 'Republikflucht' and passed down a non-excessive 
sentence would not be perverting justice.184 In essence, the meeting agreed that the 
scope of competences of the Central Registration Office was to be limited. This 
referred to an extension of tasks that had happened in 1963, when violent acts 
committed in the GDR were also especially included in the ZESt’s lists of tasks.185 
Consequently, Niedersachsen’s Justice Minister, Gustav Bosselmann (CDU), 
restricted the scope of the ZESt’s remit. Henceforth, only the following cases of 
‘violent acts’ were to be recorded by the Central Registration Office and deemed 
punishable under West German law:186 killings at the border, and killings with the 
aim of enforcing the regime's aims, if they violated human dignity; 'terror 
judgements'187  were also included, understood as verdicts which handed down 
excessive punishments which allegedly conflicted with basic principles of humanity 
(Menschlichkeit). Also, abuses during preliminary investigations, as well as during 
arrest, were still monitored, if they ‘can be recognised  as an expression of the 
politically violent system of the SBZ’.188 Lastly, acts which justified suspicions of 
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genocide (§ 220a StGB), displacement (§ 234a StGB) or political harassment (§241 
StGB) were also included.189 
 
The legal debate sparked by Grünwald, and the ensuing administrative 
discussions, were yet another turning point in West German conceptions of how to 
relate legally to violent acts committed by GDR authorities. On the one hand, this 
discussion took place between public servants – not between politicians. 
Apparently, the issue was still deemed a rather technical and uncontested question. 
Moreover, the debate was largely defined by consensus. In this sense, the debate 
concerning the future of the Central Registration Office, and, more broadly, about 
how the Federal Republic would view and position itself in relation to abusive acts 
by the GDR, and whether criminal prosecution was legal and legitimate, did not 
appear to be a matter of politics. On the other hand, however, this technical debate 
also marks the first time that the paradigm of punishability was called into question 
in the political-administrative sphere, albeit only by a minority at this stage. Over 
the next two decades, however, Deutschlandpolitik in general, and views on 
punishability and the Central Registration Office in particular, became subject to an 
ever-widening divide along party lines. 
Neue Ostpolitik and the Politicisation of the ZESt in the 1980s 
Enthusiasm or brusque outrage, respectively, had fuelled West Germany’s 
political culture since Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel had initiated the Neue 
Ostpolitik in 1969. The country experienced a period of polarisation and 
politicization, and hundreds of thousands of people joined political parties. This 
was sparked by the new government’s Neue Ostpolitik, a careful redefinition of 
West Germany’s attitudes towards the German question with respect to the 
Ostgebiete in post-1945 Poland, as well as its diplomatic relations with countries in 
 






the Warsaw Pact. A series of treaties established diplomatic relations, launched 
several forms of cooperation and, all in all, sought to establish a sense of security 
and trust in the relationship between East European states and the Federal 
Republic.190 A series of treaties was signed towards this end, with the USSR (1970), 
Poland (1970), and the CSSR (1973), as well as a series of treaties between the FRG 
and the GDR, aimed at relaxing Inner-German relations and enabling easier contact 
between families on both sides of the border.191 
This Neue Ostpolitik carried the Social-liberal government of SPD and FDP to a 
sweeping victory in the Bundestag elections of 1972. In 1974, Willy Brandt 
resigned his chancellorship unnecessarily after an East-German spy was detected 
working in his personal office. Helmut Schmidt (SPD), who took over the 
chancellery, struggled both to gain as much popularity as Brandt, and to maintain 
public support for his policies. The 1973 oil crisis and the subsequent termination 
of the Bretton-Woods-System had brought the trente glorieuses to an end; it had 
been a period of unprecedented stability and economic growth, and Western Europe 
had witnessed an increase in wealth. The following period of stagflation – a 
stagnation of economic growth with simultaneous inflation of prices – made it 
increasingly difficult to meet societal conflicts with an increase in public 
expenditure.192 
On the international plane, a series of events led to an aggravation of the bloc 
confrontation since the late 1970s. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 
December 1979 fostered the fear that the USSR would aggressively seek to 
 
190 For international views and responses to Neue Ostpolitik, see Fink, Carole/Schaefer, Bernd 
(eds.): Ostpolitik, 1969-1974. European and Global Responses, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press 2009.  
191 Conze, Sicherheit, 425-53; Wolfrum, Demokratie, 283-314. 
192 ibid. For an in-depth study of social and economic transformations in the late 20th century, see 
Doering-Manteuffel, A. and L. Raphael (2008). Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf die 
Zeitgeschichte seit 1970. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. More recently, see Doering-
Manteuffel, A., L. Raphael and T. Schlemmer, Eds. (2016). Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart. 






maintain and extend its mode of rule. Just a few weeks earlier, the NATO states had 
taken a massive step in order to keep up with increasing numbers of Soviet 
intermediate-range missiles. The NATO Double-Track decision of 12 December 
1979193 threatened the Eastern bloc with the deployment of more middle-range 
nuclear weapons in Western Europe if the Warsaw pact declined mutual nuclear 
arms control. Lastly, the growing opposition movement of Solidarity in Poland 
alarmed East German leaders, hinting at the possibility of an uprising in the GDR.  
All these developments entailed a deterioration of the international climate and 
further complicated the policies of détente. The Inner-German Entspannung had 
already lost its verve since the mid-1970s, and the Schmidt government’s push for 
the NATO Double-Track decision led to an insurmountable polarisation within the 
SPD. Parts of the party, including the party’s youth organisation Jusos, intended to 
maintain détente even in the altered international climate, while other parts of the 
party supported Schmidt’s push for a nuclear balance in Europe.194 
In the GDR, the Honecker government sought to stabilise its own reign by 
halting further personal and cultural exchange between West and East. To this end, 
the minimum amount of change (Mindestumtausch) to be obtained by Western 
visitors to the GDR was doubled in order to reduce the number of day tourists, 
especially those from West-Berlin. Moreover, in a speech made on 13 October 1980 
in Gera, Honecker set four demands to be met by the Federal Republic as a 
necessary precondition for any further steps of cooperation and relaxation in Inner-
German relations. The GDR government justified these measures with the NATO 
double track decision, but they rather served the hope of preventing the rise of an 
opposition movement similar to the Polish Solidarity movement.195 
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In his speech, Honecker had demanded that West Germany fully recognise and 
respect East German citizenship by halting its policy of giving out West German 
passports to East German refugees; moreover, he demanded that the Ständige 
Vertretungen (permanent representations/missions) be upgraded to full embassies. 
Thirdly, the border should be determined in the middle of the river Elbe, a claim 
that remained contested between Bonn and Ost-Berlin. Finally, he demanded that 
the ZESt be closed. In essence, the Gera demands came down to the expectation of 
a full recognition of the GDR under public international law. This would have 
transformed the unique Inner-German relations into ordinary international 
relations. 
In Bonn, the Gera demands were met with reservation. Helmut Kohl (CDU), 
who in 1980 was still leader of the opposition, made it clear that these demands 
could not be the basis of Inner-German relations. Helmut Schmidt, forced to a more 
pragmatic approach by his office as chancellor, discussed the Gera demands with 
Erich Honecker during his visit to the GDR from 11-13 December 1981. In the joint 
communiqué, Bonn and East-Berlin acknowledged that they had not been able to 
reach a consensus on fundamental questions, including those brought up by the 
Gera demands. However, these disputes would not be a precondition for further 
developments in Inner-German relations. Within 14 months, the Gera demands had 
already become a toothless tiger.196 
After the Liberal Democrats had changed sides and had elected Helmut Kohl 
(CDU) chancellor to oust Helmut Schmidt, the Kohl government maintained the 
social-liberal governments’ policy of relaxation with the East by securing what had 
been achieved – just as Schmidt had done since the decline in international detente 
since 1979.197 This was certainly encouraged by the personal continuity of Hans-
Dietrich Genscher as Foreign Minister. What changed in Bonn was the rhetoric 
 
196 ibid. For the original text, see 'Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik', ed. by Michael Hollmann, 
Series 6, Vol. 6: 1 January 1979-31 December 1980, München: Oldenbourg 2015, pp. 796-800. 






towards the Honecker regime, as legal positions now became more strongly 
emphasised, but the underlying principles remained unchanged.198 This attitude has 
been described as 'operational continuity but declaratory change'.199 
For the SPD, however, securing the status quo was not enough – and even in 
this, the Kohl government was not to be trusted. Enfeebled by the internal dispute 
over the deployment of nuclear weapons and weakened further by the secession of 
sections of the party’s left to the new Green party, the Social Democrats made a 
turn to the left in the years after 1982 with regard to their position on matters of 
Inner-German relations. The party continued to engage in personal exchange with 
the Honecker government and was often criticised for establishing a 
Nebenaußenpolitik, a separate foreign policy independent from West Germany’s 
government. In doing so, the SPD has been criticised for overemphasising its desire 
to establish good relations with the Honecker government, rather than seeking close 
ties with GDR opposition circles. It remains an open question as to what extent this 
policy may have ideologically stabilised the GDR regime during the 1980s.200 
Talks between the SPD and SED continued throughout the 1980s and were 
fuelled by the Social Democrats’ concern that the Kohl government could 
jeopardise the achieved level of relaxation in Inner-German relations. West 
Germany’s SPD and East Germany’s SED pursued quite different aims in these 
talks. The SED strove to gain more respectability in West Germany, and to 
strengthen those groups in the FRG who were opposed to the  new nuclear arms on 
West German soil. The SPD hoped to make their own position more plausible in 
East-Berlin, but also wanted to shore up opposition to the GDR regime by 
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increasing the gap between the government and young reformers as well as by 
championing a pluralist society.201  
* * * 
Surprisingly, perhaps, given the consensus that fundamental disagreement 
should not prevent further measures of relaxation, agreed by chancellor Schmidt 
and Honecker in 1981 (vidi supra), the SPD soon turned to the GDR’s demand that 
the Central Registration Office be closed. Between 1984 and 1989, the continued 
existence of the ZESt, hitherto largely a political matter, became a key contested 
point of West German Deutschlandpolitik, as the country was growing apart along 
party lines. Freed from any governmental responsibility, the SPD started to 
advocate the closure of the ZESt, and their efforts intensified over time. In 1985, 
Niedersachsen's Ministerpräsident Gerhard Schröder allegedly promised Erich 
Honecker that the ZESt would be closed,202 and Berlin's SPD executive committee 
passed a unanimous resolution declaring the ZESt 'ineffective and superfluous'203 
However, since the institution had been established and maintained by all Länder, 
the initiative to close the office also had to come from their governments.  
Consequently, Hamburg’s governing SPD took on the role of initiating the 
process. The SPD parliamentary group’s motion appealed to Hamburg’s state 
government, the Senat, to advocate for the office’s closure at the Justice Ministers’ 
conference.204 Campaigning for this motion, Hans-Jürgen Grambow (SPD) argued 
that closing the Central Registration Office could be a meaningful step towards 
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developing and advancing ‘good-neighbourly relations’ with the GDR. Referring 
to Honecker’s Gera demands that the ZESt should be closed, it would be time for a 
quid pro quo if West Germany expected the GDR to accommodate Western 
expectations. The Central Registration Office would be seen as an interference with 
GDR domestic affairs, and would thus hinder adequate relations and a policy of 
détente. Moreover, abolishing Salzgitter would not mean abandoning the claim of 
punishing abusive and excessive GDR regime acts, as ordinary prosecutor’s offices 
retained their jurisdiction if West German criminal law could be applied in these 
cases. He concluded his remarks by branding the Central Registration Office ‘a relic 
of the Cold War’ that should be dissolved.205 
Hamburg’s Greens supported the general direction of the motion. Bernd Vetter 
(GAL) saw the Central Registration Office as 'institutionalised evidence that the 
Federal Republic’s dominant legal doctrine could never put up with the existence 
of two sovereign German states.' The assumption that West German laws would 
also bind East Germans – by using the subjunctive, he indicated that he rejected this 
notion – entailed that, in case Germany was reunited, thousands of civil servants 
and functionaries of the GDR would have to be prosecuted. According to Vetter, 
this violated the prohibition of interference with domestic affairs, as agreed in the 
Grundlagenvertrag. Moreover, in Vetter’s view, this interference also violated 
basic principles of public international law, and could only be seen as a relic of the 
Cold War. (However, it needs to be noted that the Federal Government had 
accompanied the Basic Treaty with a 'Brief zur deutschen Einheit', in which it was 
declared that the Treaty did not contradict Bonn's aim of achieving German re-
unification.206) Consciously ignoring the specific situation of German division as 
opposed to normal international relations between two sovereign states, Vetter 
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argued that no other state’s acts were monitored and recorded by West German 
prosecutors. The only thing that the Greens regretted about the SPD motion was 
that it came 'twelve years too late' – thereby referring to the conclusion of the 
Grundlagenvertrag on 21 December 1972.207 
Only the Christian Democrats opposed this move. Gert Boysen (CDU) pointed 
to the Brandt federal government’s success in excluding the Central Registration 
Office from the Grundlagenvertrag in the 1970s. He also contended that, if criminal 
prosecution were not dependent on the Office’s existence, abolishing it would not 
satisfy the GDR government’s demand. West Germany’s claim that border-related 
killings and other human rights abuses were punishable under West German law 
remained the law of the land, ‘das zu ändern weder möglich noch politisch 
vertretbar wäre’. Thus, dissolving the office would be pointless for the 
improvement of Inner-German relations. However, it might very well impede 
criminal prosecution as well as the institution’s deterrent effect on GDR officials. 
Only a fundamental change to the border regime could warrant the abolition of the 
ZESt. The SPD’s manoeuvre would only aim at weakening the federal government 
and at accepting permanent German Zweistaatlichkeit.208In Public International 
Law, such declarations made upon or before the signing of treaties is a regular 
instrument of specifying the signatories' intention and limiting the extent of an 
treaty. 
 Eventually, the Social Democrats’ motion was passed, but it did not have any 
direct political effect.209 However, this debate marks the first public utterance of 
doubts as to whether the East German government should consider border-related 
shootings to be punishable acts under West German law, as expressed tentatively 
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by Hans-Jürgen Grambow (SPD) and more forcefully by the Green Party’s Bernd 
Vetter. Previously, despite dogmatic doubts in the legal academy, as expressed in 
the 1966/67 debate, a political consensus had maintained that the most abhorrent 
acts of GDR officials undoubtedly qualified for criminal prosecution in West 
Germany. Now, the legal and political paradigm of the punishability of such GDR 
acts started to become politicised, albeit rather cautiously. What is more, speakers 
in this debate also established their respective parties argumentative paradigms 
regarding the ZESt, which received more prominence when the debate escalated 
between 1987 and 1989. 
 
In 1987, the Social Democrats were supported by the Greens when they had 
found their way into the Länder parliaments. They used parliamentary budget 
competencies in various Länder in order to leverage the ZESt’s closure by stopping 
their states’ respective financial contributions towards its maintenance. In 
Hamburg, a parliamentary motion initiated by the SPD in this respect was passed 
in April 1987, and Hamburg’s justice senator subsequently informed his colleague 
in Niedersachsen that Hamburg would cease its financial contributions in 1988. 210 
Similar steps were taken by the governments of Nordrhein-Westfalen, Bremen, and 
Saarland.211 
A comprehensive set of arguments for the SPD-led Länder actions was given by 
Rolf Krumsiek (SPD), Justice Minister of Northrhine-Westphalia in his respective 
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letter. He reiterated most of the arguments already established by Hamburg’s SPD 
in 1984: the continued existence of the ZESt was understood as a strain on Inner-
German relations. The establishment of the office had been an immediate political 
reaction to the construction of the Wall. In the light of the policy of détente, and 
especially after the Basic Treaty of 1972, keeping the office running would no 
longer be appropriate. Moreover, the criminal prosecution of border-related killings 
and assaults, which was undoubtedly still necessary according to Krumsiek, could 
be carried out by the regular judicial branch. According to him, the ZESt had not 
lived up to expectations: only a negligible amount of cases had led to convictions, 
despite more than 35,000 records being kept at Salzgitter. Krumsiek also added a 
new argument that became a contested point between supporters and opposers of 
the ZESt. He called into question one of the fundamentally political arguments in 
favour of the office, the idea of deterrence. Rather than deterring border guards 
from firing at fugitives, Krumsiek argued that it might reinforce their loyalty to the 
GDR regime, since they would have to fear criminal prosecution in the West in case 
of desertion to the Federal Republic.212 Finally, Krumsiek pointed to remarks made 
in previous years by leading liberal-conservative politicians. Statements such as the 
FDP chairman's that the ZESt was a 'Cold War relic' were seen as having 
undermined the ZESt already..213 Rheinland-Pfalz’s Minister President Bernhard 
Vogel and Ottfried Hennig, parliamentary state-secretary (deputy Federal Minister) 
for Inner-German relations, had mentioned that the ZESt could be dissolved at some 
point. Vogel had said its existence would be ‘no iron law’. Likewise, Hennig had 
argued that the office could be dissolved – but only if the GDR lifted the 
Schießbefehl.214 In light of these remarks, Krumsiek saw the value of Salzgitter as 
leverage in negotiations with East-Berlin as being compromised.  
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Krumsiek’s letter is representative of the sentiments and aims quoted by all 
opponents of the continued work of the office at Salzgitter. They aimed to improve 
Inner-German relations by meeting the Gera demands. Their arguments towards 
this end were based predominantly on diplomatic, political, and pragmatic 
considerations related to the contemporary state of German division. 
Considerations of the future  –  that is, what role the institution and the files kept by 
it could play during a possible future reunification process – were all but absent 
from this debate. So was the judicial legitimacy of its work: the unresolved 
questions of legal dogma and legal philosophy which had concerned the work of 
Salzgitter since the beginning. 
 
The Social Democrats’ cause was furthered by the city council of Salzgitter, 
which, on 26 August 1987, approved a resolution expressing regret that the office 
had not been closed yet. In light of Erich Honecker’s state visit to Bonn in 1987, 
the city council hoped that the Central Registration Office could be closed, as they 
sought to be twinned with an East German city in order to promote Inner-German 
Entspannung.  
In response to these demands, conservatives sought to close ranks. The issue was 
taken seriously, otherwise Salzgitter’s city council’s resolution would not have been 
presented to the Chief of the Federal Chancellery, Wolfgang Schäuble.215 However, 
conservative Länder Justice Ministers struggled to find compelling arguments in 
defence of the ZESt. 
An institutional argument was made in claiming that only the ZESt would be 
able to keep record and track all ‘violent acts and Unrechtsurteile’. The institution’s 
work was a necessary precondition for criminal prosecution, and this threat 
remained necessary as long as Germans shot Germans, as West-Berlin’s justice 
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senator Rupert Scholz (CDU) claimed in his reply.216  Moreover, the idea of a 
deterrent effect was upheld, as Bayern’s Justice Minister Mathilde Berghofer-
Weichner (CSU) added in her reply. Liquidating the office would render this 
deterrent ineffective and would be seen as backing off in the face of human rights 
abuses in East Germany. If the Länder dissolved the Central Registration Office, 
they would fail to live up to their responsibility for the ‘human rights of all Germans 
in divided Germany’. She ended with scathing criticism of the Social Democrats: 
Human rights abuses, she wrote, had to be denounced. But it would be ‘implausible’ 
to ‘play the champion of human rights in other parts of the world, but to keep quiet 
about crimes which are happening in one own’s backyard.’217 But these arguments 
were either hypothetical – in the case of criminal prosecution, since it happened 
very rarely – or speculative, as it was impossible to measure the deterrent effect of 
the threat of criminal prosecution on GDR officials. Overall, these arguments were 
not particularly compelling. Hence, an attempt was also made to block any 
unilateral defunding by doubting that the Länder had the competence to do so. 
Rather, the biannual conference of Ministers of Justice should debate the issue, as 
proposed by the Ministers from Niedersachsen, West-Berlin, Hessen, Baden-
Württemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz.218 This idea, however, was rejected by the SPD 
Ministers in Hamburg and Nordrhein-Westfalen.219 
The issue remained a politicised topic throughout autumn 1987. A conference of 
the chairmen of all CDU/CSU parliamentary groups on federal and Länder level 
approved a motion by West-Berlin’s CDU caucus, expressing their resolution to 
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maintain the Central Registration Office in the future. In case future negotiations 
with Bremen, Hamburg, NRW and Saarland remained unsuccessful, the CDU and 
CSU-led governments were asked to increase their funding for the office to 
continue its service. The conservatives used this opportunity for some virtue-
signalling statements. The Central Registration Office stood for the claim 'to 
prevent injustice falling into oblivion'.220Demanding human rights for ‘Germany’s 
other half could only be credible, if information on the extent of such violations 
could be obtained and recorded: 
'The situation on the wall and barbed wire is by no means made more bearable by 
wanting not to know; not knowing does not undo injustice. Rather, the causes of 
injustice must be fought, its henchmen denounced, its extent documented and moral 
pressure exerted on the authorities in the GDR by constant demands for the fulfilment 
of human rights.'221 
In these words, the CDU made a strong case for the Office, based solely on 
contemporary grounds. Its arguments had a deutschlandpolitisch grounding; they 
were words of diplomacy. Questions of how desirable it would be to use the 
criminal law after potential future German reunifications were not considered. As 
often in debates about GDR acts, future ramifications of the paradigm of 
punishability and the work of the Central Registration Office were not 
contemplated. 
 
The conservative-liberal Länder governments knew that it would be difficult to 
force the SPD-led Länder to continue their financial contributions. This was also 
supported by a memorandum from the Federal Justice Ministry in December 1987, 
noting that the purely administrative agreement that provided the legal basis of the 
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ZESt was unable to oblige all Länder permanently and even against their will to 
fund the office. A majority vote of the Justice Ministers’ Conference to maintain 
the office was not qualified to overrule parliamentary decisions of individual 
Länder.222  However, the remaining governments and the federal government were 
also unwilling to give in to the Social Democrats’ move.  
At the Justice Ministers’ Conference on 17 December 1987 in Bonn, the parties 
were unable to reach a consensus. The statement of the four Länder which had 
terminated their financial contributions was acknowledged. However, it was 
concluded that the Central Registration Office continued to exist on the basis of the 
conference’s resolution of October 1961.223 To fill the budgetary hole of approx. 
DM 66,000 p.a., the federal ministries of justice and inner-German relations agreed 
to double the federal subsidy from DM 50,000 to DM 100,000.224 
 
This virtual cease-fire did not endure for long. In the wake of the Baschel affair 
in 1987, the SPD took over the government in May 1988 with an absolute majority. 
Subsequently, Schleswig-Holstein joined the other SPD-governed Länder and 
terminated its financial contributions to the ZESt in December 1988.225 The same 
arguments were used to justify this move, and only Bayern's Justice Minister saw 
fit to reply, albeit in a business-like manner. 226  Answering an ensuing 
parliamentary query in the Bundestag, parliamentary state secretary Friedrich-
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Adolf Jahn (CDU) only made the half-hearted claim that evidence suggested the 
ZESt’s existence was ‘not without mitigating effect’.227 
Only weeks later, in January 1989, West-Berlin’s voters shocked both pollsters 
and politicians when they surprisingly gave the CDU and SPD equally high election 
results in West-Berlin’s state parliament election. After difficult negotiations, SPD-
politician Walter Momper entered a formal coalition with the Alternative Liste (AL; 
later: Die Grünen), and the city government (Senat) was sworn in on 16 March 
1989. The CDU had been ousted after almost nine years. In a resolution on the new 
government’s guidelines, the new Senate held that close relationships with the GDR 
should be established. Berlin’s future was envisaged in a European 
Friedensordnung which would overcome Europe’s division into political blocks. 
For the time being, it would be decisive that both German states mutually accepted 
their existence and would seek as much cooperation as possible. Thus, breaking 
with all deutschlandpolitisch orthodoxy, but quite in line with the SPD’s 
Nebenaußenpolitik since 1982, the Senat expressed their resolution:  
'In diesem Sinne kommt es nicht darauf an, Grenzen in Europa zu verändern, sondern 
den bestehenden Grenzen ihren trennenden Charakter zu nehmen. Dies gilt auch für 
die deutsch/deutsche Grenze und die Mauer in Berlin.'228 
A seemingly anachronistic authority like the Central Registration Office – an 
institutional materialisation of West Germany’s claim to sole representation of the 
German nation (Alleinvertretungsanspruch) – did not fit into this new picture. 
Hence, defunding the Central Registration Office became one of the first policy 
measures which the new government pursued. On 23 May 1989, notably on the day 
of the 40th anniversary of the Federal Republic’s foundation, West-Berlin’s senate 
voted to seek a swift abolition of the Central Registration Office and to stop West-
Berlin’s financial contributions of DM 8,343 p.a. from 1990 onwards. 229  The 
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enclosed press release reiterated the arguments put forward by all other Länder 
which had terminated their contributions: the low figure of judgements was alleged 
to prove the institution’s ineffectiveness, and criminal prosecution remained 
possible through the work of ordinary state prosecutors. However, two new 
arguments surfaced, as the Senat expressed doubt as to the legality of criminal trials 
– as well as pointing to the fact that the acts in question might have lapsed by now 
anyway.230 
A debate at the Justice Ministers’ Conference from 30 May to 1 June had failed 
to deliver Jutta Limbach’s (SPD) 231 , West-Berlin’s Justice Senator) preferred 
outcome of closing the office. Subsequently, she informed her colleagues about the 
state’s decision to terminate all funding contributions.232 West-Berlin’s specific 
situation at the heart of German division prompted the Federal Government to 
respond more forcefully than previously. Recent incidents such as Chris Gueffroy’s 
death in early 1989, it was claimed, proved the Federal Government’s views 
right. 233  Most other Justice Ministers, however, deemed no reply necessary, 
possibly bored or worn out after the cascade of terminations by SPD governments. 
Only Bayern's Justice Minister replied, repeating her previous assertions, and 
adding that West-Berlin’s special situation would have demanded a different way 
of action.234  As a consequence, Berlin’s chapter of CDU’s youth organisation, 
Junge Union Berlin, announced that it would engage in public fundraising to 
balance the budgetary hole after West-Berlin’s termination of funding.235 When 
West-Berlin’s budget proposal without any financial contribution to the ZESt was 
approved by West-Berlin’s Abgeordnetenhaus, this went through without any 
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controversial debate – notably after the fall of the Berlin wall – on 8 December 
1989.236 
 
Reviewing this continuous and repetitive debate about the Central Registration 
Office and everything it stood for during the 1980s, it is striking how presentist 
arguments were. That is, they were based on diplomatic considerations and the Gera 
demands of the GDR government. Serious thoughts of future German unity were 
largely absent from these considerations. Whether the criminal law was a desirable 
and feasible means of addressing socialist state crime was not considered. This quiet 
adaptation to the status quo reflected a wider development in Inner-German 
relations, namely that West Germany had accustomed itself to a more permanent 
state of German division.237 Hence, judicial categories such as criminal law and 
punishability were no longer perceived as a predominantly legal issue, but a 
political-diplomatic one, as well as a matter of domestic virtue-signalling. 
What changed, however, was that questions of punishability and the criminal 
law were separated from institutional questions around the Central Registration 
Office. Increasingly, Social Democrats started to suggest and later demand the 
closure of the Central Registration Office, thus accepting Erich Honecker’s 
demand. But at the same time, the paradigm of punishability of the aforementioned 
GDR acts was hardly ever openly questioned or denied. Rather, it was suggested 
that ordinary state prosecutors could fulfil the role of the Central Registration Office 
instead. Not the claim of punishability, but the Central Registration Office as its 
most prominent expression and reiteration had come under attack. The idea of 
punishability itself, in contrast, did not seem very relevant or drastic: no one 
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expected it to attain any actual relevance. No one believed in German reunification; 
least of all the Social Democrats. 
* * * 
The notion that GDR government were a case for West German trials was 
established in an office in Salzgitter and a courtroom in Stuttgart in the early 1960s. 
As for the ZESt, its foundation in autumn 1961 was an immediate, almost impulsive 
reaction of West German politicians, and it was met with consensus from liberals, 
social democrats, and conservatives. Arguably, the office was a permanent 
institutional expression of West Germany’s claim that German division was wrong, 
and that enforcing the border regime at the price of killing fugitives was repulsive. 
In 1963, this notion was reinforced by Landgericht Stuttgart in the Hanke case, 
where the court offered a multilayer justification for why prosecuting Hanke was 
legal. These justifications, however, became – convincingly perhaps – contested in 
the legal sphere. In the late 1960s, this challenge spilled over into federal and 
Länder ministries, and administrators as well as politicians realised that the grounds 
for criminal prosecution of GDR officials were weaker than previously assumed. 
While this had some procedural consequences for the Central Registration Office, 
the paradigm of punishability of GDR crimes and the work of the ZESt was almost 
unanimously supported by politicians up until 1982. 
Diplomatic interventions by the GDR, the marginal figures of convictions of 
GDR officials, and liberation from government responsibility led Social Democrats 
to reconsider their commitment to the work of the ZESt from 1984 onwards. 
Publicly, at least, only the office, and not the notion of punishability, was called 
into question – but in reality, the notion itself had very little relevance. After all, no 
one saw many GDR officials coming under the jurisdiction of West German courts. 
As for the conservatives, they held on to the office as a diplomatic tool and as 
leverage in negotiations with East-Berlin, but their defence of the office grew less 
and less passionate. Maintaining it cost little, both financially as well as politically, 






securing cooperation and seeking relaxation where possible while insisting on legal 
(or legalistic) views regarding the German question. In reality, and despite the 
rhetoric of the government, Kohl and Genscher had accommodated themselves to 
a long-lasting German division. Yet, after the fall of the Wall, their public insistence 
on legal positions and the prospect of German unity allowed for widespread 
interpretations of Kohl as a far-sighted statesman possessing qualities of forceful 
leadership. At the same time, the SPD’s Nebenaußenpolitik and Oscar Lafontaine’s 
reluctance towards German reunification undermined the credibility of  Social 
Democrats in both East and West.238 This not only led to weak performances in the 
first free elections, but also legitimised conservative concepts of the German 
question and proposals for the design of German reunification. Perhaps Social 
Democratic voices could have had important things to say about the design of East 
Germany’s comprehensive transformations, but they scarcely found an audience 
that was willing to listen.  
 
Naturally, no one saw the fall of the Berlin Wall coming. But when it happened, 
the Central Registration Office, which gained attention only from the SPD’s 
continuously unsuccessful quest to dissolve it, became unexpectedly relevant. Fritz 
Schäffer’s remark of 1961 became surprisingly meaningful: the deeds recorded in 
the 40,000 files by the ZESt were so severe that West Germany’s criminal code 
demanded criminal prosecution ex officio. Once the GDR acceded to the Federal 
Republic, state prosecutors became obliged to initiate preliminary proceedings to 
avoid charges of perversion of justice. It remains unclear to what extent this was 
understood by politicians before German reunification happened in October 1990. 
During the bloc confrontation, the Central Registration Office had served 
ideological and diplomatic – in any case: pragmatic, not legal – purposes. In the 
eyes of its supporters, it deterred GDR officials from committing repulsive and 
 






morally wrong acts, served as a moral demarcation, and was a means for the 
restoration of a sense of justice for East Germans. Now, within days, the products 
of its work, those 40,000 investigations files, became a powerful force that enabled, 
if not pushed, the authorities of a freshly re-united Germany to use this existing 
material in the newly-opened field of bringing socialist perpetrators to justice.  
After the end of the fall of the Wall and the end of the SED regime, the work of 
Salzgitter became more important. Over the years, its sheer existence had 
anticipated questions which became more pressing now: what should be done with 
huge quantities of GDR officials after the state’s demise? In the past, the ZESt’s 
work and existence had been shaped by pragmatism, but also by ideology. Now, 
however, its investigation files became subject to a legal obligation on state 
prosecutors to initiate proceedings – unless politicians would agree on a different 







2. Seeking Justice, Enabling Reconciliation: 
Public Debate and Political Decision-
Making, 1989/92-1997 
This chapter aims to explore political debates and legislative decision-making in 
the realm of criminal prosecution as a measure of transitional justice in the early 
1990s. In political debates, politicians wrestled with the usual challenges of 
transitional processes: striking a fair balance between seeking moral and indeed 
legal justice on one hand, and on the other enabling reconciliation between former 
antagonists and ensuring the success of the transition by preventing former elites 
and organisations from gaining momentum towards a reactionary agenda.  
Naturally, we need to bear in mind that those challenges faced by every transition 
were still a little different in East Germany compared to other post-socialist Eastern 
European countries: unlike, say, Poland or Hungary, the GDR ceased to exist. It 
was absorbed by the Federal Republic which could facilitate the transitional process 
with unmatched economic, institutional and human resources. Especially once 
reunification had been achieved, there was no ostensible danger that a strong 
reactionary backlash could endanger the revolution’s progress and success: even an 
implausibly like-minded socialist population in the Neue Länder would still have 
been outnumbered by West Germany’s population and their vote share. Likewise, 
political leaders had to pay little attention to accommodating old elites and 
functionaries, as the transitional process and institutions like the judiciary, state 
governments, civil service or the economy were – potentially – still able to rely on 
incoming staff resources from the alte Länder, the former West. And lastly, the 






law had now been adopted in the former East as well. After all, German 
reunification was not a merger of two parts on an equal footing, but East Germany’s 
accession to, and absorption into, the institutions and discourses of West 
Germany.239 
When asking how political actors tried to balance seeking justice and enabling 
reconciliation, we explore and illustrate conflicting concepts of Aufarbeitung or 
Vergangenheitspolitik. This chapter also aims to identify relevant political actors, 
i.e. major proponents of a policy of criminal prosecution vis-a-vis advocates of an 
amnesty-based approach. Moreover, it analyses legislative steps which enabled, 
safeguarded and politically legitimised criminal trials against former GDR officials 
through the extension of limitation periods in 1993. Hence, this chapter looks at 
how political decisions were taken by which political actors and how they were 
vindicated in a multifaceted political field.  
While all parties, save the PDS, recognised the need for extending limitation 
periods, political interest and ideological sensitivities modulated the responses in 
parliamentary debates. Divisive points were, among others: which offences should 
be covered; how directly to apply precedent from the debates during the 1960s and 
1970s about the extension of limitation periods with respect to Nazi crimes; and 
whether to reflect the complicity of Block parties and even the general population 
in the 'rule of unlawfulness' (Unrechtsstaat). On a more general level, politicians 
and legal commentators clashed on whether the GDR was at all to be equated with 
the Third Reich. All this can be seen in exceptional clarity in the debates and 
parliamentary drafting and redrafting of bills relating to extending the limitation 
periods in 1992 and 1993. They are, hence, the topic of this chapter. 
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As this study argues, the Border Guard Trials were not a carefully considered 
expression of a unified and consistent philosophico-political position. Rather, they 
came to pass ad-hoc and to an extent determined and constrained by legal, 
ideological and historical framings (see introduction, chapters 1 and 3). Public 
interventions by former GDR civil rights activists such as Friedrich Schorlemmer, 
Wolfgang Thierse, and Wolfgang Ullmann, who spoke out in favour of a 'people's 
tribunal', were quickly dismissed and could gain little political traction. They were, 
however, the decisive impulse for the establishment of the Enquete-
Kommissionen.240 In the absence of a genuinely political initiative for criminal 
trials, parliamentary debates about the extension of limitation periods have served 
as a retroactive political and parliamentary legitimisation and confirmation of those 
ongoing trials. In other words: these legislative processes served as a symbolic and 
surrogate political debate on the paradigm of using the criminal law as a transitional 
justice measure. Those legislative acts of 1993 were pushed for by right-of-centre 
forces, so-called 'bürgerliche Kräfte', that is conservatives (CDU/CSU) and liberals 
(F.D.P.) as well as East-German civil rights activists among Social Democrats 
(SPD) and Greens (Bündnis ’90/Die Grünen). However, these two left-leaning 
parties were more strongly divided on the right course of transitional justice with 
respect to former GDR officials. Yet, I argue that, given the East German judicial 
initiatives explored below (Ch. III) and the strong advocacy for continued criminal 
prosecution as uttered by former East German civil rights activists across party 
lines, debates and legislation on criminal proceedings against former GDR officials 
(i.e. the extension of limitation periods to ensure ongoing criminal prosecution) 
were not (only) an expression of political dominance of West German politicians 
and normative concepts, but rather were initiated and substantially vindicated by 
East German politicians. 
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The Challenge of Limitation Periods, 1992-93 
Given the manifold challenges that societies face after comprehensive political 
transformation, it is, perhaps, not all that surprising that vergangenheitspolitische 
debates were only held if they could no longer be suppressed or delayed.241 In other 
words: such debates never emerged without a concrete cause. This is certainly true 
for re-united Germany’s approach towards open questions regarding state crime 
during the GDR. For re-united Germany’s attempt to ‘come to terms’ with East 
Germany’s socialist past, this specific cause was uncertainty as to whether criminal 
prosecution of government crimes was legally possible. The legal concept of 
punishability of GDR government acts had been established well enough in 
previous decades (see chapter I) and had been reinforced by legal actions taken by 
East Germany’s judiciary even before the GDR saw its end (see chapter III). But 
now, in the early 1990s, a legal technicality challenged the whole construction: the 
lapse of time. 
 
According to legal scholars, limitation periods have a high social value. They 
aim at securing legal peace after a significant amount of time has lapsed. 242 
According to § 78 of Germany’s criminal code, minor crimes lapse after three years 
(sentence: up to one year in prison or penalty), medium-heavy offences (sentence: 
one to five years in prison) lapse after five years. 
Now, in view of East Germany’s political transition, what was called 
minderschwer (minor) or mittelschwer (medium-heavy), was not so negligible as 
one might like to think. Minor offences include the violation of privacy of 
correspondence – a constitutional right in Art. 10 GG after all – , spying or trespass. 
All were deeds which were essential for the running of the GDR’s notorious secret 
service Stasi and which not only violated citizens’ rights, but also, at times, gravely 
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impaired their private and professional life and which contributed to the very 
Unrechtsnatur of the GDR. More so, medium-heavy crimes, whose lapse did not 
immediately loom, include fraud, perversion of justice, assault and battery or false 
imprisonment. Again, acts that constituted the very Abhörstaat or, in the case of 
fraud, contributed to the rightfully perceived idea of a corrupt elite that authorised 
all sorts of luxuries for themselves while appealing to ‘the people' to tighten their 
belt. Hence, it is quite evident that allowing for these deeds to lapse would not have 
meant merely  disregarding minor, irrelevant crimes, but  allowing acts which 
stabilised and indeed constituted the dicatorship’s deep penetration of society to be 
brushed under the carpet, or, in any case, prevent the victims from bringing their 
tormentors to justice. The question of limitation periods of these crimes, small as 
they may have seemed according to the taxonomy of Germany’s criminal law, was 
therefore a grave and very political one, exceeding mere persecutory fury. 
Naturally, a significant share of the supposedly criminal deeds in question had 
been committed a significant time ago when reunification happened, so that 
normally, they would have lapsed long ago, certainly before German reunification 
and before West German courts and prosecutors could even begin to contemplate 
effective prosecution. And so, the lapse of time and limitation periods became the 
cause for widespread political and judicial debate. As will be demonstrated below, 
this debate was inextricably intertwined with political, legal, and moral debates 
about West Germany's efforts of a judicial reckoning with former Nazi perpetrators 
which had taken place since the 1960s. 
* * * 
We know little other than the given name of the child: Svetlana. Apart from that, 
we neither know her surname nor her age, let alone anything of her family. What 
we do know, however, is that her life changed in a court room in Staßfurt. The city, 
roughly thirty-five kilometres south of Magdeburg, is known predominantly for the 
world’s first potash mine. Here, on 10 August 1973, a district court decided to take 






GDR’s family law knew this as 'Annahme an Kindes Statt'. Today, it is known that 
this measure was not only used to protect children from abusive parents or neglect, 
but also to punish oppositional citizens and other dissenters by taking away their 
children and to reward political loyalty of couples who failed to have children of 
their own. Edwin, whose surname is unknown to us, was one of the judges who 
decided this case. In 1991, almost a year after German reunification, Magdeburg’s 
state prosecutor (Staatsanwaltschaft) decided to charge Edwin for abuse of justice 
in this case of 1973, that is, eighteen years earlier. However, the competent district 
court dismissed the case on grounds of lapse of time in April 1992.243  
In 1991 and 1992, at least two more verdicts gave rise to concerns that – despite 
all institutional preparation and comprehensive records of many cases – a 
significant number of government crimes of the GDR could no longer be prosecuted 
as they might have lapsed even before German reunification. 244  The 
aforementioned case of Edwin prompted the ministry of justice of Sachsen-Anhalt 
to send a letter to the Federal Ministry of Justice and Bundestag’s legal committee’s 
chairman, demanding a legislative clarification of the matter. 
It also became clear that the regulations of the German Reunification Treaty 
(Einheitsvertrag, GRT) were insufficient. Here, article 315a had been added to the 
Einführungsgesetz zum Strafgesetzbuch, a bill that had reformed the penal code in 
1975. The GRT had stated that the lapse of such crimes punishable under GDR law 
which had not yet lapsed was ‘interrupted’ by German unity, effectively meaning 
that the lapse of time would begin to count anew. This gave prosecutors time to sort 
things out regarding recent crimes. But less recent crimes remained untouched. 
So, shortly after German reunification, both the legal system and politicians 
faced uncertainty as to whether and how criminal prosecution of GDR officials for 
abusive acts was possible at this point in time – and whether it remained feasible 
 







beyond a very short time horizon. More precisely, it was unclear whether criminal 
acts from long ago were still punishable, despite the regulations of the GRT, and 
whether more recent crimes which had not lapsed yet would, inevitably, lapse 
within a few years. 
Against this backdrop, state governments – which play a significant role in 
German law-making in their role as members of the second chamber (Bundesrat) – 
felt a strong urge to act. And so, in early 1992, state governments from Bayern, 
Thüringen and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, tabled to draft bills which aimed at 
providing legal certainty and predictability for courts and at appearing capable of 
acting with respect to Germany’s quest to ‘work through’ Socialism. 
The first draft bill was submitted by the state governments of Bayern, Thüringen 
and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, all led by conservative politicians of CDU or CSU. 
This draft bill intended to declare that the usual lapse of time had been ineffective 
for political crimes in the GDR between 11 October 1949 (two days after the GDR 
had been founded, when Wilhelm Pieck became first President) and 17 March 1990 
(the last day before East Germany’s first and only democratic parliament had been 
elected). More precisely, the draft bill envisaged this Ruhen der Verjährung for 
such crimes which ‘have not been prosecuted in accordance with the express or 
presumed will of the leadership of the former GDR for political reasons or reasons 
incompatible with fundamental principles of a liberal constitutional order’.245 The 
draft bill claimed that if legislators failed to clarify these questions, years could pass 
by until a high court verdict could decide the matter. It was expressly feared that 
the aforementioned verdicts could have ‘a grave impact’ on trust in the legal system 
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among East Germans, just as it was growing. 246  Only a few days later, 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’s state government separately took a step further and 
submitted a more far-reaching draft bill. According to this, minor crimes should 
have been expired no earlier than on 2 October 1996, i.e. at least three years after 
the original date; medium-heavy crimes no earlier than on 2 October 2000, i.e. at 
least four years later.247  In hindsight, the necessity and urgency for this more 
sweeping proposal is clear: without the extension of limitation periods, 3 October 
1993 would have been the day of expiration for many GDR government crimes, at 
least if one assumes that the first draft bill (1. Verjährungsgesetz248) would be 
accepted. 
Bundesrat initiatives for the Limitation Period Bills 
The legislative proceedings on what became known as the first and second 
Limitation Period Acts (1. and 2.  Verjährungsgesetz) were opened on 13 March 
1992 in Bundesrat. Thüringen’s Justice Minister Hans-Joachim Jentsch (CDU) 
argued, that the Germans owed the judicial 'Bewältigung des SED-Unrechts' to 
themselves,249 rejecting any notion of victor’s justice. Prosecution would be based 
on those regulations of GDR law, which '(…)the rulers then autocratically overruled 
when it came to criminal acts to their advantage'.250  
Rainer Funke (FDP), Parliamentary State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of 
Justice, had the privilege of outlining the government’s view on an issue where 
hitherto, the cabinet had remained rather inactive. Like all other speakers, the 
federal government emphasised the importance of criminal justice in the process of 
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‘mastering’ the GDR past. Funke identified a 'longing for the rule of law'251 as a 
driving force for the GDR’s peaceful revolution of 1989. Therefore, it was crucial 
for this hope not to be dashed and for the country’s 'legal peace'252  not to be 
compromised by judicial idleness.253 The GDR’s victims deserved that 'legitimate 
punitive claims'254 would be asserted. This meant neither revenge nor retribution, 
but the realisation and assertion of the 'Rechtsstaat'.255 In saying so, Funke relied 
on the popular rhetorical figure of contrasting the Rechtsstaat of the Federal 
Republic with the 'Unrechtsstaat' that the GDR allegedly had been; this concept 
had left its stamp on decades of West German self-image and should remain a 
central rhetorical concept throughout the 1990s.256 
Of course, the problem of justifying exceptional treatment of GDR government 
crimes in terms of limitation periods persisted, but Funke relied on the far from 
unusual comparison of GDR and Nazi Germany. The ‘Third Reich’ had 
acknowledged the Führer’s will as factual law; the GDR had acknowledged the will 
of the regime as factual law. Therefore, all precedent established where 
extraordinary limitation periods and regulations were concerned, as had been 
developed in the disputes over the prosecution of Nazi perpetrators, could be easily 
transferred to cases of GDR state crime.257. 
In a nutshell, the federal government showed sympathy for the request to extend 
limitation periods, but pushed for ‘further deliberation’ – delaying as a tactic of 
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inaction, as viewers of Britain’s popular sitcom ‘Yes, Minister’ might be inclined 
to think. 
 
Only Jürgen Trittin (Bündnis ’90/Die Grünen), Minister for Federal and 
European Affairs in Niedersachsen, roughed up the otherwise businesslike and calm 
debate, a usual quality of Bundesrat deliberations. Though superficially 
acknowledging the necessity of criminal prosecution of GDR government crimes, 
he exercised himself in fundamental critique and quibbling deliberations. Referring 
to the title of the second draft bill, he rejected the term ‘SED-Unrecht’, as also such 
government crimes would be included which had not been committed by formal 
party members of the SED. He claimed that the long-standing GDR Justice 
Ministers Kurt Wünsche and Hans-Joachim Heusinger (both LDPD, a ‘liberal’ 
block party that lived in forced cooperation with the SED) had been complicit in 
covering-up cases of state crime. Indeed, those two politicians had held the office 
between themselves from 1967 until 1990. Describing GDR government crimes as 
‘SED-Unrecht’ would in fact exonerate those ‘block parties’ from their 
responsibility and complicity. Likewise, their integration into West Germany’s 
conservative and liberal parties, as had happened after reunification, would be 
concealed by this rhetorical dodge. 
Trittin’s tu quoque argument to deflect attention away from the question at hand 
was rather obvious and surprisingly in line with strategies of Whataboutism, which 
the USSR had deployed for decades: Trittin’s remarks reflected the continued 
rejection of criminal prosecution as a measure of Aufarbeitung, which had been 
characteristic for Green initiatives regarding the ZESt all the way since the 1980s.258 
But Trittin also emerged with more impressive views. He discussed the 
fundamental importance of acceptance – or tolerance – of a dictatorship by its 
citizens. The GDR could not have survived, he believed, without the 'toleration of 
 






many, without followers and without countless accomplices', be they driven by need 
or opportunity.259 This was, of course, correct – but it remained unclear which 
policy of transitional policy was to follow from this insight. In any case, Trittin 
rejected any equalisation of GDR and the Nazi dictatorship: 'Isn't it perhaps also 
possible (…) to name injustice in the GDR without using this analogy and at the 
same time questioning the singularity of the industrially organised genocide of the 
National Socialists?'260 This was meant as a reaction to statements of conservative 
and liberal politicians, who time and again blurred the lines between comparing NS 
and GDR and equating them. For example, the parliamentary secretary of state, 
Rainer Funke, had merely pointed out some similar structural characteristics of 
authoritarian rule,261  while others, such as Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’s Justice 
Minister Ulrich Born (CDU), had used the equating term of 'totalitarian 
Unrechtsregime' – be it negligently or deliberately.262 
 
Trittin’s speech provoked some criticism, especially by Bayern’s Justice 
Minister Alfred Sauter (CSU),263 which, in turn, prompted Jürgen Trittin to assure 
his colleagues that the Greens did not object to the intention of extending limitation 
periods; what they did demand, however, was to drop the term of 'SED-Unrecht' 
and to formulate a draft that was 'impeccable with respect to the rule of law, and 
politically true'.264 Now, in turn, Sauter felt called-upon to point to a hitherto broad 
consensus that all injustice in the GDR had been driven by the SED, thereby 
defending the term 'SED-crimes'. But leaving aside this skirmish, Sauter pointed 
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something out that threatened to be forgotten: that the question at hand was indeed 
a political question and not merely a judicial issue.265 
 
Ulrich Born, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’s Justice Minister, advertised the first, 
but also the more sweeping second, draft bill. He believed that it was the judicial 
branch’s task, '(…)to deal with the legacy of the 40-year rule of a totalitarian 
[Unrechts-] regime with the means of the  criminal law'.266 Born pointed to an 
excessive workload on the judiciary problems arising from the re-organisation of 
the branch in his state to make a case for extending limitation periods. Moreover, a 
flood of criminal complaints was expected after the Stasi’s files had been opened 
to the public only a few weeks before.267 Born stressed that extended limitation 
periods would simplify to bring former potentates over the coals. Born thought it 
would be 'intolerable' 268  to prosecute only those who actually carried out 
government crimes, just because their deeds could be proven so much more 
easily.269 He also emphasised that it was crucial to include minor crimes, as this 
category often included 'typical SED-crimes'.270 
Remarkably, the more sweeping second draft bill (extension of limitation 
periods) not only intended to enable prolonged prosecution of GDR government 
crimes – i.e. deeds committed before the GDR’s dissolution on 3 October 1990, but 
also meant to extend limitation periods for all medium-weight crimes committed in 
the territories of the GDR up until 31 December 1991. In public debate, this 
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temporal extension was crucial. It meant allowing for prosecution of so-called 
'Vereinigungskriminalität': white-collar crimes from the time immediately 
preceding and following reunification, e.g. fraud, betrayal of confidence, forgery of 
documents, etc. These offences had often been committed to the detriment of the 
Treuhandanstalt, governments, or East German owners. Arguably, for many East 
Germans, these crimes were a tangible cause for their own social-economic 
experiences of frustration and degradation. Like with those criminal trials still 
launched in the late GDR against state and economic leaders of the regime, it 
reflects the social significance of East Germany’s economic downfall with all 
societal and social frictions and uncertainties related to this. These political 
circumstances were also discerned by state governments. In the view of 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’s state government, criminal prosecution, which really 
only gained traction in 1992, should therefore not only cover GDR government 
crimes, but also this unsettling immediate period of state and economic 
transformation.271 
Broadly speaking, a general consensus existed among all speakers: the necessity 
of criminal trials as a measure of 'mastering' the socialist past was undoubted and 
the concern to enable continued prosecution by firstly asserting that lapse of time 
could not have happened before 2 October 1990 and secondly by extending 
limitation periods was widely shared – at least in principle. However, this 
observation disguises the fact that most states’ representatives did not consider the 
issue significant enough to make a statement. And leaving aside Jürgen Trittin 
(Bündnis ’90/Die Grünen), all those who did speak belonged to centre-right parties, 
they were part of the conservative camp, i.e. F.D.P., CDU and CSU. Although 
hardly any opposition was voiced, Aufarbeitung had, arguably, become a partisan 
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issue, as the deliberations on the second draft bill on limitation periods (see below) 
demonstrate. 
 
In the following committee stages, both draft bills were separated. For the first 
bill, which sought to assert that no lapse of time had occured until 1990, a quick 
progress could be observed. Within two months, the proposal passed all necessary 
committees in Bundesrat, though with a significant amendment. Overall, both the 
committee for home affairs (Innenausschuss) and the committee for legal affairs 
(Rechtsausschuss) considered the matter with a great deal of earnestness.  
The home committee discussed broader questions regarding the necessity, 
desirability and feasibility of criminal trials as a measure of 
‘Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung’. When presenting the draft bill, Thüringen’s 
representative claimed that, although it became abundantly clear how little the 
criminal law could contribute to ‘working through’ the past, it still was a necessary 
measure of dealing with government crimes at a time ‘when great disappointment 
is rampant’.272 Failure to prosecute government crimes would compromise the trust 
of East Germany’s population into the Rechtsstaat. 273  It was stressed that 
prosecution did not follow notions of victor’s justice, but applied the GDR criminal 
code as valid at that time, which the rulers had ‘autocratically invalidated’ when it 
suited them. 274  At the same time, the speaker reiterated that the draft bill’s 
regulations merely clarified what had been accepted by most courts as judicial 
practice, namely the application of such basic principles regarding limitation 
periods as developed in trials against former Nazis. More precisely: a great majority 
of judges, lawyers, legal scholars and politicians believed that the lapse of time had 
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been paused until the end of the GDR anyway, as West Germany’s courts had 
established in trials against Nazi perpetrators. 
However, Thüringen’s representative also touched upon a seemingly legal detail 
which would dominate almost all political discussions on the subject in coming 
months. A specific case group presented a theoretical problem, and many lawyers 
were aware of it: cases, where culpability existed both in former West and East 
Germany, for example because a GDR border guard, standing on East German soil, 
had shot a fugitive on West German soil. On the one hand, this case could be 
subsumed under the draft bill’s intention: an East German case of government crime 
which could not be prosecuted until 1990. On the other hand, as the crime scene 
was also in West Germany, the prosecution under West German law was not 
hindered by political will of state leaders, but by the fact that the culprit was able to 
elude criminal prosecution in West Germany by staying on East German soil. To 
an extent, this was a case comparable to other crimes where a culprit could not be 
apprehended before a lapse of time became effective.  
The draft bill intended to include such cases where even West German 
jurisdiction had existed until 1990. However, a majority of federal states opposed 
this provision. Both in the home committee and in the legal affairs committee, state 
governments fuelled their worries into successful votes against this contested 
provision. And while votes on the floor of Bundesrat are based on a finely balanced 
distribution of votes for each federal state275, all states have merely one vote in 
Bundesrat’s committees. Here, it’s mostly government officials who represent and 
vindicate their state governments views, which gives discussions a sober and 
professional face. In any case, in the home affairs committee, Brandenburg 
successfully submitted a motion to exclude such cases where jurisdiction had lain 
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with East and West Germany from the bill to make it bulletproof against reproach 
of violating the prohibition of retroactive punishment (nullum crimem, nulla poena 
sine lege), as laid down in Art. 103 (2) GG.276 
 
In the weeks before, the legal affairs committee and a subcommittee had 
substantially scrutinised the draft bill. It was asserted that an amendment of 
limitation periods did not affect the ‘material criminal law’,277 and that the Federal 
Constitutional Court had stated that it was the responsibility of Parliament to 
resolve a ‘conflict between [legal certainty/predictability of legal decisions] and 
‘justice’.278 Here, like in the home committee, the eastern state of Brandenburg’s 
government successfully suggested to exclude cases with dual jurisdiction. This 
motion was passed against the governments of Bayern, Berlin, Hessen, 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen and Thüringen. In essence, this means that 
those who lobbied for a more comprehensive facilitation of criminal trials were 
conservative-led governments, while, generally speaking, SPD-led West German 
state governments favoured the more restrictive approach. While this was not an 
absolute division, , it resembles the political circumstances of the years before 1989 
when West German states wrestled over the Central Registration Office. 
So, while the basic principles of the draft bill remained unchanged, a majority of 
states had amended the bill – against the explicit wish of its initiators, so as to 
exclude such cases where jurisdiction had lain with East and West German 
authorities alike. This included cases where a shooter stood and fired on East 
German soil but hit (and potentially killed) a target on West German soil, making 
this a case where both East and West German jurisdiction was given. According to 
the amended draft bill, these cases’ lapse of time would start according to usual 
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regulations, counting from the time of offence. Thus, in many cases especially of 
deadly shots at fugitives, but also spy crimes on West German soil, lapse of time 
would have become effective already and prevent any further criminal 
proceedings.279 
 
The second and final reading of the draft bill was short and in principle elicited 
consensus.280 Despite a legal consensus held that the lapse of time had for political 
crimes had rested between 1949 and 1990, legislators opted to re-affirm this view 
in statute. Thüringen’s Justice Minister, Hans-Joachim Jentsch (CDU), welcomed 
the shared awareness for the problem at hand. This, he believed, marked a political 
shift. And in fact, it was only in autumn 1991 that a majority of Justice Ministers 
from the state governments had agreed not to pursue any legislative action for 
extending limitation periods.281 Rainer Funke, parliamentary state secretary state at 
the Federal Ministry of Justice, claimed that citizens in the East had ‘put their hope 
and trust into our Rechtsstaat’.282 Rightfully, they expected that ‘those responsible 
for 40 years of injustice, oppression and lost opportunities would finally be called 
to account’. 283  Their sympathy for slow judicial proceedings was limited, he 
believed. Hence, effective criminal prosecution of GDR perpetrators was important: 
‘It is not about revenge and retaliation or even about victorious justice. It is about 
the implementation and enforcement of the rule of law.’284 Even though the GDR 
itself was not equated with the Third Reich, a comparison was drawn to judicial 
 
279 BR-Drs. 141/1/92, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verjährung von SED-Unrechtstaten 
(VerjährungsG), PA-DBT 4000 XII/187 Bd. A lfd. No. 7. 
280 'Stenographischer Bericht der 642. Sitzung des Bundesrates', 15 May 1992, PA-DBT 4000 
XII/187 Bd. A lfd. No. 11.  
281 PA-DBT 4000 XII/187 Bd. A lfd. No. 2, pp. 104f., 108.  
282 ‘…Hoffnung und Versauen in unseren Rechtsstaat gesetzt.’, 'Stenographischer Bericht der 642. 
Sitzung des Bundesrates', 15 May 1992, PA-DBT 4000 XII/187 Bd. A lfd. No. 11, p. 225. 
283 ‘…die für 40 Jahre Unrecht, Unterdrückung und vergebene Lebenschancen Verantwortung 
tragen, jetzt endlich zur Rechenschaft…', ibid. 
284 'Es geht nicht um Rache und Vergeltung oder gar um Siegerjustiz. Es geht um die 






attempts to prosecute former Nazi perpetrators.285 For Hessen, a written statement 
was submitted in lieu of a parliamentary speech. Hessen’s Justice Minister endorsed 
the bill, especially in light of a special interest of the ‘neue Länder’ to clarify a 
legally vague situation.286 
The special case of crimes with dual jurisdiction remained a contested topic. 
Hans-Jürgen Jentsch refuted the amendments made to the original draft bill in this 
matter. Remarkably, representatives of those federal states which had pushed 
through the amendment in question in the committees remained silent throughout 
the debate. 
Again, only Jürgen Trittin (Bündnis ’90/Die Grünen), Niedersachsen’s Minister 
for Federal and European affairs, rose to speak and to reiterate the point he had 
previously made on the bill's ideological terminology. He suggested that, while the 
bills main provisions ought to remain unchanged, the crimes should be referred to 
as 'GDR crimes' as opposed to 'SED' crimes to properly include those acts which 
had been carried out by state officials who were not member of the SED. For 
instance, he claimed that the failure to prosecute GDR government crimes in the 
GDR lain in the responsibility of the Justice Ministers who had always been 
members of the Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (LDPD), a so-called 
'block party' which had consistently supported the SED: ‘If you take these facts out 
of the draft bill, if you conceal co-responsibility and complicity with the great 
master perpetrator, and concentrate on this very master perpetrator, then I tell you 
that with such formulations in the law (...) you do not reproduce history correctly 
and completely.’ 287  His claim was firmly rejected by conservative politicians. 
Herbert Helmrich (CDU), Justice Minister of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, claimed 
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that the SED and in particular the party’s Zentralkommittee had been the power 
centre of the GDR. Hans-Jürgen Jentsch warned against causing confusion with 
such terminological debates. ‘This could also be misunderstood by the people in the 
neuen Ländern, because they have an interest that we act together at least where 
here in a difficult situation for the western legal order…’. 288  Finally, 
Niedersachsen’s motion for a change in the draft bill’s terminology was rejected. 
The draft bill as it had left the committees, excluding cases of dual jurisdiction, was 
passed and sent on to the Bundestag.289  
Overall, the Bundesrat debates as well as the committee proceedings can be 
characterised as calm and sober, only occasionally more lively when Jürgen Trittin 
(Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) made his statements. However, it also must be noted that 
those state governments that advocated a more restrictive bill remained silent 
throughout most of the Bundesrat proceedings, including floor debates. By and 
large, only supporters – or more precisely: initiators – of the draft bill rose to speak. 
A ‘silent majority’ (Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann) of state governments remained 
silent, yet dictated the course of action. They mitigated the draft bill by excluding 
potentially legally problematic cases of dual jurisdiction from the suspension of 
limitation periods. Perhaps, this was owed to legal prudence and a caution to 
prevent the Federal Constitutional Court from striking the law down for 
unconstitutionality altogether. But, due to most West German governments’ 
silence, it appears worthy to note that there is a remarkable line of continuity. Those 
West German governments who successfully watered down the draft bill were also 
mostly those governments who, before 1990, repeatedly attempted to close the ZESt 
 
288 '[d]as könnte auch von den Menschen in den neuen Ländern falsch verstanden werden, denn 
diese haben ein Interesse daran, daß wir angesichts einer für die westliche Rechtsordnung 
schwierigen Situation – das westliche Recht wird nicht überall als allgemein ausreichend und der 
Lage gerecht werdend begriffen – gemeinsam wenigstens dort tätig werden können…', ibid., p. 
223-24. 
289 BR-Drs. 141/92 (Beschluß): ’Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verjährung von SED-Unrechtstaten 
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(see chapter 1). Given a close temporal proximity, and a continuity in those SPD-
led governments for the most part, it is fair to say that their course of legislative 
action stone in a tradition of favouring a less aggressive course of judicial action 
against GDR government crimes, and to (unsuccessfully) enforce such a course by 
legislative and administrative steps. At the same time, those who initiated and 
defended the draft bill were mostly East German conservative state governments, 
backed up by a few West German conservative governments. 
The 1. Verjährungsgesetz in Bundestag 
In Germany’s federal parliament, Bundestag, two parties had also recognised 
need for action. Remarkably, other than in the state governments, the legislative 
move came from Greens and Social Democrats. The Green’s draft bill290 deplored 
that ‘no internationally recognised criminal law’ existed which could ‘sanction 
criminal deeds of unjust regimes…’. Moreover, it became obvious that the ‘national 
criminal law was inadequate and the Rechtsstaat struggled with the criminal 
Aufarbeitung’ of the GDR. This draft bill’s regulations were akin to the Bundesrat’s 
initiative, with only the title differing, as it named the government crimes in 
question ‘DDR-Unrechtstaten’ rather than ‘SED-Unrechtstaten’, just as 
Niedersachsen’s Green Minister Jürgen Trittin had suggested in the states' 
chamber.291 
Yet a few weeks earlier, still in February 1992, the SPD parliamentary group 
submitted a motion (not a draft bill) that Bundestag should declare that limitation 
periods had been suspended until 3 October 1990 for such crimes in the GDR which 
 
290 Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, Drs. 12/2332, PA-DBT 4000 XII/187 Bd. A lfd. No. 
16. 
291 For both quotations: ’Ein internationales, völkerrechtlich anerkanntes Strafrecht, das die 
Straftaten von Unrechtsregimen sanktioniert und von der Staatengemeinschaft der welt anerkannt 
wird, gibt es nicht.’ ‘Es zeigt sich, daß das nationale Strafrecht ungenügend ist und der Rechtsstaat 
Schwierigkeiten mit der strafrechtlichen Aufarbeitung der Unrechtstaten der SED-Diktatur hat.’ in: 
Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, ‘Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Berechnung strafrechtlicher 
Verjährungsfristen von DDR-Unrechtstaten’, 24.03.1992, Drs. 12/2332, PA-DBT 4000 XII/187 






had not been prosecuted ‘for political reasons’. At the same time, the motion 
emphasised the importance of ‘juristische Aufarbeitung’ such crimes as an 
‘important task of the democratic Rechtsstaat’.292 Remarkably, this motion was 
drafted and submitted even before the original draft bill was introduced to 
Bundesrat. 
 
In this draft's first reading in May 1992, Bundestag confronted itself with 
questions of limitation periods and the facilitation of continued criminal 
prosecution of transitional justice for the first time.293 This debate was, at least in 
my view, characterised by argumentative rigour and a high intellectual level. Again, 
speakers’ addresses reflected a broad consensus on the question whether limitation 
periods had rested until 1990. However, speakers differed more fundamentally on 
the justification for this assumption. Moreover, technical aspects were contested, 
such as the question of what end date should be stated for the pausing of limitation 
periods, or whether cases of dual jurisdiction should be included – the same 
questions that had been highlighted during Bundesrat debates. 
The need for some form of parliamentary action was hardly doubted. In the eyes 
of most MdBs, the principles of suspended lapse of time, as developed by high 
courts in cases against former Nazi perpetrators, had to be applied to this category 
of crime anyway. However, since a few state prosecutors had decided otherwise 
when they assumed an effective lapse of time, legal uncertainty was soaring and a 
clarification was needed. And since a high court ruling could only be expected in a 
few years from the time, Bundestag should take action, as Hans de With (SPD) 
demanded.  For CDU/CSU, Michael Luther fought the same corner when claiming 
 
292 ‘…aus politischen Gründen…’; ‘judicial Aufarbeitung’; ‘…eine wichtige Aufgabe des 
demokratischen Rechtsstaats…’, in: Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, ‘Antrag zur  
Verfolgungsverjährung von Unrechtstaten in der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen 
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that a 'constitutional, problem-solving and practical‘ bill needed to be found.294 Jörg 
van Essen (FDP) added that through the work of the BStU, people would only 
become aware of many crimes that they had suffered in coming years, so that even 
an extension of limitation periods could be discussed.295 More contested, however, 
was how parliamentary action could be justified. 
Except for the PDS, all parties agreed that a some form of clarification by the 
Bundestag was needed on the matter. But this broad consensus must not camouflage 
the fact that stark differences existed regarding the principal justification and legal 
substantiation behind this measure. For SPD, CDU/CSU and FDP, judicial 
precedent and legislative measures related to criminal trials against former Nazi 
perpetrators served as basis for their justification. Principles of suspended limitation 
periods could be applied without any doubt, as Hans de With claimed for the Social 
Democrats. Likewise, Michael Luther (CDU/CSU) defended the logical deduction 
of suspended limitation periods from legal precedent, claiming that that the will of 
state and party leadership had quasi-legal meaning in the application of laws.296 
Yet, speakers were always cautious to avoid an equalisation of Third Reich and 
GDR, but certain structural parallels had to be identified in order to justify the 
transfer of the legal argument. Jörg van Essen (FDP) warned that all needed to be 
done to prevent claims of a failure of judicial Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung of the 
GDR, as had been uttered in certain jubilee events 40 years after the end of World 
War II: 'We have a responsibility not to be accused of anything similar on the 40th 
anniversary of German reunification.‘297 
 
294 'verfassungskonforme, …problemlösende und praktikable Gesetzesvorlage‘, Michael Luther, 
ibid., pp. 7521f.. 
295 'Wir stehen in der Verantwortung, daß bei dem 40. Jahrestag der deutschen Wiedervereinigung 
nicht ein ähnlicher Vorwurf gegen uns erhoben wird.’, ibid., pp. 7522f. 
296 'verfassungskonforme, …problemlösende und praktikable Gesetzesvorlage‘, Michael Luther, 
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An alternative route to the same destination was taken by the Greens. Wolfgang 
Ullmann rejected a 'mechanical‘ equalisation of Nazi crimes with GDR crimes. 
Hence, their proposal took another route to develop a legally impermeable 
justification for their draft bill. He drew a line from the World Wars as the origin 
of unprecedented crimes: 'Since the beginning of the world wars, the combination 
of violence with treachery, cruelty and cowardice has been considered justified. The 
fight against the defenceless became the rule.’298 Both World Wars had been the 
gateway to a new and unprecedented kind of crimes committed in the name of 
states. This had led to the passing of the momentous Kontrollratsgesetz No. 10 in 
occupied Germany, which enumerated new categories of crimes: crimes against 
peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity. Ullmann continued to argue that all 
provisions of this law had been transposed into the GDR’s constitutions and 
criminal codes, which did not prevent her from undermining these very regulations: 
'One of the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition [i.e. the Soviet Union and the 
GDR]… solemnly confessed themselves ... to the principles of peace, humanity and 
human rights. But that didn't stop them from adding another dark chapter of political 
inhumanity to the history of this century.’299 For Ullmann, this physical and moral 
'liquidation of human dignity‘300 by the Soviets and their satellite states culminated 
in planful and deliberate mass rape of German women in 1945 and a series of show 
trials in the 1930s and 1950s. The proposed legislation thus intended to declare that 
all communist 'crimes against peace and humanity‘ would be known and had to 
await their condemnation.301 
 
298 'Seit dem Begin der Weltkriege galt die Verbindung von Gewalt mit Heimtücke, Grausamkeit 
und Feigheit als gerechtfertigt. Der Kampf gegen Wehrlose wurde die Regel.’ Wolfgang Ullmann, 
ibid., p. 7519. 
299 'Eine der Mächte der Anti-Hitler-Koalition [und die DDR]… bekannten sich selbst … feierlich 
zu den Prinzipien des Friedens, der Menschlichkeit und der Menschenrechte. Aber das hat sie 
nicht gehindert, die Geschichte dieses Jahrhunderts um ein weiteres dunkles Kapitel politischer 
Unmenschlichkeit zu vermehren.’ Wolfgang Ullmann, ibid., p. 7519. 
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The practical questions that had to be solved were widely seen: jurisprudential 
precedent from the 1950s and onwards could hardly define when exactly the lapse 
of time would start to count. Here, a legal clarification was needed and the speakers 
in Bundestag and Bundesrat differed as to if this date should be set on the 17 March 
1990, the day before East Germany’s first and only free parliamentary election, or 
the 2 October 1990, the last day of the GDR. Practically, however, this decision 
was meaningless, as the Treaty on German Unity had stated that all limitation 
periods would be interrupted by German reunification. Under the regulations of 
(West) Germany’s criminal code, this meant that they would start anew. Hence, one 
way or another, the calculation of lapse of time would commence on 3 October 
1990 anyway. So, the decision which date should be chosen was purely symbolic: 
was the free election of the GDR’s Volkskammer to be seen as the end of German 
state socialism and the beginning of the rule of law, or only East Germany’s 
accession to the FRG? Another contentious issue identified was the question which 
had already shaped debates in Bundesrat: how to deal with cases of dual jurisdiction  
But this parliamentary debate also presented an opportunity to embark on a 
discussion of larger and more fundamental questions of 
Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung, justice, and the role of the criminal law in achieving 
these goals. It appears that speakers were somewhat torn between skepticism if 
criminal prosecution could facilitate Aufarbeitung, while adhering to its necessity 
anyway. Michael Luther (CDU/CSU), for instance, suggested that 
'This tangled web of injustice ... requires an uncanny expenditure of energy ... and 
does not bring a single investment, not a single job. ... But the GDR past cannot be 
overcome with a repression mechanism. It must ... be dealt with. Drawing a line, that 
also means silently granting the Stasi snoopers and Stasi gangsters amnesty. ... We 
can't avoid it: what made the GDR inhuman must come to light.'302 
 
302 '[d]ieser Wust von Unrecht … erfordert eine unheimliche Kraftaufwendung … und bring nicht 
eine einzige Investition, nicht einen einzigen Arbeitsplatz. … Aber mit einem 
Verdrängungsmechanismus läßt sich die DDR-Vergangenheit nicht bewältigen. Sie muß … 
aufgearbeitet werden. Schlußstrich ziehen, das heißt ja auch, dem Stasi-Schnüffler und Stasi-
Gangster stillschweigend Amnestie einzuräumen. … Wir kommen nicht darum herum: Was die 






At the same time, Hans de With (SPD) had limited expectations. Criminal trials 
could not deliver 'absolute justice‘ for past governments. 'Judicial enlightment’ 
could not facilitate 'coming to terms with the past: we have to do it on our own'.303 
as he claimed, whoever 'we‘ might have been in this statement. By contrast, 
Wolfgang Ullmann (Bündnis ’90/Die Grünen) pointed to the international 
dimension of the questions faced by German courts. He said he had a feeling that 
this proposed legislation as an act of enabling criminal prosecution of government 
crimes was of 'larger relevance'. It would transcend national boundaries and it was 
important to him that Bundestag clarified that 'crimes against humanity are crimes, 
whoever commits them, and wherever they take place.‘304 
Solely Uwe-Jens Heuer (PDS) rejected the broad, cross-party consensus. He 
profoundly doubted both the appropriateness and the feasibility of comprehensive 
legal action against former regime elites and subordinates. He emphasised the 
singularity of Nazi war crimes and genocides. Their unmatched magnitude alone 
had justified the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision to assume a suspension of 
the lapse of time in their court ruling in 1952. Heuer was convinced that the GDR 
could not be subsumed under the same category: ’Until the end, the GDR was not 
a Rechtsstaat. But that doesn't (…) justify its characterisation as an Unrechtsstaat. 
The concept of the Unrechtsstaat proves to be a questionable combat term.’305 
Hence, grave reasons were needed to prosecute minor crimes which, occasionally, 
dated back more than 40 years ago. Heuer also directed his audience’s gaze towards 
present challenges. Against the backdrop of a 'crisis of economical adjustment‘,306 
 
303 'richterliche Aufklärung‘,'Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit: Das haben wir selbst zu leisten‘. 
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Kampfbegriff.’, Uwe-Jens Heuer, 'Stenographischer Bericht der 91. Sitzung des Deutschen 
Bundestages', 12. Wahlperiode, 7 May 1992, p.7523-25, PA-DBT 4000 XII/187 Bd. A lfd. No. 18. 






it was necessary to ask whether the grave societal situation should be destabilised 
even further by 'hundreds of thousands of penal proceedings‘?307 Instead, the PDS 
suggested to enable criminal prosecution only for 'really grave crimes‘.308 Apart 
from that, a reconciliatory approach was demanded. 
Reinhard Göhner, Parliamentary Secretary of State (CDU) in the Federal 
Ministry of Justice, that is, a second-tier member of the federal government, decided 
to submit his strong speech in written form just for the record. Like Heuer, he 
acknowledged the grave economic transformation which East Germany underwent, 
but he thought that achieving 'inner unity‘309 was the even bigger challenge and 
even more important condition for overcoming the GDR’s 'Unrechtsregime’. In his 
view, this included taking both victims and perpetrators into account, whilst also 
acknowledging the limits of the rule of law: 'A constitutional [rechtsstaatlich, P.E.] 
criminal law is not a flaming sword of revenge with which the state retaliates.'310 In 
trying to justify penal action, he uttered a familiar argument, namely that such trials 
would be no case of revenge and retribution, let alone of victor’s justice. Instead, 
he claimed it was about 'the implementation and enforcement of the rule of law.'311 
It remained a logical inconsistency throughout this legislative process that this 
claim was often accompanied by the declaration that the GDR was an 
Unrechtsstaat. It could be asked how such criminal trials and the enabling 
legislation were seen as merely enforcing the Rechtsstaat and GDR laws when this 
state and its laws were disqualified as Unrechtsstaat at the same time.  
Eventually, both the Greens’ draft bill and the SPD’s declaratory motion were 
sent into the committee for legal and home affairs.312 Here, it appears, the proposals 
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were held back until the Bundesrat’s initiative could join them once Bundestag 
would receive the draft bill. So, before anything happened in the committees, the 
states’ initiative was passed in Bundesrat and submitted to Bundestag for 
deliberation, where the first reading took place in September 1992.313 
 
In this short debate, the arguments brought forward were largely the same as in 
the debate on a few months before. The view that limitation periods of political 
crimes in the GDR had been suspended, and that a law could and should clarify this 
declaratively, was almost uncontested. Again, legal challenges faced by courts 
when dealing with socialist government crimes were compared to those faced by 
West Germany’s judiciary when dealing with Nazi perpetrators. This comparison 
served as a justification for interfering with statutory limitation periods. Particularly 
noteworthy are a series of statements made which related criminal trials, and more 
specifically the planned legislation, to broader questions of post-revolutionary 
justice, East Germany’s economic situation and suggested expectations of 'the 
people‘ in the Neue Länder. Especially against the backdrop of xenophobic violent 
riots in Rostock in August 1992, but probably also hinting towards widespread 
frustration with the economic transformation in East Germany, Hans de With (SPD) 
suggested that Bundestag had to demonstrate to East Germans that it made an effort 
to clear away 'unjustified barriers‘ of a 'justified desire‘.314  Likewise, Michael 
Luther (CDU/CSU) was critical of a 'dissatisfying‘ legal Aufarbeitung.315  East 
Germans’ trust in the rule of law suffered, as only negative personal consequences 
would be experienced, such as rocketing unemployment, anxiety about the future 
and rising figures of asylum seekers. Luther also saw this reflected in the riots in 
Rostock and the frustration uttered over the judiciary’s failure to sentence a high-
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ranking GDR leader so far. Luther claimed that victims of state crimes were entitled 
to Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which speedy legislation should ensure. 316  The 
Federal Minister of Justice, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (F.D.P.) also 
amalgamated legal and political arguments: Without quoting any evidence, she 
suggested that East Germans had 'lacked, longed for and invested their hopes into 
the Rechtsstaat‘.317 Rightfully, she said, East Germans expected that those who 
were responsible for '40 years of injustice, oppression and missed life chances‘ be 
brought to justice and that this was primarily seen [by East Germans; P.E.] as 
bringing them into court. 318  Still, she admitted that the criminal law was an 
inadequate tool for facing systemic injustice. In my view, her remarks reflected a 
widely-known notion of most politicians of the time (and still to date) to know 'what 
the people want‘. Still, by including missed life chances in her speech, she extended 
her claim to justice beyond justiciable deeds and charged it with the unreachable 
task of also making amends for personal frustrations.  
Again, only the PDS’ Uwe-Jens Heuer rejected the very idea of all draft bills. In 
suspending limitation periods, which Heuer saw as a way of retroactive punishment, 
the draft bills did exactly what they accused the GDR of: violating the rule of law. 
Moreover, he saw this as yet another instance of special laws for East Germany, 
probably hinting towards divergent regulations of pensions entitlement in both parts 
of the republic, as introduced after German unity.319 He drew a dramatic picture of 
the social and legal situation in the East: referring to Bärbel Bohley’s famous 
dictum ('Wir wollten Gerechtigkeit und bekamen den Rechtsstaat'), he argued that 
East Germans had received neither justice nor the Rechtsstaat. Instead, he quoted 
Hessen’s Environmental Minister, Joschka Fischer (who later rose to become de 
facto leader of the Greens and Foreign Minister): 
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'If one consistently applied the moral, legal and political standards of coming to terms 
with the Stasi past in East Germany to our legal system, the constitutional state of 
Germany would remain nothing but a gruesome distortion'.320 
Heuer continued to argue that in passing the bill, this 'gruesomely distorted 
picture‘ would be intended and continued: 'Whoever passes this law does not want 
legal peace, but legal war.'321 
 
Bundestag’s committee for home affairs and the budget committee passed the 
bills without extended debate within a fortnight, suggesting that they proceed with 
the Bundesrat draft and leave the Greens’ draft bill and the SPD’s motion aside, as 
they pursued the same aim. Naturally, the leading committee for legal affairs 
subjected the draft bills to greater scrutiny.322 In a committee session which was 
held in Weimar (probably to show political sympathy and presence in East 
Germany and especially at the birth place of the Weimar constitution), the legal 
affairs committee showed a broad consensus on the legality and desirability of this 
statutory clarification. Three open questions remained to be discussed. Firstly, if 
the 17 March or 2 October 1990 should be taken as end date for the suspension of 
limitation periods (eventually, the 2 October was chosen, but this had no practical 
relevance anyway, see above). Secondly, if an enumerative catalogue of crimes that 
fell within the category should be included as an example (eventually, this 
paragraph was deleted). Finally, and most contested, if crimes where jurisdiction 
had existed in West Germany as well as in East Germany should be included or not. 
Committee members were cautious not to jeopardise the whole intended law to be 
struck down by the Federal Constitutional Court only because this specific 
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provision (Article 2) might be flawed. To avoid this and to get legal clarification, 
the committee eventually decided to summon an expert hearing on the matter.323 
Only Uwe-Jens Heuer continued to object to the very idea of suspending limitation 
periods. He believed that the GRT had intended 'to draw a line – for whatever 
reason‘. 324  Moreover, quoting Christoph Schaefgen (head of the unit on 
government crime in Berlin’s prosecution authority), he claimed that potentially 
hundreds of thousands of investigations were still to come. This would likely usher 
in a state of constant threat of coming under legal investigation for many East 
Germans in the next five to seven years. Heuer considered this too grave a strain on 
the East Germans, especially in the light of economic misery.325 
Four law professors were heard in the legal committee’s expert hearing on 11 
November 1992: Michael Bothe (Frankfurt), Bodo Pieroth (Marburg), Friedrich-
Christian Schroeder (Regensburg), and Herbert Tröndle, President of the District 
Court of Waldshut-Tiengen and honorary professor in Freiburg. They were asked 
if there were reasons to believe that a declaratory statement confirming the 
suspension of prison sentences, as intended with Article 1 of the Bundesrat’s draft 
bill, violated the constitution. The same was asked for the bill’s second article which 
included cases of dual jurisdiction into this statement. Lastly, it was also asked 
whether an extension of limitation periods for medium-heavy crimes from five to 
eight years was  seen as possible and necessary, since Jörg van Essen (F.D.P.) had 
urged his colleagues to discuss the matter both on the floor as well as in the 
committee. Committee members and those four law professors (and, in one case, 
 
323 Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, 'Stenographisches Protokoll der 50. Sitzung des 
Rechtsausschusses', 07 October 1992, PA-DBT 4000 XII/187 Bd. A lfd. No. 24; Deutscher 
Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, 'Stenographisches Protokoll der 52. Sitzung des Rechtsausschusses', 
14 November 1992, PA-DBT 4000 XII/187 Bd. A lfd. No. 25; Deutscher Bundestag, 12. 
Wahlperiode, 'Beschlußempfehlung und Bericht des Rechtsausschusses', Drs. 12/4110, 18 January 
1993.  
324 'Der zweite Staatsvertrag wollte, aus welchen Grünen immer, einen Schlussstrich ziehen…‘; 
Uwe-Jens Heuer, Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, 'Stenographisches Protokoll der 50. 







practitioners) engaged in an intense legal debate about those and some even more 
specific questions. The session’s record  fills 46 forty-six densely typed pages, and 
the experts’ written statements submitted upfront fill another sixty pages. 
Essentially, only Bodo Pieroth, an expert on constitutional and public law 
questions, was skeptical of the legality of the endeavour. Herbert Tröndle, a judge 
himself, found a surprisingly sober answer to the question, if NS and GDR could 
be compared: notwithstanding all qualitative and quantitive differences between the 
two regimes, both regimes prevented proper criminal prosecution of government 
crimes. According to Tröndle, that was all that counted in this subject matter. 
Therefore, Tröndle argued that the suspension of limitation periods had been 
legitimate both after the end of the 'Third Reich' as well as after the demise of the 
GDR.326 
A month later, the legal committee met again for a refreshingly short final debate 
on the matter. Almost all speakers now agreed on the constitutionality of the draft 
bill. The end date was determined as the 2 October 1990 and the title changed, 
following a suggestion of the Federal Government. The originally planned, but 
merely enumerative and exemplary, catalogue of crimes was dropped while those 
highly contested cases of dual jurisdiction remained included in the bill. Chairman 
Horst Eylmann (CDU) justified this by suggesting that failure to incorporate such 
cases – that is, to enable continued prosecution also in such cases – could not be 
understood by anyone, thereby bringing a legal common sense into the equation. 
Again, only Uwe-Jens Heuer opposed the draft bill fundamentally, also by referring 
to passages of the expert reports that warned to be cautious or uttered reservations 
about the extent of the planned bill. Politically, he reiterated his apprehension that 
at least tens of thousands of cases would be looming in the coming seven years, 
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thereby creating a state of fear and insecurity among East Germans.327 Eventually, 
however, and hardly surprisingly, the amended draft bill was passed almost 
unanimously for final debate on the floor.328 
 
The final debate on the floor, the second and third reading on 24 January 1993 
once again highlighted to what extent the regulations in question touched upon 
highly political issues: questions of justice, questions of the legitimacy and 
usefulness of legal Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung, but also on striking a fair balance 
of powers between branches of government. At the same time, speakers (who were 
the same specialists who had been present during the first reading and the 
committee meetings) relied mostly on familiar arguments. This final debate came 
only days after Erich Honecker had been released from detention pending trial after 
Berlin’s district court (Landgericht) had refused to formally open a case against him 
on medical grounds.329  
Remarkably, the idea of courts and laws having to acknowledge a certain 
common sense with respect to criminal regulations was highlighted by speakers 
from different sides of the political spectrum. Michael Luther (CDU) for example 
claimed that the 1. Verjährungsgesetz legally clarified, ‘what the ordinary citizen 
thinks’.330 Likewise, referring to Honecker’s release, Hans de With (SPD) reminded 
that the legal branch of their responsibility was to rule in a responsible manner: 
 
327 Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, 'Beschlußempfehlung und Bericht des 
Rechtsausschusses', 18 January 1993, Drs. 12/4110, PA-DBT 4000 XII/187 Bd. A lfd. No. 28. 
Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, 'Kurzprotokoll der 59. Sitzung des Rechtsausschusses', 9 
December 1992, PA-DBT 4000 XII/187 Bd. A lfd. No. 27. 
328 Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, 'Beschlußempfehlung und Bericht des 
Rechtsausschusses', 18 January 1993, Drs. 12/4110, PA-DBT 4000 XII/187 Bd. A lfd. No. 28. 
329 Beschluss des Landgerichtes Berlin, 13 January – 514-35/92 –, in: Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1993, p. 1608. 
330  ‘was der normale Bürger denkt’, 'Stenographischer Bericht der 134. Sitzung des Deutschen 







'It is beyond dispute that in every decision, however serious the accusation may be, 
the human dignity must not be violated. It is also beyond dispute (…) that no 
government may be involved in legal proceedings. But it should also be beyond 
dispute that in a case like this – and law is spoken in the name of the people – there 
should be a lasting rethink of how to judge in a more comprehensible and 
understandable way for the ordinary citizen. This concerns us all.’331
  
Still, he reminded his audience of his conviction that the draft bill – and hence 
the enabling of continued criminal prosecution – was not an act of revenge or 
political justice, but of enforcing GDR law, as all relevant crimes had also been 
criminal in the GDR. Therefore, the aim of this bill was to realise the state’s punitive 
claim in individual cases.332 Horst Eylmann (CDU/CSU) used his time to urge his 
colleagues and the general public to reflect on the normative foundations of ‘our 
Rechtsstaat’, as the debate about legal details – especially as brought forward by 
the Federal Ministry of Justice, as he criticised – had shown a lack of orientation in 
the technical regulations of the criminal law and the constitution.333 The will of the 
people – or what was believed to be the will of ‘the people’ – once again served as 
a resource of legitimacy for this legislation. Rainer Funke (FDP), parliamentary 
secretary of state at the Federal Ministry of Justice, claimed that Germans in the 
East expected that those liable for the authoritarian regime would be brought to 
justice. In order to justify this invasion of regulations on the lapse of time, parallels 
to challenges faced by West German authorities when prosecuting Nazis were 
drawn, as already established in the committees. Horst Eylmann (CDU/CSU) 
claimed that this was the second attempt to work through the remains of an 
‘Unrechtsregime’ and that for the second time, Germany struggled to do so while 
also serving basic principles of justice. 
 
331 ‘Es steht außer Streit, daß bei jeder Entscheidung, wie schwer der Vorwurf auch sein mag, die 
Würde des Menschen nicht verletzt werden darf. Es steht ferner außer Streit… daß in 
Gerichtsverfahren nicht hineinregiert werden darf. Es sollte aber auch außer Streit stehen, daß in 
einem Fall wie diesem – und Recht wird im Namen des Volkes gesprochen – nachhaltig überdacht 
werden sollte, wie für den Normalbürger nachvollziehbarer und verständlicher geurteilt werden 
kann. Das geht uns alle an.’, ibid. 
332 ibid, pp. 11664-66. 






On the one hand, criminal justice was seen as an indispensable part of Germany’s 
attempt to ‘overcome’ Socialism. On the other hand, its limitations towards 
achieving this aim (whatever the final state of Aufarbeitung might be) were clearly 
seen. As Horst Eylmann (CDU/CSU) put it sharply: Criminal trials as a measure of 
transitional justice had to be  
'necessarily unsatisfactory (…) Not every politically wrong is necessarily also a 
criminal wrong. On the other hand, criminal injustice does not lose its criminal feature 
because just because it is also political injustice'.334 
Jörg van Essen (F.D.P.) uttered his particular frustration at the Honecker trials’ 
ending. In his view, this had renewed the ‘old’ debate if small men be hanged and 
big men be let go. Self-critically, he asked that ‘we (…) contribute to making the 
prosecution of small men ever moreperfect , while one of the key players enjoys the 
beautiful Chilean summer?’335 Though generally supporting the draft bill, he also 
demanded that they develop an international criminal law with limitation periods 
which permitted retroactive criminal Aufarbeitung. 
Once again, it was Uwe-Jens Heuer’s task to formulate fundamental opposition 
to the project. His constitutional doubts culminated in the claim that the draft bill 
amounted to perversion of justice – the very same reproach made against the GDR, 
as he exclaimed. He fought a political line of defence: as a five digit figure of cases 
was to be expected, legal peace could not be achieved within the next half decade. 
In his eyes, this supported right-wing extremism, as the perpetual discreditation of 
Socialism deprived people of their past.336 
It was clear that this law was a very political project. As Wolfgang Ullmann 
(Bündnis ’90/Die Grünen) emphasised: This was a ‘fundamental question’ that 
 
334 ‘notwendigerweise unbefriedigend… [Nicht alles] politisch[e] Unrecht [ist] notwendigerweise 
auch kriminelles Unrecht. Allerdings verliert andererseits kriminelles Unrecht diese Eigenschaft 
nicht, weil es auch politisches Unrecht ist.’, ibid. 
335 ‘Tragen wir durch dieses Gesetz nicht dazu bei, die Verfolgung der Kleinen juristisch noch 
perfekter zu gestalten, während einer der Hauptakteure den schönen chilenischen Sommer 
genießt?’, ibid., p. 11667. 






successfully had been 'handled and decided in democratic discourse’.337 The final 
vote was predictable: CDU/CSU, F.D.P., SPD and Bündnis ’90/Die Grünen 
supported the bill, PDS abstained. 338  After Bundesrat had given its final 
approval,339 the first Limitation Periods Act (1. Verjährungsgesetz) came into force 
in spring 1993, only a few months after Honecker had been released from prison 
(see chapter 4).340 
Extending Limitation Periods: the second Bill 
Other than the first Bill on Limitation Periods, the second draft bill which aimed 
at extending limitation periods, was more contested. Its aim was to extend limitation 
periods beyond the usual point in time where the acts had lapsed. The more 
controversial legislative process suggests that there was inarticulate, yet substantial, 
opposition to the legislation; a 'silent majority' might indeed have disfavoured the 
very idea of extending limitation periods.  
Following Bremen’s proposals (Bremen was at the time governed by a coalition 
government of SPD, Bündnis ’90/Die Grünen and F.D.P., a so-called 
Ampelkoalition), the Bundesrat’s leading justice committee postponed the matter 
repeatedly for more than one year. This was always done by the majority of SPD-
led and left-leaning state governments against the votes of the conservative-led 
governments of Baden-Württemberg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen-Anhalt 
and Schleswig-Holstein; Thüringen repeatedly abstained. Looking at East German 
states, it  is striking that only Brandenburg (Ampelkoalition) and Berlin agreed to 
postpone the matter, that is, if one counts Berlin as an East German state.341 A 
 
337 ‘fundamentale Frage’; ‘im demokratischen Diskurs behandelt und entschieden’; ibid., p. 11664. 
338 Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, 'Amtliches Protokoll der 134. Sitzung', 21 January 
1993, PA-DBT 4000 XII/187 Bd. A lfd. No. 30; Gesetzesbeschluß des Deutschen Bundestages: 
Gesetz über das Ruhen der Verjährung bei SED-Unrechtstaten, BR-Drs. 50/93, 22 January 1993. 
339 Beschluß des Bundesrates zum Gesetz über das Ruhen der Verjährung bei SED-Unrechtstaten, 
Drs. 50/93, 12 February 1993, PA-DBT 4000 XII/187 Bd. A lfd. No. 35 
340 Gesetz über das Ruhen der Verjährung bei SED-Unrechtstaten (VerjährungsG) vom 26. März 
1993, Bgbl. 1993 I, p. 392. 






similar picture existed in the committee for home affairs, where only Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern insisted on the questions urgency, whereas a majority, be it 
erroneously or deliberately, saw no urgent need for action, as once again Bremen’s 
representative made clear.342 
 
This debate – or rather the non-debate – continued up until May 1993, that is, to 
a point in time where the lapse of time for ‘minor’ crimes was only five months 
away. Now, Sachsen introduced a new proposal 343  and Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern’s new Justice Minister, Herbert Helmrich, used this opportunity to 
once again underline the urgency and necessity of legislative action. In his words, 
'the liberal-democratic constitutional state' had to keep its promises. 344  He 
consequently rejected all attempts to de-politicise or to legalise the question of 
limitation and to accept it as a normal judicial process. Assuming this would 
misconceive the unique position of Germany’s Neue Bundesländer. Victims of 
government criminality – in their longing for justice – could not be expected to bear 
the consequences of government inaction .345 
Rolf Krumsiek, Justice Minister of Nordrhein-Westfalen and already a 
prominent actor in the SPD’s quest to dissolve the ZESt during the 1980s now 
became the first Social Democrat to contradict the concern. Although showing basic 
appreciation for the general intention, he argued that it was not the right time to 
make a decision in this question. (This once again reminds the reader of the 
notorious strategies of postponement and inaction displayed by the BBC’s famous 
permanent under-secretary of state in Yes, Minister, Sir Humphrey Appleby.) He 
lobbied for the – legally unrealistic – idea of initiating proceedings in all cases. 
According to the law, this would have interrupted the count of the limitation period, 
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thereby beginning anew. 346  Naturally, this argument overlooked that East 
Germany’s authorities could hardly have managed to initiate proceedings in a 
noteworthy number of cases between May and September 1993; law enforcement 
authorities were still enervated by mass exchange of elites and a change of many 
legal documents, and summer vacation time was imminent. Moreover, it was 
widely expected that many bagatelles would only surface through individuals 
studying their Stasi files at the BStU and subsequently filing a criminal complaint. 
Still, Krumsiek argued that, if such an initiation of proceedings as a means to extend 
limitation periods could not be managed, the lapse of time should be accepted, in 
accordance with the 'basic ideas of the Rechtsinstitut'.347 Even though hidden in 
intertwined language, this was a clear case for letting bygones be bygones – a 
political position originally known from conservatives in the battles of ‘mastering’ 
the Nazi past. For Krumsiek, this lapse of time would have had even some desirable 
consequences: In the future, prosecuting 'small offenders'’ would no longer bind 
legal resources. Hence, prosecution of those actually responsible for GDR regime 
could be accelerated. Moreover, Krumsiek identified the positive aspect that East 
Germany’s judiciary would no longer neglect to combat current crime, especially 
such gang delinquency that had been imported from the West, as Krumsiek said.348 
Krumsiek did not go as far as mentioning the notorious 'final stroke' that was well-
known from debates on the overcoming Nazism. But his remarks nonetheless 
reflected the same confrontation of Aufarbeitung and mastering current problems. 
Eventually, this reading ended without a conclusive vote; rather, the majority 
favoured continued committee deliberations. 
 
346 According to § 78c (1) StGB, the limitation period is suspended upon a defendants first 
interrogation, when search warrants or arrest warrents have been issued, or when the main 
proceedings are being opened. However, the lapse of time inevitably occurs after a time twice as 
long as the origional limitation period has passed. This is called 'absolute Verjährung'.   
347 '… wird es entsprechend dem Grundgedanken des Rechtsinstituts der Verjährung meines 
Erachtens dabei auch sein Bewenden haben dürfen.', PA-DBT 4000 XII/245 Bd. A lfd. No. 14, pp. 
159-61. 






However, the proponents of extended limitation were resolved not to drop the 
matter. Behind the scenes, the representatives of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Sachsen-Anhalt and Sachsen agreed on a new draft bill; those East German states 
with a CDU-led government pressed the issue further.349 In the committee for legal 
affairs, SPD-led Bremen, Niedersachsen and Nordrhein-Westfalen once again 
voted for repeated deferment on 2 July 1993, probably knowing that, owing to 
parliament’s summer recess, this would have meant the end for the project, as 
getting legislation through before the lapse of those minor crimes on 3 October 1993 
would become ever harder and more unlikely.350 However, this time, the three states 
failed, as all other SPD-led governments, perhaps yielding to increasing public 
pressure, joined the conservative side of the Bundesrat in voting  to take the 
legislative project to the next stage.351 This time, this even included Berlin, which 
was governed by a startlingly silent Grand Coalition under Eberhard Diepgen 
(CDU), which was responsible for the lion’s share of criminal cases. The draft bill 
that was finally approved by the committee for legal affairs stated that, according 
to West Germany’s StGB, murder would no longer lapse; moreover, medium-heavy 
crimes (such as fraud or violent assualt) should have lapsed eight years after the 
legislation came into force. Minor crimes, whose speedy expiration had been the 
original impulse for the whole legislation, now disappeared from the document and 
hence would have lapsed a few weeks later.352 
The Bundesrat’s debate on the floor was unemotional. Herbert Helmrich (CDU, 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) was the only speaker; other ‘speakers’ had their 
speeches recorded. Again, at least the original intention was widely welcomed and 
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the draft bill was approved and sent to the Bundestag for further legislative 
procedures.353 
Bundestag deliberations on the second draft bill 
Bundestag reconvened only some eight weeks later, in early September 1993; 
only three and a half weeks before the crucial date of 3 October. Here, the issue 
received a more passionate debate and broad support. In the meantime, two 
alternative proposed bills had been drafted within the Bundestag. CDU/CSU, F.D.P. 
(the government parties) and SPD joined forces to introduce a joint draft, proposing 
an extension of limitation periods by c. two and a quarter years. 354 The draft bill of 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen went further in suggesting an extension by four and a 
quarter years. However, it was also narrower in excluding so-called 
‘Vereinigungskriminalität’, as only deeds committed during the time of the 
existence of the GDR were included. Economic crimes committed during the 
turbulent months following reunification would have remained subject to shorter 
limitation periods.355 The abolition of limitation periods on murder, however, was 
beyond dispute. As parliamentarians were running out of time, all proposals were 
directly sent on to Bundestag’s committee on legal affairs, whose subsequent report 
back to the plenum was crucial for future progress of the legislation.356 
 
In Bundestag’s leading committee, legal affairs, the general necessity of 
extending limitation periods and ensuring the possibility for future trials was hardly 
contested. Still, the committee subjected all three drafts a detailed scrutiny. Horst 
Eylmann (CDU), who was the committee’s commentator (Berichterstatter) on the 
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affair, identified several severe judicial and linguistic mistakes or ambiguities. 
Eventually, the Federal Ministry of Justice tabled a ‘Formulierungshilfe’, which 
happened to already have been cleared with all state governments. (It remains 
unclear why the government only provided such a document instead of a draft 
bill.)357  
This Formulierungshilfe helped to avoid unintended conse-quences by through 
linguistic and legal precision. Now, other than the Bundesrat’s draft, but in 
agreement with the Bundestag’s parties drafts, this proposal once again included 
bagatelles. It was suggested that they could lapse lapse no earlier than 31 December 
1995, while medium-heady crimes could not lapse before the end of 1997.358 
Surely, to re-introduce the extension for ‘minor’ crimes was also a reaction to 
interventions made by East German representatives, for example Bündnis ’90/Die 
Grünen’s parliamentary group in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’s state parliament, 
but also by all Länderbeauftragten für die Stasi-Unterlagen, or the Bund der 
Stalinistisch Verfolgten in Deutschland e.V.359 
The BMJ’s intervention was unusual: unorthodox in its form, and unprecedented 
in its resolution to support the extension of limitation periods, as the government 
had remained rather inactive in previous years and months. But be this as it may, 
the BMJ’s intervention was widely welcomed by the committee. Almost all 
members signalled their support for the bill. Only Wolfgang Freiherr von Stetten 
(CDU), born in Sachsen, but socialised in Baden-Württemberg made clear that 
bagatelles should have been excluded from the draft. The PDS (the SED’s legal and 
institutional successor party) had Uwe-Jens Heuer speak for them. Other than in the 
subsequent plenary debate, he remained rather tame, only welcoming that the 
 
357 For the 'Formulierungshilfe' (formulation aid or draft), which was not a Drucksache in its own 
right, see the appendix to the Legal Committee's 87th session on 15 September, PA-DBT 4000 
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BMJ’s proposal was less sweeping than the Greens’ draft had been.360 The BMJ’s 
proposal sailed through the committees’s vote with only two nays. Now the 
Bundestag’s floor was called upon to take the final decision.361  
 
Oddly enough, given the relevance of criminal proceedings in Germany’s post-
socialist transitional justice, 23 September 1993 marked the Bundestag’s first 
plenary debate on the extension of limitation periods (as opposed to the assertion 
that crimes had not lapsed until 1990, as provided by the first bill) – and one of only 
few occasions were criminal trials as transitional measures were debated in a 
broader sense. Taken together with the deliberations on the first Limitation Periods 
Act in spring 1993, these parliamentary readings mark on of the places, where 
political accountability and legislative legitimacy of criminal trials as 
transformative measure can be identified, as these debates went beyond discussing 
the narrow content of the proposed legislation and rather also contemplated 
purpose, means, and limits of judicial forms of transitional justice. 
The debate was held with earnest and reflected a broad consensus; only the 
PDS’s Uwe-Jens Heuer, still tame during the committee stages, catered for some 
controversy. This second and third (and hence final) reading of the draft bill 
oscillated between various argumentative levels and can fairly be characterised as 
a comprehensive and successful debate on the potentials and limits of judicial 
Aufarbeitung and the preconditions for reconciliation.362 
Naturally and inevitably, different intellectual and argumentative dimensions 
blended during the debate. On the legal level, it was feared that extending limitation 
periods might violate principles of the rule of law. Even though, legally speaking, 
extending limitation periods did not violate the constitutions prohibition of 
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retroactive punishment (Art. 103 (2) GG), this concern pointed to questions of 
political legitimacy and the purpose of judicial Aufarbeitung after transformation to 
democracy, beyond a purel legalistic dimension. 
However, most speakers saw a fundamental injustice in the threatening lapse of 
crimes committed by the Stasi, including the prosecution of those ‘minor’ crimes 
which was now at stake. For instance, MP Dirk Hansen, and the Federal Minister 
of Justice, Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (both F.D.P.) felt that such crimes could 
not lapse, as otherwise disappointment in the Rechtstaat would be fuelled and 
nourished even further.  
 
Like in the immediate post-war period, the figure of a 'final stroke'363 played an 
important role for contemporaries. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’s Minister-
präsident, Bernd Seite, who made use of his privilege to also address the Bundestag, 
pointed to an INFAS opinion poll of August 1993 in which fifty-one per cent of 
East Germans demanded a final stroke. Seite and also Hans-Joachim Hacker (SPD, 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) rejected this notion. A final stroke, Seite argued, 
meant failing to master an enormous ‘societal challenge’, as well as failing the 
victims’ interests. By no means would this mean that all 
Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung would be left to criminal justice; this could only be 
part of it:  
'The social debate about the causes, the extent and the effects of injustice in the GDR 
must be continued in a variety of ways in the interest of the democratic, constitutional 
future of our people.'364 
 
363 'Schlussstrich' 
364  'Die gesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzung über Ursachen, über den Umfang und die 
Auswirkungen von Unrecht in der DDR muß im Interesse der demokratischen, rechts-staatlichen 






In Seite’s view, this included that victims of government crimes could not only 
identify former wrongdoers upon studying their Stasi files, but also bring them to 
justice. 
Again pointing to the BStU’s work, Angelika Barbe also believed that the extent 
of regime crimes would only gradually come to be known. Only then would 
prosecution of the old elites become possible. She rejected any claims of such trials 
amounting to pure revenge, as rather lenient penalties suggested the very opposite. 
For Rolf Schwanitz, an East German Social Democrat, granting the victims the 
opportunity to decide whether or not to file charges was paramount. In his view, 
former elites had been all too successful in assuming attractive posts in the economy 
or civil service after reunification; at the same time, GDR victims would only 
insufficiently be recognised and acknowledged. 365  Therefore, any calls for 
amnesties were inappropriate, and rules regarding judicial rehabilitation of victims 
of perversion of justice would be inadequate. Hence, reinstating former victims with 
agency would be important. 
 
Comparisons to West Germany’s criminal prosecution of former Nazis became 
a key resource of legitimacy, even though speakers were careful not to equate the 
two dictatorships with respect to their gravity or cruelness. Horst Eylmann (CDU), 
for example, believed that allowing crimes to lapse would be a highly problematic 
privilege for political perpetrators, especially in a country that 'had been afflicted 
by a dictatorship twice within a lifetime'.366 Too easy-going an approach, Eylmann 
warned and pointed to the slow prosecution of Nazi perpetrators, could bring about 
unwished and unintended consequences. Likewise, Bernd Seite with a warning tone 
referred to insufficient ways of Aufarbeitung of the NS-Regime. Dirk Hansen 
(F.D.P.) also relied on the comparison between Aufarbeitung of the Nazi regime 
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and the GDR in order to justify continued criminal prosecution of GDR 
perpetrators. Like many speakers, he was careful to differentiate between both 
dictatorships, and stressed the importance of criminal prosecution in a country in 
which two 'dictatorships, [though] highly incomparable in their objectives and 
foundations, twice had the chance to torture, persecute, imprison and kill people in 
a totalitarian manner'.367 
 
A key question negotiated in this debate was how criminal trials would be related 
to other measures of transitional justice, that is, how significant their role should be 
in comparison to other means, and how these could be related to central aspects 
such as reconciliation or justice. Almost all speakers emphasised that criminal trials 
would indeed be an important, but not sufficient means of Aufarbeitung, let alone 
an anti-totalitarian prevention. Rather, they were always placed in the context of 
more comprehensive social processes. Again, Bernd Seite stressed that many forms 
of political injustice were judicially elusive. Many people, more than just formal 
regime perpetrators, had contributed to an ‘atmosphere of fear’, without their 
actions being litigable. Hence, Aufarbeitung would have to include political, 
historical and academic measures; all in order to prevent any ‘romanticisation’ of 
the GDR. However, only the criminal law could ‘atone for guilt and do justice to 
the victims’. Horst Eylmann (CDU) believed he heard calls with soaring volume 
demanding an end to criminal trials and urging to let ‘reconciliation have priority 
over vengeance’. He referred to an editorial by Die Zeit’s publisher Marion Dönhoff 
who had described as an act of wisdom Poland’s decision to close the secret 
service’s files immediately after the fall of Socialism in 1989. In a rhetorical 
question, Eylmann asked whether, following this logic, the BStU should be 
 
367  '(…) Diktaturen, die in Zielsetzung und Grundlagen höchst unvergleichlich waren, in 
Deutschland zweimal die Chance hatten, in totalitärer Manier die Menschen zu quälen, zu verfolgen, 







dissolved and also the ‘Salzgitterakten’ (the files of the ZESt) and the files of the 
Reichssicherheitshauptamt (a key institution in the organisation of the Shoah) 
should be sealed?  
For Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Wolfgang Ullmann also rejected the contrasting 
juxtaposition of truth and reconciliation. Achieving reconciliation without truth was 
impossible, as he claimed that 'reconciliation without truth, that should be a bleak 
reconciliation'. 368  Dirk Hansen (F.D.P.) added, that criminal prosecution was 
without alternative; victims could only forgive their wrongdoers if and when they 
knew what there was to forgive. He also reminded his audience that so-called 
bagatelles often really were violations of basic and human rights.  
'We want to be able to go beyond shock and distress on the way to enlightenment, and 
moral and judicial rehabilitation. We do not want to repress and cover up, but to 
preserve the possibility of reconciliation by way of knowledge and truth (…)'369 
  Likewise, Bernd Seite stressed that ‘justice’ and elucidation would be 
necessary preconditions for reconciliation and a common future. 
 
Of course, grand questions of guilt and complicity, of consent and coercion were 
touched upon. Arguments for a reconciliatory approach were seen as a 'mashing up 
perpetrators and victims', as Horstl Eylmann put it.370  He believed it aimed at 
making all responsibilities forgotten: 
'Dictatorships, regardless of their provenance, do not come over a country like 
hailstorms, they are made by people, and they are also maintained by people. There is 
no reason to reward those who, in a dictatorship, have not even respected their own 
 
368‘Versöhnung ohne Wahrheit, daß müsste eine trostlose Versöhnung sein.’ 
369  'Wir wollen über Erschütterung und Betroffenheit hinaus den Weg zu Aufklärung und 
moralischer wie justiziabler Rehabilitation weitergehen können. Wir wollen nicht verdrängen und 
zudeckeln, sondern überhaupt die Möglichkeit der Versöhnung auf dem Wege der Erkenntnis und 







criminal laws and committed crimes with a disguised amnesty – that is what letting 
the crimes lapse would amount to.'371 
However, he strongly refused to see that this would be a collective punishment 
for all East Germans. A majority of those had not become criminal, but had arranged 
themselves with the regime, ‘… as West Germans had done no different.’ For most 
people, in fact, it had been possible not to become criminal. Those majority of East 
Germans were not at the centre of the proposed legislation, Eylmann believed. He 
saw it as a 'commandment of political wisdom' and as a sign of solidarity, to reach 
out to those people and to give them an opportunity to take part in the community.372 
Hence, the bill would not seek 'vengeance', but 'justice'.373 Likewise, Bernd Seite 
rejected totar perpetrators and victims with the same brush: 'Not all of us Germans 
in the GDR were SED party members; by far not all party members have become 
guilty. Therefore, it is all the more important not to lump the real perpetrators with 
the victims.' 
 
Only Uwe-Jens Heuer (PDS) dared to step out of line of this broad and pan-
partisan consensus. In the GDR, Heuer had had a remarkable administrative career. 
Now, he described the Border Guard Trials as political trials, aiming only at 
supporting the argument that GDR had been an ‘Unrechtsstaat’. Like Trittin, Heuer 
relied on a rabulist rhetoric when asking what crime Markus Wolf had committed. 
In the GDR, Wolf was head of the Stasi’s foreign secret service, HVA. Heuer asked 
whether Wolf could not have legitimately been head of a secret service. With an 
equalisation of West German secret services with the Stasi, Heuer tried to downplay 
 
371  ‘Diktaturen, gleich welcher Provenienz, kommen nicht wie Hagelschauer über ein Land, sie 
werden von Menschen gemacht, und sie werden auch von Menschen aufrechterhalten. Es gibt keinen 
Grund, diejenigen, die in einer Diktatur noch nicht einmal die eigenen Strafgesetze respektiert und 
Delikte begangen haben, mit einer verkappten Amnestie – das wäre nämlich das Verjährenlassen – 
zu belohnen.’  
372 'Gebot der politischen Klugheit'. 






the quality and extent of GDR state crimes: pointing to acts of 'subversion'374 and 
espionage in the Stalinist days of the GDR, he claimed it would be 
incomprehensible why today’s courts should have to deal with opened letters or 
insults of the 1950s – he did not mention the suffering of political prisoners, of 
victims at the Wall and border or of their survivors. He believed the purpose of 
criminal trials and of extending limitation periods was to humiliate and unsettle 
thousands of East Germans in order to destroy their 'fighting spirit' 375  and to 
compromise advocates of reconciliation and amnesty. But Heuer’s provocations 
failed to ignite uproar in Bundestag. Eventually, an overwhelmingly large majority 
of CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen approved the bill, with only 
the PDS/Linke Liste rejecting the proposal.376 The only exception to this rule was 
the CDU’s Wolfgang von Stetten who, in a written statement, stressed that a full 
amnesty in 1990 would have been the right approach.377 
 
Now, the Bundesrat was called upon to deliver a final vote.378  The Second 
Chamber’s committee for legal affairs convened on the same day and, after 
mentioning the differences between the Bundesrat’s own draft bill and the 
Bundestag’s passed bill, the committees‘ majority approved the bill to go to the 
floor. However, once again, the Social Democratic governments of Brandenburg, 
Bremen, Saarland und Schleswig-Holstein voted against the bill.379 On the floor, 
the matter was debated quickly. No one requested to give a speech, and so the 
Bundesrat finally approved the Bundestag’s draft bill, which could now soon come 




376 ibid., p. 15236. Cf. PA-DBT 4000 XII/245 Bd. A lfd. No. 32. 
377 'Stenographischer Bericht der 176. Sitzung des Deutschen Bundestages', 12. Wahlperiode, 23 
September 1993, PA-DBT 3001, p. 15237. 
378 BR-Drs. 659/93, PA-DBT 4000 XII/245 Bd. A lfd. No. 33. 
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Helmrich (AMT Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, CDU) welcomed the outcome. Hans-
Otto Bräutigam (Brandenburg) criticised that minor offences were now once again 
included in the law. Hans-Joachim Jentsch, Thüringen’s Justice Minister, once 
again heavily criticised the bill’s opponents within SPD and Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen for their strategy of delay:  
'The keyword "Salzgitter" gives rise to the (certainly not only 
polemical) question whether some wanted to achieve through the lapse 
of time what they had failed to achieve in their attempts to starve the 
[ZESt].'381 
He also dared to give a prophecy which, as an exception, shall be quoted in 
German:  
'Doch bleibt eines richtig: Dem Rechtsstaat, der nicht den Weg der Nürnberger 
Kriegsverbrecherprozesse gehen will und der nicht die in einer unblutigen Revolution 
unbefriedigten Rachegefühle nachträglich befrieden kann, sind Grenzen gesetzt. Ich 
denke zu Recht. Und dennoch wird das Zusammentreffen einer rechtsstaatlichen 
Ordnung mit der Erbschaft einer Diktatur auch Anlaß sein, diese Grenzen neu zu 
bestimmen – sie bestätigend oder – was ich eher glaube – neu festsetzend.'382 
The Bundesrat’s vote on 24 September383 was soon to be followed by executive 
signatures of the Federal Minister of Justice, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger 
(FDP), by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) and by Federal President Richard von 
Weizsäcker. The law was finally proclaimed in Germany’s Bundesgesetzblatt on 29 
September 1993, coming into force the next day.384  
Summary 
The first Limitation Periods Act (1. Verjährungsgesetz), in force since spring 
1993, put in writing a widely shared legal assumption: the idea that socialist 
 
381  'Das Stichwort 'Salzgitter’ gibt Anlaß zu der sicherlich nicht nur polemischen 
Frage, ob einige über die Verjährung das erreichen wollten, was ihnen durch das 
Verhindern des Aushungerns der Erfassungsstelle Salzgitter mißlungen war.' 
382 ibid., No. 35. 
383 ibid., No. 36 (BR-Drs. 659/93 (Beschluß)). 
384 Gesetz zur Verlängerung strafrechtlicher Verjährungsfristen (2. VerjährungsG) vom 27. 






government crimes in the GDR had not begun to lapse until German reunification. 
This assumption had been derived from West German jurisprudence on large-scale 
Nazi government crimes. Signed into force in autumn 1993, the 2. 
Verjährungsgesetz, was more sweeping, both in extent of deeds which it covered as 
well as in temporal scope. It extended limitation periods for crimes in the former 
East until 31 December 1995 for minor crimes (prison sentence up to one year) and 
until 31 December 1997 for medium-heavy crimes (prison sentence: one year up to 
five years). For this latter category of crimes, which included forms of fraud, crimes 
in the former East committed before 31 December 1992 were included. With this 
measure, legislators aimed at including cases of economic fraud in the immediate 
aftermath of reunification, so-called ‘Transferrubel’ deals.  
The political debates and legislative proceedings of both draft bills on limitation 
periods were strongly intertwined and they have to be understood in each other’s 
context. Yet, their genealogy differed slightly. The  legislative project of declaring 
that the lapse of socialist government crimes had been suspended (1. VerjährungsG) 
was supported by a broad coalition of political forces. It was initiated by a coalition 
of conservative-headed state governments from South and East Germany. However, 
around the same time, the SPD Bundestag group proposed a parliamentary 
declaration with similar effect: to declare what many jurists believed anyway, 
namely that limitation periods of socialist government crimes had been suspended 
during the reign of the SED. This legal understanding was vital for state prosecutors 
in the 1990s to investigate cases of abuse, murder, espionage etc. which, in many 
cases, took place years or even decades before. Those crimes would often have 
lapsed long before. Fundamental opposition to the bill was only uttered by Uwe-
Jens Heuer (PDS) in Bundestag. However, at an early stage, a coalition of state 
governments in Bundesrat managed to water down the draft bill by excluding such 
cases from the regulation where dual jurisdiction existed, that is, where until 1990, 
not only East German courts would have been competent, but also West German 






case, eventually they failed, as the first act specifically included cases of dual 
jurisdiction. The only open remark we have from this informal caucus is the 
somewhat rabulistic address given by Jürgen Trittin in Bundesrat. 
But this tacit coalition of left-leaning West German state governments also 
played a major role in the legislative process for the second act. By contrast to the 
first act, this project appeared to be more partisan. In Bundesrat, where the second 
draft bill originated as well, this tacit coalition of objectors delayed the bill for 
several months by repeatedly postponing to discuss the matter in relevant 
committees. Reasons for this remain unknown, but it is striking that these were by 
and large the same state governments which had also tried to bring the ZESt to its 
knees in the late 1980s. By contrast, at an early stage, the bill was pushed especially 
by right-leaning East German state governments, most of which were represented 
by Justice Ministers and/or Ministerpräsidenten who personally came from the 
former East. Once, however, it got through to Bundestag, the draft bill and the idea 
of extending limitation periods found strong support also among the SPD and 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. Increasing public pressure might account for some of this, 
but it also seems fair to assume that the presence of former GDR civil rights activists 
among the ranks of SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen might have convinced their 
comrades from the West that seeking justice was not a reactionary programme, but, 
perhaps, shared by East Germans. 
Of course, both legislative ideas were challenged by questions if it was legal – 
and constitutional –   firstly to declare that limitation periods had been suspended 
and, secondly to legislate that they would even be extended. Hence, for both acts, a 
series of arguments was brought forward to vindicate the legislative agenda. 
Politicians as well as legal experts pointed to the Federal Constitutional Court’s 
jurisprudence on the lapse of time of Nazi crimes from the 1950s as an important 
precedent. These references normally did not amount to an equalisation of the Third 
Reich and the GDR. Rather, the arguments of the Constitutional Court’s judgement 






the will of the state and party leadership of SED and GDR in this case. Still, it 
insinuated a certain degree of comparability between Nazi crimes and GDR crimes 
which, broadly speaking, can neither be seen as equal or similar in quality or 
quantity.385 Hence, this parallel remained a contested argument and was challenged 
by left-leaning politicians, such as Wolfgang Ullmann (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) or 
Uwe-Jens Heuer (PDS). Over the course of time, it seems that also conservative 
politicians became increasingly aware of the importance of sensitivity on this issue 
and weighed their words with an increasing degree of caution, without abandoning 
the argument altogether.386 A specific version of this vindicative comparison were 
references to the ‘failed’ criminal prosecution of former Nazis – a form of 
Aufarbeitung which was seen as all to lax and myopic. This history of sweeping the 
past under the carpet was used as an apotreptic exemplum: re-united Germany 
should not make the same mistake again.  
Solely Wolfgang Ullmann and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, despite supporting the 
overall aim of suspending and extending limitation periods, demonstrated that 
justifications for criminal trials against GDR officials could be found without 
drawing any parallels to the Third Reich and its Bewältigung in West Germany. 
They managed to do so by referring to global human rights regimes, 
notwithstanding that these emerged also out of the ashes of Auschwitz-Birkenau. 
 
Another argumentative resource which was widely deployed was the idea of a 
legal ‘common sense’: the idea that a legal situation had to be readily understood 
by wider public. This was, for instance, reinforced when Hans de With (SPD) 
reminded his audience that verdicts were handed down ‘in the name of the people’. 
In this claim, also prevalent in current political debates about the extent to which 
courts should take popular will into account, clashes between the democratic 
 
385 However, it is important to emphasise that this statement is not meant to relativise individual 
sufferings under GDR oppression. 






principle and the rule of law became visible which are familiar to modern 
democracies.387 This notion was tied to the more general idea that this legislation 
was necessary because the public expected it. In theory, reference to popular will 
is, of course, a sign of a functioning democracy. However, it remains unclear 
whether this reflected a prevalent political sentiment at the time, or merely served 
as a rhetorical figure. In any case, it brought about a  merging of technical-legal 
considerations with political and normative arguments. 
 
An argument brought forward by all supporting parties was that re-united 
Germany’s courts merely enforced GDR law, as all relevant deeds were also 
prohibited under the GDR’s criminal code. The argument was that due to the will 
of state and party leaders, crimes had not been prosecuted. Thus, newly induced 
trials would merely do the job of the GDR’s third branch. This marked a very 
positivist understanding of GDR law, hence a very positivist idea of the functional 
role of the law in an authoritarian regime. This idea suffered from a series of 
conceptual and intellectual inconsistencies. For instance, it appears questionable 
why considerable legislative and judicial efforts should be spent on enforcing the 
laws of a state which, at the same time, was characterised as an authoritarian regime 
and an Unrechtsstaat. Looking at West German debates between 1961 and 1989, 
another dogmatic inconsistency is evident. In these twenty-eight years, it was West 
German legal dogma that most of GDR government crimes were punishable under 
West German law. Now, after the fall of the Wall, the punishability under East 
German law was emphasised and initial West German claims of punishability were 
 
387 Kielmansegg, Peter Graf: Die Grammatik der Freiheit. Acht Versuche über den demokratischen 
Verfassungsstaat (= Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, vol. 1376), Bonn: 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2013, pp. 145-180; Ely, John H.: Democracy and Distrust. 
A Theory of Judicial Review, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press 21992; Alleweldt, Ralf: 
'Die Idee der gerichtlichen Überprüfung von Gesetzen in den Federalist Papers', in: Zeitschrift für 






played down. These two aspects amplify a perception that any reason available was 
deployed in order to justify the pursued purpose. 
This all reflects that the necessity of judicial Aufarbeitung – and Aufarbeitung in 
general – was widely uncontested in Germany’s post-reunification political debate. 
Essentially, almost all political forces seemed to accept the necessity of criminal 
trials against former GDR officials as unquestionable axiom. The SED’s successor 
party PDS was the only political force which rejected the planned legislation and 
voiced concerns that a criminal-justice-based approach would entail significant 
negative consequences for the processes of transition and transformation of East 
Germany into a functioning democracy, Rechtsstaat and market economy. For their 
speaker, Uwe-Jens Heuer, criminal trials had to be seen in the wider context of 
transformative experiences. He warned that continued and extended criminal 
prosecution of GDR officials, if not limited to a few leading individuals, could 
become yet another strain on a collective East German soul already burdened with 
economic and social frustrations. 
 
As will be demonstrated in chapter 4, criminal trials were carried out in ordinary 
regional courts. The occasionally-voiced idea of setting up some form of 
revolutionary or people’s tribunals was not executed. No grand comprehensive 
debate on transitional justice was held after or during the run-up to German 
unification. No central political decision was taken to deploy the criminal law in 
this process. Its use emerged, as argued in chapters 1 and 3, out of a mix of path 
dependence, conservative ideological hegemony and continuity from initially East-
German ways of dealing with former GDR leaders. Hence, on a political and 
symbolic level, these legislative debates served as a surrogate debate on the concept 
of criminal prosecution as measure of transitional justice. Both Limitation Periods 
Acts served as retroactive justification and legitimisation, and the parliamentary 
proceedings giving birth to those acts can be understood as symbolic and surrogate 






of the criminal law was defended and politically resolved, even though the third 
branch had initiated the trials already. Despite the claim that those proceedings were 
inevitable and without alternative, they were not. Naturally, law makers – or 
negotiators of the TGR – would have been free to prescribe amnesia, a grand forgive 
and forget. They did not, and the Limitation Periods Acts with their genealogy are 
the most visible statement of a widely shared political will, disguised as inevitable 
factual necessity. 
The Border Guard Trials also played into an international development. In their 
remarks, Wolfgang Ullmann and Jörg van Essen pointed to the deplorable lack of 
an international criminal law which could have regulated how to handle officials of 
an authoritarian and abusive regime. The debate on both acts fell into the time 
immediately preceding and following the installation of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Den Haag. This decision, taken by 
UN-Security Council Resolution No. 827 on 25 May 1993, marked the first step of 
an institutionalisation of an International Criminal Law after more than forty years 
of standstill during the time of the Cold War, after the Nuremberg Trials had 
established some of the basics of International Criminal Law in the late 1940s. 
Thus, reunited Germany’s debates were shaped by international debates, but they 
also left their imprint on political, diplomatic, academic and legal debates on the 
subject matter, which provisionally culminated in the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague in 1998.388  
.  
Initial fears regarding the legality and especially the constitutionality of both 
laws could be swept aside during the legislative process. The courts have not 
dismissed the acts as unconstitutional in subsequent years. The laws effectively 
targeted all sorts of socialist crimes. This included not only major crimes, such as 
 
388  On the intersection between debates about German state crimes and the development of 







murder or manslaughter, but also seemingly minor crimes such as trespass, invasion 
of personal privacy or voter fraud. On a large scale, all these deeds had been 
essential to the running of the GDR’s dictatorship and hence it was considered fair 
and wise to include them. 
The inclusion of post-reunification crimes in the extension of limitation periods 
is but one example of attempts to relate criminal trials to other forms of transitional 
justice. Including these crimes can be understood as an attempt to counter 
widespread frustration about the economic downturn of East Germany’s economy, 
soaring unemployment, and alleged cases of fraud and other economic crimes. With 
this inclusion, legislators tacitly admitted that criminal justice had to be understood 
in the wider context of transformative practices and experiences which East 
Germany underwent in the early 1990s. Another example is Michael Luther’s 
reference to the 1. SED-Unrechtsbereinigungsgesetz, which aimed at rehabilitating 
former political prisoners. This law targeted the GDR’s victims, while the 
Verjährungsgesetze targeted the perpetrators: legislators understood the wider 
context of what they were voting on. This link was also implicitly acknowledged 
by Federal Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger when she related 
the people’s expectation for trials to be carried out with frustration over missed life 
chances. But was the ordinary criminal law the right mechanism to address missed 
life chances? Would not other, more comprehensive forms of revolutionary justice 
have been more appropriate for acknowledging those far-reaching impacts of the 
dictatorship? 
Aufarbeitung in general and criminal trials in particular were seen as without 
alternative. Naturally, they were not. Alternative approaches to transitional justice 
could have included amnesties, partial amnesties for low-ranking officials, extra-
legal or extra-ordinary courts and trials etc. However, such alternative approaches 
were not discussed, except by the PDS. However, given its involvement with former 
GDR leaders, it is fair to say that the PDS could hardly be seen as a credible agent 






As proxy justification and sanctioning of criminal trials, the laws had a much 
bigger societal relevance than their legislative content would have allowed for. It 
marked the point where a re-united country decided to pursue criminal trials as a 
transformative measure – but this public decision came after trials and 
investigations had already commenced. As almost all legislators failed to discuss 
potential other forms transitional justice measures, a lack of alternatives was 
suggested. This suggestion contributed to a key feature of the trials themselves: that 
they were a de-centralised form of transitional justice which de-politicised a 








3. Criminal Prosecution in the Late GDR, 
1989-1990 
Calls for Justice 
Before the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, the SED regime had tried 
everything to to preserve its power, not even shying away from toppling their own 
leader. On 18 October 1989, Honecker was ousted by the SED’s Central Committee 
(Zentralkommitee, ZK), but this could not stop the revolutionary tide in the GDR. 
389 
The fall of the Wall marked a stark transition. It made clear that what followed 
was not just a change of heads, but that a regime change was imminent. Thus, as 
soon as the old regime had lost its intimidating countenance when the Wall had 
fallen, demands for criminal prosecution of former leaders were made by citizens. 
Even a dictatorship of 40 years could not eradicate a sense of what is right and 
wrong in peoples' minds. Over the years, many citizens of the GDR developed a 
grudge against their ruling class for enjoying luxuries which most people in East 
Germany could hardly dream of. This contrast fuelled numerous letters to the 
GDR’s Attorney General and prompted citizens to offer leads to law enforcement 
authorities in pursuit of corrupt elites.390  
Remarkable courage was displayed by the teaching staff of a high school in a 
municipality near Saxony’s Czech border. In a letter dated 7 November 1989, that 
is, two days before the fall of the Wall, they targeted regime leaders for their 
apparently widely known luxuries: 
‘We demand criminal prosecution of all those who, in their position and function, 
obtained unjustified advantages for themselves, who took advantage of the property 
of the people, who obtained a standard of living more than just different from that of 
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the labourers, whose lavishness and prestige is expressed in the personal power of 
disposal over guesthouses and similar objects, their … corruptness, their taking and 
giving of "gifts", whose economic crimes can be proved by appropriate 
investigations.’391 
Despite their expression of a ‘deep concern for our socialist Heimat’ as an 
introductory phrase, this was a bold – or potentially socially suicidal – move. Their 
letter reflected an intense frustration about verbal abuse which they claimed to have 
endured as representatives of the state. Therefore, they also demanded ‘immediate 
suspension’ for all those who had contributed to the ‘current misery’ by breaking 
‘state and party discipline’, irrespective of their rank or their state and party 
function.392 Lastly, the 26 signatories, many of whom were women, took on Egon 
Krenz. The teachers demanded a public statement from Egon Krenz as leader of the 
election commission in the local elections in spring 1989, as ‘massive 
allegations’393 of voter fraud in these elections were already widely known in the 
autumn of 1989. In early November 1989, Krenz had just been promoted to 
Secretary-General of the SED and Staatsratsvorsitzender, that is, de facto head of 
state and government of the GDR. Their direct criticism of the leadership reflects 
that in early November 1989, the regime could no longer control public outrage 
about cases of corruption and inappropriate luxuries of elites. 394  Given the 
comprehensive allegations against former state leaders, the signatories showed 
significant trust in the work of their country’s judiciary’s independence, remarkably 
 
391 ‘Wir fordern die strafrechtliche Verfolgung der Vergehen all derjenigen, die sich in ihrer 
Stellung und Funktion ungerechtfertigte Vorteile verschafften, die sich am Vermögen des Volkes 
vergriffen, die sich einen Lebensstandard ergaunerten, der sich von dem der Werktätigen mehr als 
nur unterscheidet, deren Prunk- und Renommiersucht in der persönlichen Verfügungsgewalt über 
Gästehäuser und ähnliche Objekte zum Ausdruck kommt, deren …  Korrumpiertheit (sic!), deren 
Nehmen und Geben von “Präsenten”, deren Wirtschaftsvergehen durch entsprechende 
Untersuchungen nachgewiesen werden können.’, in: BArch DP 3 / 1290, No. 2. (Specific details of 
the senders remain anonymous in this study in accordance with regulations of the Bundesarchiv.) 
392 BArch DP 3 / 1290, No. 2. (Specific details of the senders remain anonymous in this study in 
accordance with regulations of the Bundesarchiv.) 
393 ‘massive Vorwürfe’, BArch DP 3 / 1290, No. 2. (Specific details of the senders remain 
anonymous in this study in accordance with regulations of the Bundesarchiv.) 






even before the fall of the Wall made it clear that the old regime was dead and 
buried.  
Apparently, East German citizens did not see the GDR as that outright 
Unrechtsstaat discussed today. At least initially, they turned to their country's 
courts to address abuses of power which had long been known to large parts of the 
wider public, but previously never been subject to judicial review. Arguably, 
corruption made tangible those benefits which the elites had enjoyed, and made 
them stand out clearly against material deprivations experienced by large parts of 
the GDR's population. This form of abuse of power therefore overshadowed other 
forms of deprivations experienced by East Germans. Moreover, the complaints 
addressed in this chapter were cast in terms of the GDR's own legal provisions, 
suggesting a certain remainder of public trust in legal institutions. Lastly, responses 
by civil servants such as teachers and state prosecutors, who were themselves 
attacked as a part of the regime and were now keen to distance themselves from it, 
can be read as a sign of disintegration of the institutional system of the GDR. 
 
Still, we must not be confused: for most of the time, state prosecutors were an 
integral part of the dictatorship. This was also reinforced by an undated draft order 
by the National Defence Council (NVR) on state prosecutors’ role in a case of 
defence: According to this draft document, state prosecutors had to fulfil their duties 
primarily ‘in the implementation of decisions of the party of the working class’, and 
only secondarily guided by the constitution and laws.395 
In another letter to the Attorney General, a person from Dresden denounced top 
officials for allowing infrastructure and buildings to deteriorate. This piece dates 
from 9 November 1989 and makes no mention of the fall of the Wall, suggesting it 
was posted before the writer received notification of that evening’s 
 






developments.396 The writer demanded that party and union leaders be charged for 
deliberate damage to socialist property (§ 163 StGB-DDR), an offence usually more 
easily punished than offences against private property, despite all socialist ideology 
and rhetoric.397 
 
Numerous letters to the Attorney General reveal a widely shared knowledge – or 
at least hearsay – of the elites’ luxurious lifestyle, like a piece of writing from a 
citizen in Freiberg (Saxony) demonstrates (for reasons of data protection, the 
authors’ stated names are not mentioned here) This  is a notable contrast to letters 
sent a considerable time before the fall of the Wall, which usually hid their author’s 
identity.398 On 10 November 1989, hours after the fall of the Wall, the writer drafted 
(or dated) a letter asking if an alleged luxurious building for Hermann Axen (SED, 
member of the Politbüro) near the Baltic Sea (and hence at the other end of the 
country) was correctly funded or if it was ‘just another fancy building for state 
functionaries’399. Only days later, a citizens committee from Zepernick, north of 
Berlin, asked the Attorney General where the money from foreign exchange income 
had gone to. The revenues belonged ‘to the whole people’. Whoever had 
misappropriated people’s property for personal benefit had to be criminally 
charged, the committee demanded.400  In a similar manner, in a letter dated 16 
November 1989, a lady gave the Attorney General a hint that Siegfried Lorenz, First 
Secretary of the SED-district leadership in Karl-Marx-Stadt (today: Chemnitz) had 
a private house built with financial means from the ministry of popular education 
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(Ministerium für Volksbildung), which, at the time of the allegations, was headed 
by Erich Honecker’s wife Margot.401 Without any polemic, the author merely asked 
the prosecutors to investigate and reply. 
But it was not only private persons who used the fall of the Honecker regime to 
demand investigations. The Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitung (BGL) was a post within 
the federation of the official trade unions, the Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 
(FDGB). In each company, factory or institution, one or several persons were 
elected by union members for administrative help in questions like finding nursery 
places or booking vacations in union holiday homes. 402  In a letter dated 27 
November 1989, the BGL of Berlin’s institute for the preservation of monuments 
(Institut für Denkmalpflege) uttered outrage at reports about luxurious lifestyle of 
‘criminal union leaders’ and demanded criminal charges be brought against them.403  
Numerous further letters were posted to the Attorney General, often by private 
persons and sometimes by the staff of institutions such as the aforementioned 
teaching staff or the BGL. All of these letters have in common that they appear to 
be written under a real name;  at least nothing suggests the contrary. Moreover, the 
predominant topic which sparked these letters‘ outrage was an alleged luxurious 
lifestyle of (former) leaders of state, party, and unions. The suspicion that this had 
been realised by misappropriating public finances weighed heavy, especially in a 
society which claimed more moral purity than capitalist societies, and in a country 
where public property was labelled people’s property. While sometimes writers 
primarily expressed their frustration, others used their writings to give prosecutors 
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specific hints or even formally report an offence, for instance against long-time 
leader Erich Honecker. Another person who was targeted often was the former 
leader of the FDGB, Harry Tisch. In almost all letters, writers demanded criminal 
prosecution for corruption and waste of public money. While most letters were sent 
after the fall of the Wall, some were written in the days between Honecker was 
ousted (on 18 October 1989) and 9 November.404 
 
Only few letters went beyond this specific subject area. One letter, dated 14 
November 1989, also uttered frustration about how former government politicians 
had improved their living standards at the expense of citizens, thereby ‘violating 
the constitution’ and ‘abusing citizens’ trust’.405 The writer went on to claim that 
therefore, the government was responsible for families leaving the country (via 
Hungary and Austria) in summer and autumn 1989 and after the fall of the Wall in 
November of that year. Leaders were responsible for fraud against citizens, for 
waste of public money, and most notably: 
‘They are guilty of driving many citizens to their deaths because they wanted to escape 
oppression and paternalism and were shot at the border by the allegedly non-existent 
firing order.’406 
This is one of few letters which also included deaths at the Wall (and the 
notorious ‘firing order’ which never was found) in its reasoning. However, it was 
not the borderguards who carried out the shots were charged, but those leaders who 
allegedly made fugitives flee the country. In an interesting twist, the writer fails to 
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demand criminal prosecution as a way to handle former leaders for their alleged 
wrongdoings, but demands: 
'Until the machinations of these people have been thoroughly investigated, they 
should not be allowed...to travel abroad. If they are proven guilty, they should not be 
granted concessions. Like every average citizen of the GDR, they should receive an 
appropriate living space and also the pension should correspond to the average citizen, 
so that they get to feel once what it means to have to earn one's living with the 
minimum pension.’407 
So while deaths at the Wall were included in this author’s list of government 
wrongdoings, he suggested a sanction which once again would have been related to 
experiences of deprivation allegedly shared by many ‘average’ East Germans. 
A final letter shall be presented here which displays one of the widest arrays of 
accusations against the state leadership. In a letter dated 17 November 1989, its 
author claims to be writing for an initiative in support of ‘anti-Stalinist’ and 
democratic groups in the GDR. S/he accuses former leaders of establishing a 
dictatorship, of falsifying elections, of violating the ‘dignity and freedom of 
citizens’ through violent interventions at demonstrations. Moreover, s/he alleges 
violations against the right to education, freedom of speech, freedom of association. 
In their perception, the ‘personality and liberty of each citizen of the GDR had been 
violated’ by the border regime and by violations of postal and telecommunications 
secrecy. Lastly, the Volkskammer had only been a fake parliament, as the writer 
quite accurately claimed.408 No specific sanction was demanded in this piece of 
writing. 
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Finding the Right Way Forward 
If this survey of letters to the Attorney General shows that the population focused 
mainly on crimes like corruption, the misappropriation of public finances, and a 
widespread claim for criminal investigations into this category of crimes, this 
emphasis is reinforced in a drafted criminal law reform.409 The draft penal reform 
(which was eventually realised after  the Volkskammer elections of March 1990),410 
was discussed as early as 27 November 1989, that is, less than three weeks after the 
Wall had fallen. It suggested the introduction of a new paragraph into the penal 
code effectively penalising wiretapping. Moreover, an amendment for § 219 StGB-
DDR was proposed. According to this amendment, crossing the border without a 
passport was no longer considered a criminal offence. Lastly, the draft reform 
proposed a paragraph regulating abuse of office and criminalising the destruction 
of sensitive  documents: 
‘Anyone who commits a bodily injury (§ 115), a deprivation of liberty (§ 131), an 
insult (§ 137), a coercion (129), a threat (§ 130), or a destruction of documents or data 
relevant to evidence (§§ 241, 241a) in the course of state activities may be punished 
with a term of imprisonment of up to five years.’411 
All of this suggests that in late 1989, the penal code was considered an important 
instrument of managing the ongoing revolution. However, at this time, it seemed 
paramount to provide legal certainty for cross-border travel and to penalise such 
abuse of power which the secret service Stasi and party leaders had notoriously 
committed. Another focus was put on the prevention of officials from destroying 
compromising files, as they were seen as a cornerstone of elucidation of the 
dictatorship. Since criminal trials seemed institutionally undisputed, it seems fair to 
assume that for many GDR lawyers, corrupt leaders and secret service had not acted 
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in accordance with  but in violation of GDR law.412  Hence, using this law to 
prosecute them would not pose any form of legal challenge. Prosecution of border 
guards, however, was once again largely left out in considerations in late 1989. 
 
The same notion can be seen in demands of political actors. During the Peaceful 
Revolution of 1989/90, Neues Forum was one of several political movements 
whose work led up to the fall of the regime in November 1989, and subsequently 
part of East Germany’s Round Table.413 Afterwards, Neues Forum was one of the 
oppositionary groups which were part of East Germany’s Round Table.414 In a 
motion tabled for the Round Table’s session on 22 January 1990, Neues Forum 
explicitly demanded criminal investigations against those who had destroyed files 
as potential means of evidence against Stasi officials and the SED’s security 
branch.415 In their motion, Neues Forum claimed that ‘a peaceful and democratic 
future’ of the GDR was ‘unthinkable’ without a ‘truthful disclosure of past and 
present.’416 Moreover, the movement demanded that all duties of silence be lifted 
and that false testimonies be prosecuted consistently.417 Criminal trials were again 
seen as an integral part of such a ‘truthful disclosure’, and such demands were 
predominantly directed against those who had contributed to citizens’ experience 
of being bullied and of being spied upon. 
Another piece pointing into the same direction was a public appeal of Erfurter 
Bürgerkommittee. This was an ad-hoc committee composed of opposition 
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politicians and dedicated citizens which tried to prevent the destruction of 
compromising Stasi files by blocking and occupying Stasi offices. Similar 
movements in other towns can be seen as a non-institutional precursor to the BStU. 
In an appeal of 9 January 1990, the committee demanded to ‘solve’ Stasi crimes 
and to block any special bonuses paid to Stasi officials. Moreover, the Stasi’s 
dissolution was demanded and criminal trials against Stasi staff and members of the 
SED leadership. Lastly, the group also called for the SED’s assets to be disclosed. 
This appeal was signed by representatives of former block parties CDU, NDPD and 
LDPD, as well as by opposition parties like SDP and Greens and other groups or 
citizens’ movements like Neues Forum, Demokratischer Aufbruch, Offene Arbeit, 
and further citizens apparently without any party affiliations.418 
 
However, in winter 1989/90, it was far from clear how, if at all, former state and 
party leaders of Stasi officials would be criminally prosecuted. 419  After all, 
protecting them against any criminal claims had been an integral part of state 
practice for decades. Therefore, regional state prosecutors felt the need to urge their 
superiors to go after former leaders for their alleged acts of corruption. In a letter 
dated 4 December 1989, the district attorney of Kreis Glauchau expressed his 
‘dismay’ at revelations about the leadership’s crimes. He also criticised the 
Attorney General for not investigating these claims thoroughly enough, thereby 
damaging the credibility of all state prosecutors. 420  In a letter also dated 4 
December, the district attorney of Kreis Aue expressed their resolution to contribute 
to an atmosphere of ‘openness in our very own work’ 421  to protect state 
prosecutors’reputations . However, the writer also expressed the belief that at that 
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point, the authority still enjoyed significant credibility with the general population, 
as reflected in numerous petitions and letters. 
These letters need to be read with care, as they could also been have written in a 
spirit of indulging revolutionaries while elegantly sweeping one’s one political 
entanglement under the carpet. Still, they once again reflect that citizens and 
institutions alike considered the criminal law an effective tool of dealing with 
former elites, and even a means that was politically untarnished.  
Government and opposition politicians, however, knew that the law was far from 
being ‘pure’ and free of all political influence. Hence, in its session on 7 and 8 
December 1989, the Round Table felt the need to pass a series of resolutions on 
'Rechtsstaatlichkeit':422  Most importantly for this dissertation, the Round Table 
determined that ‘[a]ny person who has committed abuse of authority and corruption 
shall be held accountable on the basis of the Penal Code in force.’423 While this may 
sound like a perfectly obvious and superfluous statement, it demonstrates the 
perceived necessity that politicians weigh in on how to persecute former elites. 
Apparently, a different behaviour could have been expected from state authorities 
in the ‘old days’, if politicians had not reminded them of the legal situation. 
Therefore, they also stated that: ‘[t]his means, if necessary, the issuing of warrants 
of arrest and not the ordering of unlawful house arrests’, as was practice with former 
elites under the SED regime.424 
An Ambitious Beginning  
Those vocal demands for criminal trials were being heard by GDR state 
prosecutors. By 10 January 1990, merely two months after the fall of the Wall, 
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twenty-two investigative procedures had been launched in the area of responsibility 
of the military prosecutor’s office alone.425 Of those twenty-two investigations, 
twelve were directed against senior officers. They were under investigation for 
allegations such as destruction of documents (§241 StGB-DDR), unauthorised 
possession of firearms or exploders (§ 206), misdemeanours or fraud to the 
detriment of socialist property (§ 161, 159), verbal abuse (§ 137), coercion (§ 129), 
or battery (§ 115).426  
Ten military leaders were also under investigation in early 1990. The report 
quotes that former Stasi head, Army-General Erich Mielke was under investigation 
for abuse of confidence (§ 165).427 This paragraph428 punishes abuse of office to the 
economic detriment of the GDR in severe cases with up to ten years in prison. Other 
military leaders were also under investigation for allegations such as abuse of 
confidence (§ 165), destruction of documents (§ 241), and crimes against ‘socialist 
property’, i.e. state property (§§ 161a, 162, 165). This group included generals and 
officers who had had senior positions in the Stasi, in the state’s administrative 
hierarchy (as heads of a Kreis- or Bezirksamt) and the manager of supplies to the 
elite’s gated community in Wandlitz. Three of those cadres had been taken into 
custody, including Mielke.429 Over the coming months, many other leaders became 
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subject of preliminary proceedings for similar claims, but also for alleged voter 
fraud, like Potsdam's head mayor.430 
By August 1990, three former leaders had already been charged with abuse of 
confidence (§ 165) and economic crimes against ‘socialist’ property, i.e. state 
property: Harry Tisch, former chair of the FDGB; Werner Krolikowski, member of 
the Politbüro and responsible for economic and currency affairs; and Gerald 
Götting, who was chair of the GDR’s SED-loyal CDU (not to be  confused with 
West Germany’s then-ruling party CDU) and deputy of Egon Krenz as head of state 
and government.431 Moreover, a series of former leaders were under investigation, 
predominantly for economic crimes to the detriment of public finances and the 
country’s economy: former head of state Erich Honecker, head of Stasi Erich 
Mielke, SED-secretary for economic affairs Günter Mittag; moreover, former head 
of government and head of state Willi Stoph, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski as 
former leader of the GDR’s secret commercial enterprise Kommerzielle 
Koordinierung (KoKo), whose aim was to provide foreign currencies for the GDR; 
lastly, also Hermann Axen was under investigation, formally a senior foreign policy 
figure in the SED.432 
During the eleven months between the fall of the Wall and German reunification, 
nineteen charges of voter fraud were brought against seventy-sixdefendants. At the 
same time, twenty-one charges of corruption were brought against twenty-eight 
defendants. At least forty-two defendants had been temporarily arrested during this 
time. In the electoral fraud cases, eleven penalty orders were issued and six verdicts 
were handed down. In these cases, the defendants received suspended prison 
sentences of four to nine months. In the corruption and abuse of office cases, only 
one final verdict was handed down (for a prison sentence without suspension), 
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while all other proceedings were being continued after reunification. Altogether, 
124 individuals were investigated. 433 It has been pointed out that during these few 
months of criminal trials within the GDR, there was no acquittal and in no case was 
the opening of the main hearing refused – both things happened regularly in 
investigations and trials after reunification. This has been seen as an indication, that  
‘… despite radical changes in legal practice, the legal situation appeared clear and the 
legal conditions for punishment were not questioned. The change in the handling of 
the law therefore gave no reason to discuss the prohibition of retroactivity also 
applicable in GDR criminal law’.434 
Experts have therefore hailed the GDR’s judicial branch for their ‘remarkable’ 
quantities of completion, especially in the light of strained staff resources, and 
described state prosecutors and judges as 'an important pillar and driver of the 
GDR's peaceful revolution'.435 
Beyond criminal trials 
However, calls for criminal prosecution as a way to secure justice were by no 
means the only aspect of revolutionary or transitional justice avant la lettre (A. 
Weinke)436 during those months in late 1989 and early 1990. Perhaps even more 
important was to secure the progress of the revolution and to protect it from counter-
revolutionary forces of the old regime. Hence, calls to dissolve the former regime’s 
central institutions became louder. For the Round Table’s session on 15 January 
1990, Demokratischer Aufbruch437 tabled a motion demanding the dissolution of 
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the SED, the Stasi – or as it had been renamed in November 1989, the Amt für 
Nationale Sicherheit (AfNS).438 For the same session of the Round Table, Neues 
Forum demanded that all security organs as well as the SED be declared 
unconstitutional.439 In line with citizens' committees like the one in Erfurt (see 
above), both movements called for the Stasi files to be opened to the public – a 
claim later accommodated by the establishment of the BStU. Symbolic, pragmatic 
and discursive indictments oft he old regime flanked and facilitated legal ones.440 
These movements clearly supported and often demanded criminal prosecution 
of former leaders. But they also showed sensitivity for the wider necessities of a 
transitional process, including the very basic need to protect an ongoing revolution 
by dismantling institutional opponents. This is reflected in a Round Table report of 
early January 1990, which pressed politicians to continue to dissolve the Defence 
Ministry and to request the National People’s Army (NVA) to surrender their 
weapons.441 
A Menace to the Revolution 
The greatest menace to the revolution’s success and progress, however, was the 
GDR’s grave economic situation. Even before the fall of the Wall, the economic 
situation was dire. The state was all but bankrupt: its economy lagged way behind 
West European competition and the currency was so weak that it was difficult to 
import raw materials. This economic slump was further catalysed when hundreds 
of thousands started to leave the country once it had become safe to do so in 
November 1989.  
This was also understood by those in charge. Hence, many motions tabled at the 
Round Table dealt with the country’s economic crisis. In  the aforementioned 
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Round Table report of early 1990 , a dire picture of the GDR’s economic situation 
was painted. Members of the Round Table were informed that not only were the 
economy, the protection of jobs, increasing efficiency, and environmental 
protection important issues but also,more dramatically, the report discussed how 
sufficient energy and food supply could be ensured throughout winter 1989/90.442  
In another undated report for the Round Table, supposedly from early 1990, it 
was stated that some 29,000 people had already been lain off by the Ministry of 
National Defense, with another 22,500 people being sent into integration measures 
(at a total of approximately 85,500 staff).443 The Green party understood that a 
revolutionary process and the new state which was about to be born needed to 
handle this economic transformation with great care. Hence, they demanded to 
integrate those who had lost their jobs since November 1989, as otherwise they 
might turn into a radicalised group of counter-revolutionaries.444 
Likewise, in a statement before the Round Table on 15 January 1990, head of 
government Hans Modrow asked three things of Round Table participants: to 
contribute to all protests remaining peaceful, to contribute to keeping the economy 
afloat and to influence GDR citizens not to leave the country, as a continued mass 
exodus would have threatened any prospect of a successful political and economic 
turnaround.445 
Summary 
In this chapter, we have seen that criminal trials were an integral part of the 
GDR’s Peaceful Revolution and of efforts to manage its aftermath from November 
1989 to October 1990. State prosecutors, politicians of the Round Table, and 
citizens regularly turned to the criminal law in response to revelations about 
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unlawful behaviour of state and party leaders. Remarkably, a few private demands 
for criminal investigations against former senior leaders were uttered even before 
the fall of the Wall – a stark illustrations of how the success of civil protests during 
summer and autumn 1989 emboldened the old regime’s critics. Before the evening 
of 9 November 1989, no one could have foreseen whether the transition of power 
from Honecker to Krenz in October 1989 had been the regime’s last rebellion 
against its demise or simply a generational change. 
However, launching criminal investigations against former state officials was by 
no means the only priority during the winter months of 1989/90. We have seen that 
a drafted penal law reform predominantly aimed at providing citizens with legal 
certainty, especially regarding cross-border travel. Criminal trials as a 
transformative measure were not discussed during these reform talks. This 
illustrates that for citizens and officials alike, many acts of ‘state crime’ such as 
corruption and voter fraud had violated GDR laws at the time, hence no reformed 
law was necessary. 
Parties and civil rights movements included in the Round Table from December 
1989 to March 1990 tabled sweeping demands regarding criminal trials against 
former state and party leaders. Remarkably, in their demands, they predominantly 
targeted the former elites’ alleged corruption and misappropriation of public funds 
for private luxuries. However, Round Table participants also voiced demands for 
other forms of transitional justice, such as opening Stasi archives or the dissolution 
of SED and Stasi. Those far-reaching calls were mirrored by many letters of private 
citizens to the GDR’s Attorney-General, mostly giving hints in alleged cases of 
corruption and leaders’ inappropriate luxuries. In the light of many citizens’ 
material and immaterial hardships over decades, those economic crimes highlighted 







This strong focus on economic crimes was mirrored in the actions of state 
prosecutors before German reunification.446 Between November 1989 and October 
1990, twenty-one charges of corruption were brought against twenty-eight 
defendants. This predominantly included charges for the luxurious housing estate 
in Wandlitz, for concession on rents, and for the designation of specific hunting 
grounds for the elites.447 Nineteen charges of voter fraud were brought against 
seventy-six defendants.448 In these cases, eleven penalty orders were issued and six 
verdicts delivered. Only one final verdict was delivered in cases for economic 
crimes, while all other trials or investigations were continued after reunification. 
After German reunification, hardly any new investigation in such crimes was 
launched by re-united Germany’s state prosecutors. Thus, it seems fair to assume 
that GDR state prosecutors decisively shaped the course of criminal justice as a 
transformative tool. Without their strong emphasis on investigating corruption and 
abuse of office cases, this category of deeds might have been neglected by post-
unification criminal trials. The success of those investigations is further highlighted 
by the fact that the GDR could probably only deploy between twenty-five and fifty 
state prosecutors for this complex. Hence, the GDR’s initiatives have been praised 
for their 'remarkable' performance in the light of strained staff resources.449 
Yet, we must not overlook that various demands for forms of transitional justice 
other than criminal trials were being uttered. These stretched from opening Stasi 
files over depriving former elites of their privileges to the dissolution of the SED. 
However, motions submitted to the Round Table as well as their debates 
demonstrate that the contemporary meaning of the GDR’s economic disruptions 
can hardly be overestimated. At times, even supply of heat and electricity appeared 
to be at stake and the government felt the need to appeal to all parties to help prevent 
further masses from leaving the country. At the same time, the lay-off of hundreds 
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of thousands of members of staff not only of GDR authorities, but also of bankrupt 
companies proved a significant social burden. 
In the light of these developments, it was important to develop strategies which 
could have provided the new societal and governmental system with legitimacy. 
This was, in part, acknowledged by Round Table participants. Part and parcel of 
this task was the deployment of the criminal law.  
All of this supports our argument that, in late 1989 and early 1990, criminal trials 
were seen as an integral, inevitable, and feasible tool of revolutionary justice and 
was strongly pushed by East German forces. Both investigations and actual trials 
did, however, mainly happen in the field of economic crimes of former state elites, 
as well as voter fraud. Arguably, these crimes most directly stood for what GDR 
citizens felt they had been deprived of for so long: a voice in public affairs and 
individual economic prosperity. Against the backdrop of revelations of the luxuries 
which former leaders had enjoyed, one’s own material hardships weighed even 
heavier and could no longer be justified with a greater good, now exposed as 
hollow. Prosecution of border guards for fatal shots at the border, on the other hand, 
were not among the most prominent issues contemplated in the revolutionary 
months – at least not in the documents examined for this study. It would be to 
sweeping an argument to assume that the killings at the border were a topic that 
predominantly aroused West Germans. But it may be asked if, perhaps, everyday 
material deprivations (in contrast to the abundant luxuries of party leaders) were an 
even more important issue in the GDR, at least once the freedom to travel had been 







4. Judicial practice after reunification: the 
case of the border guards trials, 1991-2005 
From the outset, the Border Guard Trials were confronted with a series of 
challenges. These proceedings were the focal point of many ideological and legal 
debates during German re-unification. Why should re-united Germany's courts have 
competence to adjudicate on government acts of a state which no longer existed? 
Or why not? How could those be held accountable for killings at the Berlin Wall 
and at the Inner-German border who were ultimately responsible, even though they 
had not pulled the trigger or buried the mine? And why should it be acceptable to 
punish soldiers who had 'merely followed orders'? These questions mirrored 
contestations of the GDR's legitimacy of the Cold War, as well as disputes about 
West Germany's adjudication of National Socialist crimes. 
 This chapter examines the judicial practice of the Border Guard Trials from 
1991 until 2005, and asks how the courts have dealt with the challenges they faced. 
How did they establish the criminality of the border regime, and how did they assess 
individual guilt of rank-and-file border guards vis-a-vis military and political elites? 
To what extent did the judgments reflect the transitional and political nature of the 
trials, and how did they reflect upon the daily compulsions of life in a dictatorship? 
In addressing these and other questions, this chapter argues that the courts 
quickly developed a coherent legal approach to the most pressing dogmatic 
questions (1991-93). The jurisprudence reflected a legalistic approach, especially 
through a textual reading of GDR laws. This was essential for the juridical 
safeguarding of the convictions, especially against claims that the prohibition of 
retroactive punishment (nulla poena sine lege) had been violated. The Radbruch 
Formula, a legal principle developed in response to National Socialist crimes, was 






and normative link between the 'Third Reich' and the GDR. With a taxonomy of 
sentences, mild prison terms and acknowledging remarks on defendants, courts 
tried to accommodate the tensions inherent in the trials. However, as chapter 5 
demonstrates, this mostly failed to have an impact on public perceptions.  
This chapter will start out with a detailed exploration of the two first verdicts 
against border guards, handed down in January and February 1992. Their revisions 
by the Federal Criminal Court in late 1992 and early 1993 laid the foundation for 
the rest of the border guard cases. These two proceedings are thus of great 
significance. I will then present how the courts strove to prosecute former leaders 
in the cases against members of the National Defence Council (NVR) in 1992-93, 
and the Politbüro in 1995-97. Lastly, the decisions of the Federal Constitutional 
Court (1996) and the European Court of Human Rights (2001) will be presented 
which gave the final and authoritative decisions on the legality of the Border Guard 
Trials. As a matter of principle in German criminal law, proceedings in regional 
courts are not recorded, neither audiovisually nor in written form. As the 
investigative files have not been disclosed for this project, this chapter therefore 
relies on an examination of comprehensive court verdicts. 
 
Between 1991 and 2005, approximately 75,000 investigations were launched 
against 100,000 persons. Eventually, 1,021 trials were opened, which saw 1,737 
defendants in the dock. Of these, fifty-fourt per cent were convicted, 24,1 per cent 
were acquitted. In the remaining cases, the proceedings had to be terminated for 
various reasons. This was a relatively low conviction rate which, in itself, raises 
doubt as to allegations of 'victor's justice'. Likewise, convicts received 
exceptionally frequently suspended sentences. A mere three per cent of prison 
sentences exceeded three years. The biggest case group with regard to the number 
of proceedings were proceedings for abuse of justice. However, these trials often 






superiors, including political and military elites, constitute the biggest case group 
in terms of defendants: thirty-one per cent of the convicts were sentenced for 
killings at the border. Proceedings for Stasi crimes made up for fourteen per cent.450 
Altogether, 753 persons were convicted: 275 in connection with killings at the 
border; 181 were convicted for abuse of justice, and 99 for voter fraud. Stasi crimes 
entailed 69 convictions. 42 defendants were sentenced for physical abuse of 
prisoners, and 47 for doping. In cases for corruption and abuse of office, 13 
individuals were found guilty, and 5 persons were convicted for denunciation.451 
The Gueffroy Case – the First Precedent 
The trial against Ingo Heinrich, Peter Schmett, Andreas Kühnpast and Mike 
Schmidt was opened in May 1991 in Berlin. These four former border guards were 
charged with manslaughter. The defendants had been on duty as border guards on 
the night of 5 February 1989. In this night, the twenty-year-old friends Chris 
Gueffroy and Christian Gaudian attempted to flee the GDR from East Berlin’s 
district of Treptow into West-Berlin’s Neukölln near Britzer Allee. Dissatisfaction 
with their jobs, as well as a fear that Gueffroy could soon be drafted for military 
service were their main motivations. They chose 5 February 1989 since they 
mistakenly assumed that an ongoing state visit would prevent the border guards 
from carrying out fatal shootings – they were wrong in so far as the Swedish Prime 
Minister had left East Berlin before that day.452 
Gueffroy and Gaudian started their attempt just before midnight. After they had 
crossed the  three and a half metre high Hinterland wall, they accidentally touched 
the signal fence which caused an optical alarm to go off. The fugitives then crossed 
a patrol road, two control strips and a barrage trench before reaching the final fence. 
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Here, they repeatedly tried to climb the final fence. Equipped only with throwing 
anchors, and bare of all arms, they posed no threat to border guards.  
Kühnpast, one of the defendants, fired twelve bullets a hundred metres away. He 
claimed to have used continuous fire by accident. His post leader Schmett fired six 
single shots without hitting the fugitives. Schmidt and Heinrich, however, were 
much closer. As Schmidt, the post leader, had no weapon, he ordered his 
subordinate Heinrich: ‘Schieß doch!’. Heinrich fired two single shots on Gueffroy’s 
feet, but the victim remained standing. To prevent the imminent escape, Heinrich 
then fired a bullet into Gueffroy’s chest and pierced his heart. Gueffroy died within 
minutes. A doctor pronounced him dead at 12.15 am on 6 February 1989. Hospital 
files were manipulated and Gueffroy’s slayers were commended and obliged to 
remain silent. The death certificate was altered: the cause of death was no longer a 
‘shot though the heart’, but a ‘rupture of the heart muscle’. Gaudian was sent to 
prison and released to West Germany in October 1989.453 
 
When the defendants reached Gaudian and Gueffroy, Schmett insulted them. 
According to his statements during the trial, he did not do that because he had been 
a stalwart socialist but because the incident meant they could not leave service with 
‘white gloves’. In fact, none of the defendants appeared to be very political. They 
had been drafted to the border troops, and they indicated that their overarching goal 
was to leave service without shooting a fugitive or even having to arrest one.454 
Kühnpast, Heinrich, Schmett, and Schmidt were in their early 20s when they 
were conscripted to the border troops. Before that, the Stasi ran background checks 
to see if they were free of personal and family problems, without prior criminal 
charges and, perhaps most importantly, to see if they had any personal relationships 
to West Germany or West-Berlin which might encourage them to desert their 
comrades for the West.455  
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At the beginning of each shift, the border guards were divided up into pairs. 
During this so-called Vergatterung, officers reminded border guards of their duty 
to protect the integrity of the border; the implied meaning of this instruction was 
the prevention of illegal border crossings. . This often included a reference to the 
rules on the use of firearms. On 5 February 1989, Major Ronald Fabian had done 
that. As he stated in the trial, he had not spelled out the rules on the use of firearm 
on this day, but referred to them. As the court stated in the ruling, this appeared to 
be a ‘perfidious dual strategy’: the exact rules on the use of firearms were often 
only communicated in a deliberately nebulous way. As the Landgericht stated, most 
former border guards who gave testimonies as witnesses indicated that they only 
had a vague idea that they were supposed to only fire on fugitives’ feet to prevent 
a successful escape. At the same time, officers appear to have repeatedly urged their 
subordinates to prevent an escape at all costs. This way, an actual order to kill 
fugitives as a measure of last resort never had to be issued.456  
According to GDR laws457, the use of firearms against ‘Grenzverletzer’ was 
legal only if an escape was attempted by two or more persons, or with the use of 
weapons (which included climbing hooks). Human life was supposed to be spared 
‘where possible’ – that is: not unconditionally.458 Fabian, who was in charge of the 
defendants’ company, acknowledged that the use of firearms was not only tolerated, 
but supported by officers. As he said in court, soldiers were even being commended 
for their efforts when they had fired only at a single fugitive. In this case, Fabian 
conceded, the standard interpretation was that the firing guard had seen a shadow 
of a second person.459 In spite of the strategy of deliberately obscuring the command 
situation, all four defendants in this first case indicated that – to their knowledge – 
 
456 ibid, 50. 
457 § 27 GrenzG in conjunction with § 213 StGB. 
458 § 27 (5) GrenzG states: ‘Bei der Anwendung der Schußwaffe ist das Leben von Personen nach 
Möglichkeit zu schonen. (…) ’ 
459 Urteil des Landgerichts Berlin vom 20.1.1992, Az. (532) 2 Js 48/90 (9/91), in: Marxen, Klaus / 
Werle, Gerhard (eds): Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht. Dokumentation, Berlin: De Gruyter 2002, pp. 






the use of firearms was legal only in cases of desertion, when heavy equipment was 
used by fugitives, or when an escape was attempted by groups of two or more. 
Gaudian’s and Gueffroy’s attempted escape fell into this last category.460  
 
The regional court's verdict was handed down on 20 January 1992. As this was 
the first verdict ever on the border guards, both its outcome as well as its legal 
reasoning had been long awaited. Eventually, the Landgericht sentenced Heinrich 
to three years and six months in prison. Kühnpast received a suspended prison 
sentence of two years. 
The first major question which the court had to address was the question if the 
defendants' actions had been criminal at all. In the words of the court, it had to 
answer the question whether ‘(…) ... everything is lawful that has been formally 
and by interpretation been regarded as law.’461 The court negated this question and 
chose a bold justification grounded in natural law. Referring to an earlier FCJ ruling 
of 1952, the judges argued that ‘there is a core area of law which, according to the 
general public's awareness of the law, no law or official act of the state may 
affect.’462 The verdict then quoted the FCJ’s ruling which defined that this ‘core 
area of the law’ as including: 
‘(…) certain principles of human conduct which are regarded as inviolable and which 
have evolved over time among all civilised peoples on the basis of consistent moral 
beliefs and which are regarded as legally binding, irrespective of whether individual 
provisions of national legal systems appear to permit them to be disregarded.’463 
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This notion was not without precedent. It referred to the 'Radbruch Formula', a 
legal principle formulated by German law professor Gustav Radbruch in the wake 
of World War II. He qualified the legal positivism of his time by adding that the 
positive law had to yield to 'justice', when 'the conflict between the positive law and 
justice reaches such an intolerable degree that the law as "incorrect law" has to give 
way to justice'.464 This was a modification of legal positivism, not a refutation, but 
it was the basis of high court jurisprudence on National Socialist state crime.465  
The verdict in the Gueffroy case argued that these principles also had to be 
applied in the border guard case. However, it was careful not to equate the GDR 
with the ‘Third Reich’. The court emphasised that such concepts had been 
developed as part of attempts to bring justice after the deeds of the Nazi regime, 
‘(…) the enormity of which cannot be compared with the facts at issue here’.466 But 
the principles were believed to be applicable as ‘(…) the protection of human life 
is general and cannot depend on certain figures of killings’.467 In the view of the 
court, the gross ‘mismatch’ between the aim of preventing illegal border crossings 
and the measure of taking human life meant that any such law ‘(…) deserved no 
respect and was to be denied obedience’.468 Killing citizens for wanting to leave the 
country only secured the ‘continued existence’ of a ‘totalitarian' regime and was to 
be understood as violating ‘fundamental principles of law and humanity’.469 
 
464 '…der Widerspruch des positiven Gesetzes zur Gerechtigkeit ein so unerträgliches Maß erreicht, 
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The court was also careful to counter potential criticism. It thus engaged in a 
contemplation as to why West German state practice of securing borders differed 
from GDR state practice, especially by referring to the principle of 
proportionality.470 Also, it rejected the idea that West Germany had legitimised the 
GDR border regime by signing the Basic Treaty of 1972. The Landgericht reiterated 
the FCC's ruling on the treaty of 1973 where the supreme court judges had argued 
that the GDR border regime was ‘incompatible’ with the basic treaty and that the 
Federal Government was obliged to continuously seek to change the situation at the 
Wall and Inner German border.471  
Lastly, the court also discussed if the prohibition of retroactive punishment 
prevented any trials against border guards. This legal principle, first testified in 
ancient Rome as nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, is a pillar of criminal law 
throughout Western legal traditions. It holds that a deed can only be criminal and a 
person can only be sentenced for a crime that was illegal at the time when it was 
committed. In Germany’s legal order, it is enshrined in Art. 103 (2) Basic Law 
which prevents retroactive punishment. It is also enshrined in Art. 7 ECHR, where 
section two makes exceptions for gross violations of fundamental rights by 
providing that: 
'This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or 
omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.’ 
In this case, the regional court (Landgericht) referred to previous decisions of 
the Federal Constitutional Court where it had been held that in certain cases where 
gross human rights violations were concerned, ‘substantive justice’ had to take 
precedence over the principle of legal certainty as expressed in the rule of nulla 
poena. 472  This line of argument concluded the Landgericht’s decision on the 
criminality of shooting at fugitives as such.  
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In a next step, individual guilt of the defendants had to be assessed. Heinrich was 
convicted of manslaughter with conditional intent, meaning that he had acquiesced 
to Gueffroy’s death. Criminal investigations had proved without any doubt that the 
fatal bullet stemmed from Heinrich’s rifle. The court believed that Heinrich had 
fired voluntarily and that no order had been given to actually take Gueffroy’s life. 
In any case, according to § 258 StGB-DDR, soldiers had to disobey an order when 
this order was obviously illegal. The court believed that in this case, there was 
neither an order to kill the fugitives nor could it have been legal, had it existed.473 
Arguably, the court was quite considerate in assessing the defendants’ room for 
manoeuvre as GDR border guards. It was argued that even in the GDR, ‘justice and 
humanity' (Menschlichkeit) were upheld as educational values. Thus, the court 
argued it was ‘unimaginable’ that Heinrich could not have been able to ‘identify the 
few principles indispensable for human coexistence, which belong to the inviolable 
foundation and core area of law as it lives in the legal consciousness of all civilised 
peoples’.474  
More reasons why Heinrich and his comrades could have known the 
reprehensibility of using firearms against fugitives were presented. The court 
argued that military service at the border was widely unpopular in East Germany’s 
society, and that most border guards tried to leave service with so-called ‘white 
gloves’, meaning to avoid arresting or even assaulting a fugitive while on duty. In 
the view of the regional court (Landgericht), this reflected a deep unease with the 
use of firearms. Moreover, it was argued that border guards must have realised that 
the border was primarily directed against GDR citizens and not against violent 
attacks from the East by the set-up of the Wall which clearly was designed to 
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prevent illegal crossings from East to West. Lastly, the court referred to Heinrich's 
statement during the trial that before coming to the border troops:  he himself had 
believed that killing fugitives was illegal and equated to an unlawful death 
penalty. 475  In this light, the court argued, border guards were called upon to 
examine their conscience long before actually encountering an attempted escape. 
And ‘when it comes to killing people in the interest of maintaining power of the 
authorities’, the court concluded, ‘one should not turn off one’s conscience so 
quickly in the last quarter of the twentieth century’.476 Thus, Heinrich should have 
known that killing a fugitive for the sake of protecting the border’s integrity was 
illegal irrespective of any commands; in spite of this, doing so required at least 
conditional intent to kill Gueffroy.  
 
As for Kühnpast, who had fired several salvos of continuous fire at the fugitives, 
the court assumed attempted manslaughter with conditional intent. Relying on the 
same legal interpretation of the law, the court argued that Kühnpast had to know 
the criminal nature of killing fugitives. Although Kühnpast had fired several salvos 
of continuous fire, he had claimed in court that he did not know  his rifle was set on 
continuous fire. The court therefore assumed conditional intent to kill only from the 
second salvo onwards.477 
Kühnpast had claimed that he had deliberately missed Guardian and Gueffroy 
by three to four metres. Based on forensic tests, however, the court argued that a 
Kalashnikov rifle usually scattered more than three metres to every side when used 
from a distance of a hundred metres. Kühnpast, however, was 125 metres away 
from the fugitives. Thus, the court believed he must have known that he grossly 
endangered the fugitives.478 
 
475 ibid., 58-59. 
476 ‘Wenn es um die Tötung von Menschen im Interesse der Machterhaltung der Obrigkeit geht, 
darf man aber im letzten Viertel des 20. Jahrhunderts sein Gewissen nicht so schnell abschalten.’ 
ibid., 59. 
477 ibid., 61-64. 






At the same time, the court saw even more reason to believe that Kühnpast knew 
of the wrongfulness of shooting fugitives. When being drafted to the border troops, 
Kühnpast was asked if he would use his weapon against ‘Grenzverletzer’, if 
necessary. This question was put to every conscript. Kühnpast initially refused to 
use his rifle and was subsequently ordered to kitchen service. His comrades teased 
him for that by calling him ‘cockroach’ which he perceived as a severe 
humiliation.479 Later, he agreed to use weapons if need be in order to avoid future 
bullying. The court held this against him: ‘Nobody may switch off his conscience 
so quickly and only to protect himself from teasing by comrades.’480 
 
Schmett and Schmidt were acquitted, as any (conditional) intent to kill Gueffroy 
or Gaudian could not be proven. In Schmidt’s case, the court thought it impossible 
to prove that his order to fire had meant to actually kill Gueffroy. As for Schmett, 
the court acknowledged that he might have only fired at the fugitives’ feet. When 
firing single shots over a distance of one hundred metres, the rifle was proven to 
only scatter up to thirty-six centimetres. In the view of the court, this meant that 
firing single shots at the feet could not have resulted in the fugitives’ death. 
Therefore, he could not be convicted of attempted manslaughter.481 This technical 
examination of the rifle's features reached a very detailed level of assessing 
evidence. They were, however, arguably also a form of sidestepping difficult 
examinations of conscience and intent. 
However, both cases could have been seen as a (conditional) intent to inflict 
bodily injury when they were aiming at Gueffroy’s and Gaudian's feet (Schmett) or 
ordering Heinrich to do so (Schmidt). However, the court accepted that this could 
have been covered by the GDR border law by arguing that only in ‘extreme cases’ 
could the ‘demand for substantive justice’ take precedent over legal certainty. In 
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the case of bodily injury, the court assumed that the defendants could not have been 
expected to realise the criminal nature of assaulting fugitives.482  
 
Still, the court made clear that it had no doubts regarding the criminal nature of 
the border regime in toto. In its view, the prohibition of exiting the country was not 
a norm against crimes, but a political measure to stabilise the ‘coercive regime’483 
The court went on to argue that such harsh measures did not exist in ‘Rechtsstaaten’, 
while ‘totalitarian and especially communist states were characterised by harsh 
border barriers and travel restrictions’.484 
When assessing the sentences, the court acknowledged that a series of reasons 
supported comparatively mild sentences for the defendants. It believed that the 
GDR had ‘nurtured them to blind one-sidedness and a limited conception of the 
world’ which the defendants had not been able to withstand.485 The court also 
accepted as a mitigating factor that those who were responsible for the ideological 
indoctrination could not be brought before a court in the absence of an appropriate 
punishable offence.486 However, in Heinrich’s case the court saw as exacerbating 
factor that his killing of Gueffroy from a close distance of only approximately forty 
metres demanded ‘a particular degree of callousness and reprehensibility’. 487 
Hence, he received a punishment in the upper region of proposed sentences. 
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that both the commander of the 
respective company, Ronald Fabian, and the regiment’s commander were later 
charged and convicted of accessory to manslaughter. Fabian received no 
sentence,488 while regiment commander Walter Schulze was sentenced to two years 
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and three months in prison.489 Given that Heinrich’s sentence was alleviated after 
his successful appeal (see below), Schulze as a commander did eventually receive 
harsher sentences than those who carried out the actual attack – and other than the 
usual border guards’ sentence, Schulze’s sentence had not been suspended. 
 
Summing up this first precedent judgement, it seems fair to say that Berlin’s 
Landgericht made a coherent argument as to a) why border guards’ fatal shots at 
fugitives had to and could be seen as criminal, and b) why the individual defendants 
in this case had incurred individual guilt. The court’s argument was based on a 
natural law approach which was routed in West Germany’s jurisprudence on Nazi 
crimes, essentially arguing that some fundamental rights like the right to life could 
not be arbitrarily limited by states and that any such laws were not to be seen as 
laws at all. While the court was careful to seriously take into account the 
defendants’ statements, motivations and histories, it also provided important 
assertions about the set-up of the border regime by hearing witness testimonies of 
commanders and border guards alike. Only a few days after this verdict, however, 
a different chamber of the same court in Berlin delivered the second verdict in a 
border guard case – and revealed that this fist verdict's approach was not the only 
possible way of seeing the criminality of the GDR’s border regime. 
Michael Schmidt’s death in 1984: The Second Border Guard Case 
‘You have got me now’ said Michael Schmidt at around 3.15 am on 1 December 
1984, lying on the ground and bleeding, as two border guards stood over him. Just 
a few seconds earlier, Schmidt’s hand was reaching unto the top of the final wall 
and he had almost succeeded in his attempt to flee the GDR, when bullets from the 
rifles of Udo Walther and Uwe Hapke hit Schmidt and caused him to fall off the 
ladder. The two border guards later acknowledged that they did not think Schmidt 
 






a criminal or a saboteur, but saw him as a young man aspiring to find his happiness 
in West-Berlin.490 
 Among his colleagues, the twenty-year-old Schmidt was a popular carpenter. 
His dissatisfaction with the GDR had been growing for some time when on the 
night of 30 November, he enjoyed some drinks in a youth club. Later that evening 
and accompanied by another anonymous person, he got himself a ladder and 
marched to the Hinterland wall with the intention to flee the GDR for West-
Berlin.491 
The defendants, Udo Walther and Uwe Hapke, had been conscripted to the 
border guards during their military service. When they had been asked if they would 
direct their weapon against fugitives at the border, they had both agreed without 
any reservations.492 On the night in question, they were deployed to substitute posts 
during shift changeovers. Walther discovered Schmidt crossing the Hinterland wall 
near Schulzestraße in Berlin-Pankow. In the following minutes, Hapke climbed 
down the watch tower while Walther, who had remained on the tower, 
unsuccessfully ordered Schmidt to stop. Hapke reached the final wall 
approximately at the same time as Schmidt did, but more than one hundred metres 
away from the fugitive. Hapke then decided to shoot at Schmidt to prevent his 
imminently surmounting the Wall. In the next five seconds, he fired at least twenty-
five shots in continuous fire, thereby accepting wide scattering. About 150 metres 
away, Walther now also fired several salvos of continuous fire with a total of 
twenty-seven shots on Schmidt’s legs.493 
Schmidt was heavily injured, as one bullet had torn part of his left lung, but he 
lived. However, he was denied appropriate first aid. As described by regulations, 
the superiors did not call a regular ambulance but a special military ambulance 
 
490 Ersinstanzliches Urteil des Landgerichts Berlin, 5 February 1992, Az.: (518) 2 Js 63/90 KLs 
(57/91), in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds): Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht. Dokumentation, 
Berlin: De Gruyter 2002, vol. 2, sub-vol. 1, pp. 105-134 [107-113].  
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which had an approach of roughly forty-five minutes and was not accompanied by 
a medical doctor. Schmidt was not brought to the closest hospital, but to a specific 
police hospital further away where he was admitted as ‘XY’ shortly before 5.30 
a.m., more than two hours after being injured. All of this was in line with official 
commands. Even though hospital staff immediately prepared emergency surgery, 
Schmidt died from internal bleeding at 6.20 a.m. A medical examination clearly 
revealed that he would have survived had he been treated properly and quickly.494 
His death was covered up in official files and Schmidt’s father, who had reported 
his son as missing, was only informed of his death four days later. 
 
Hapke and Walther were tried in the same Landgericht in Berlin which had 
sentenced Heinrich and Kühnpast. However, the judges in the case at hand took a 
whole different route in their reasoning as to why the shots that had killed Schmidt 
had to be deemed criminal. Their judgement also has to be understood as a negative 
comment on their colleagues’ decision from two weeks earlier. 
In this case, the court chamber rejected the notion of the border regime violating 
fundamental principles of law. They argued that the prohibition of slavery, 
genocide, torture, or arbitrary killings were parts of such an ‘core area of the law’ 
which could not be violated. They would be part of ius cogens, a universally 
recognised part of public international law which is generally valid and non-
negotiable. The right to leave one’s country was – in the eyes of the chamber – not 
part of this codex.495 The court acknowledged that the GDR had still ratified a series 
of international human rights treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) of 1948 or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) of 1976. But since the Volkskammer had not adopted these documents into 
national law, the chamber argued that the treaties were binding the GDR on the 
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international plane only without being directly applicable and hence valid in 
domestic law.496 
In this case, the judges also rejected any comparison of the border regime with 
Nazi crimes (such as murder, genocide, enslavement, torture, and others) which had 
been judged in the Nuremberg Trials as violating that ‘core area of the law’ as 
Radbruch had later put it and which had been quoted by the other chamber in the 
Gueffroy case.497 Thus, referring to the Radbruch Formula according to which the 
positive law has to be disregarded in favour of natural law in otherwise grossly 
unjust situations, the chamber argued that in the case of the GDR border regime, 
the conflict between justice and legal security had to be decided in favour of legal 
security. The court described the restrictions caused as ‘hard and unjust’, but  did 
not believe that they had reached the threshold of being ‘intolerable injustice’. GDR 
law therefore had to be respected.498 
 
Eventually, the court acknowledged the relevant paragraphs prohibiting 
unlawful departures (§ 213 StGB-DDR) and permitting the use of firearms to 
prevent such crimes (§ 27 GrenzG) had to be seen as a valid and applicable law 
which actually allowed for guns to be used against fugitives.499  Unexpectedly, 
however, the court did then go on to assert that in the case at hand, these GDR 
regulations had been breached and that therefore killing Schmidt had been criminal 
and the defendants were guilty of manslaughter with conditional intent.500 
More specifically, the court argued that a principle of proportionality was 
inherent in GDR law. Expressions such as the one that human life should be spared 
‘where possible’ in § 27 (5) of the border law were seen as proof of this 
assumption.501 The court acknowledged that this principle might have only been 
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497 ibid., 122. 
498 ‘hart und ungerecht’, ‘unerträgliches Maß an Ungerechtigkeit’, ibid., 122. 
499 ibid., 124. 
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inherent in positive law, but not in state practice, as the deployment of spring-guns 
suggests. Still, the court maintained that a law ‘which resembles the rule of law – 
even if only for reasons of international prestige – has to be interpreted in a way 
compatible with the rule of law.’502 
Interpreted in such a way, the court believed that the GDR border law prohibited 
the use of fatal gun fire against an unarmed and ostensibly harmless fugitive such 
as Schmidt. This was particularly true for the defendant’s use of continuous fire.  
To sum up the court’s judgement on the punishability of the shots: the chamber 
essentially claimed that the border law itself might have been unjust, but not 
sufficiently iniquitous to warrant the application of the Radbruch Formula. In the 
absence of any other international or national regulations banning state practice at 
the Wall, the border regime hence had to be seen as legal. The judges then applied 
the principle of proportionality which they accepted was not recognised in state 
practice, but was warranted by the wording of the relevant law. Thus, the defendants 
had violated the criminal law by using continuous fire and thereby accepting 
Schmidt’s death with acquiescence.  
Regarding Hapke's and Walther's individual guilt, the court held that they clearly 
had to refuse their order to prevent breaches of the border no matter the cost, as it 
was ‘obviously’ violating the criminal law.503  In a surprisingly condescending 
statement, the judges asserted that: 
‘with proper use of their conscience, the intellectually simply structured defendants 
(…) would have been able to recognise that military obedience does not justify every 
action, certainly not the killing of a fugitive under the circumstances present here in 
the case at hand’.504 
 
502 ‘Ein Gesetz, das den Anschein von Rechtsstaatlichkeit – sei es auch nur aus Gründen 
internationalen Ansehens – erweckt, ist nach rechtsstaatlichen Grundsätzen auszulegen.’ ibid., 126. 
503 ibid., 127. 
504 ‘die intellektuell einfach strukturierten Angeklagten, deren Entwicklung durch eine strenge, von 
Feindbildern geprägte militärische Schulung beeinflußt war, hätten bei gehöriger Anspannung 
ihres Gewissens erkennen können, daß militärische Pflichterfüllung nicht jedes Handeln, schon gar 
nicht die Tötung eines Flüchtlings unter den hier im konkreten Fall vorliegenden Umständen 






Therefore, their use of continuous fire had to be seen as acts of ‘anticipatory 
obedience’. 505  When assessing the level of penalties, the chamber opted for 
relatively low sentences given that developing a ‘critical stance’ against the border 
regime was difficult for the defendants as they were ‘at the bottom of societal and 
military hierarchy’.506 Walther was sentenced to a suspended juvenile sentence of 
eighteen months in prison and Hapke to twenty-one months on parole.507 
 
This judgement took a different route than the first border guard case and yet it 
came to the same conclusion: fatal shots at the Berlin Wall were criminal. However, 
in the Schmidt case, the judges were careful not to pass an (implicit) sentence on 
the border regime in toto, but only on the actions of the defendants at hand. The 
GDR’s state practice at the border on the other hand was largely accepted, including 
potentially the death of fugitives. Only in this specific case did the judges see a 
violation of the criminal law in the defendants’ ignoring of the principle of 
proportionality – a principle that was not enshrined in GDR law word by word, but 
which the court had derived from the structure of certain paragraphs. On the whole, 
it seems fair to describe this judgement as more positivist and inductive than the 
verdict against Kühnpast and Heinrich in the first border guard case. 
 
With two quite divergent low court verdicts having been spoken, it was clear that 
the Federal Court of Justice was called upon to decide whether those two landmark 
decisions against Heinrich and Kühnpast as well as Hapke and Walther could be 
upheld – and how. After all, the FCC had to finally adjudicate on the criminal nature 
of the GDR border regime – and the two chambers of Berlin’s Landgericht had 
brought the FCC into a situation where it had to choose which path to follow. 
 
505 ‘in vorauseilendem Gehorsam’, ibid., 127. 
506 ‘Die Entwicklung einer kritischen Haltung und die entsprechende Betätigung war für die 
Angeklagten um so schwerer, als sie in der gesellschaftlichen und militärischen Hierarchie ganz 







Ensuring Clarity: The Federal Court of Justice’s leading decisions, 1992-93 
In Germany’s legal hierarchy, the Federal Court of Justice (FCJ) is the high court 
of appeal for all matters of ordinary jurisdiction – namely matters of private and 
criminal law. Its verdicts can only be overturned by the Federal Constitutional Court 
(FCC), and only in such cases where a verdict would violate the constitution.508 
Hence, the FCJ does what high courts usually do: giving guidance for jurisdiction 
of lower courts. This way, verdicts in similar cases are streamlined and it is ensured 
that jurisdiction across the country is coherent and legally waterproof.  Instances 
where new legal challenges emerge in particular lead to  high courts being called 
upon to provide directions. The border guard cases are a prime example. 
The opportunity to deliver a leading decision on the border guard cases presented 
itself quickly after the first two verdicts. An FCJ ruling was especially needed after 
both verdicts differed so strongly not in their outcome, but in their legal reasoning. 
However, a sound legal reasoning was paramount for more cases to go ahead as 
otherwise, a negative ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court loomed, especially 
regarding the prohibition of retroactive punishment.  
The main task the FCJ had to master was to clearly establish whether fatal shots 
at the Berlin Wall and the Inner German border were punishable at all – and if so, 
under what legal norms: East German criminal law, West German criminal law, or 
supra-positive legal norms? Moreover, the high court had to take into account how 
these finds could be squared with the ancient principle of nulla poena sine lege, the 
prohibition of retroactive punishment, which is enshrined in Germany’s Basic Law 
as well as in the European Convention on Human Rights.509 Apart from these highly 
relevant, yet somewhat legalistic challenges, the high court also faced high 
expectations of the public regarding the outcome of the case: were border guards 
 
508 Art. 93 Basic Law. Cf. Kirchhof, Ferdinand: 'Bundesverfassungsgericht', in: Staatslexikon der 
Görres-Gesellschaft, Vol. 1, 8th edition, Freiburg: Herder 2017, 889-893. 






guilty or not of killing innocent fugitives – and where was the place of their 
superiors and former state leaders in all this? 
The FCJ’s first Mauerschützen verdict 
It was especially the Schmidt case that gave the FCJ the opportunity for a 
landmark decision, as the FCC chose to decide in this case first. Initially, the judges 
had to contemplate if any procedural impediments prevented German courts from 
judging Hapke and Walther altogether. In his appeal, Walther had referred to a ‘ban 
on punishment’510 which he believed had to be derived from the ‘act of state-
doctrine’. According to this doctrine, an office holder who acts on behalf and in the 
interest of another state (in this case, the GDR), cannot be held accountable for acts 
committed while he was on duty.511  The FCJ rejected this claimed procedural 
impediment. It argued that this doctrine of ‘act of state’ was an Anglo-Saxon 
judicial doctrine and was not recognised in continental Europe. It thus could not be 
seen as a ‘universal rule of international law’ which had to be respected by German 
domestic law.512 . Moreover, the FCJ argued, the German Reunification Treaty 
(GRT) had specifically allowed for courts of the Federal Republic to overrule and 
repeal GDR courts’ judgements if those violated the principles of the rule of law. 
Thus, the court concluded that former GDR officials were not spared from 




511 For this sub-section, see Revisionsurteil des Bundesgerichtshofs, 3.11.1992, AZ 5 StR 370/92, 
BGHSt 39,1 (Mauerschützen I) –, in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds.): Strafjustiz und DDR-
Unrecht. Dokumentation in sieben Bänden, vol. 2, sub-vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2002, pp. 
135-55, [pp. 135-36]. 
512 Art. 25 Basic Law reads: ‘The general rules of international law shall be an integral part of 
federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the 
inhabitants of the federal territory.’  ('Die allgemeinen Regeln des Völkerrechtes sind Bestandteil 
des Bundesrechtes. Sie gehen den Gesetzen vor und erzeugen Rechte und Pflichten unmittelbar für 
die Bewohner des Bundesgebietes.' 






The central question: Were the shots criminal? 
The FCJ now turned to the major question of whether the GDR law had 
permitted the shots on the victim Schmidt and whether the defendants had to be 
exonerated as a result. Eventually, the senate concluded that nothing in GDR law 
could justify the deeds in question and that they had indeed been criminal. But as 
we will see in this section, it was a meandering and intellectually-demanding road 
that lead the court to this conclusion. Given that Schmidt had carried out his 
attempted escape with ladders, the FCJ acknowledged that the text of § 27 of the 
border law permitted the use of gunfire against Schmidt in order to prevent the 
imminent crime.514 Since the law stated that human life should only be spared 
‘where possible’, the FCJ believed that killings with conditional intent could have 
been permitted under GDR law. The FCJ took this interpretation even so far as to 
accept the use of automatic gunfire in order to prevent an escape.515 
For the moment, this conclusion differed remarkably from both initial 
judgements. Here, one judgement had assumed that the border regime altogether 
and especially the use of lethal force against fugitives necessarily violated 
fundamental legal principles; the other judgement had assumed that the use of 
gunfire might be legal while lethal force would be intolerable due to the principle 
of proportionality. The FCJ rejected this notion and argued that the principle of 
proportionality was indeed a good interpretative tool for the law of the Federal 
Republic. But it was alien to GDR law and hence irrelevant for the test of whether 
GDR law provided a justification for the deeds in question.516 
 
514 Revisionsurteil des Bundesgerichtshofs, 3.11.1992, AZ 5 StR 370/92, BGHSt 39,1 
(Mauerschützen I) –, in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds.): Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht. 









Nonetheless, and slightly nerve-wracking for those of us without a professional 
legal education, this was not the end of the story: the FCJ still found reasons for 
disregarding the permission which it had only just established. Because in a next 
step, Germany’s highest criminal court found that the justification inherent in GDR 
law violated superior legal considerations. With this twist, the FCJ agreed with the 
first verdict against Heinrich and Kühnpast which had argued that their actions 
violated the ‘core area of the law’. Even though the defendants actions had been 
‘legal’ within the state practice of the time, the FCJ considered them criminal, as 
the very legal provision permitting these acts was illegal. The court argued that 
under the legislation in place, preventing illegal border crossings was seen as 
paramount and overrode a human ‘right to life’, thereby violating international 
human rights and basic principles of justice. 
The FCJ acknowledged the trickiness of relying on the Radbruch Formula and 
therefore reiterated its warning that‘… cases in which a justification accepted at the 
time of the offence is considered irrelevant must be limited to extreme 
exceptions.’517  In the eyes of the senate, such exceptional situations would be 
characterised by  
‘(…) a blatantly gross violation of the fundamental ideas of justice and humanity; 
the violation must be so grave that it violates the legal convictions common to all 
peoples and relating to the value and dignity of man. The contradiction between the 
positive law and justice must be so intolerable that the law as an incorrect right must 
give way to justice.’518 
 
517 'Allerdings müssen Fälle, in denen ein zur Tatzeit angenommener Rechtfertigungsgrund als 
unbeachtlich angesehen wird, auf extreme Ausnahmen beschränkt bleiben.' ibid., p. 142. 
518 'Ein zur Tatzeit angenommener Rechtfertigungsgrund kann vielmehr nur dann wegen Verstoßes 
gegen höherrangiges Recht unbeachtet bleiben, wenn in ihm ein offensichtlich grober Verstoß 
gegen Grundgedanken der Gerechtigkeit und Menschlichkeit zum Ausdruck kommt; der Verstoß 
muß so schwer wiegen, daß er die allen Völkern gemeinsamen, auf Wert und Würde des 
Menschen bezogenen Rechtsüberzeugungen verletzt (BGHSt 2, 234 [239]). Der Widerspruch des 
positiven Gesetzes zur Gerechtigkeit muß so unerträglich sein, daß das Gesetz als unrichtiges 






This was a clear and unmistakable reference to the Radbruch Formula – the legal 
principle which the first verdict had relied upon while the second had disregarded 
its application in these cases. In applying the Radbruch Formula to the Schmidt 
case, the FCJ was sensitive not to equate socialist state crime with Nazi mass 
murder: ‘Transferring these aspects to the present case is not easy because killing 
of people at the Inner German border cannot be equated with National Socialist 
mass murder.’519 Yet, the Senate thought it appropriate to apply this paradigm 
anyway as it was important to examine if a state had violated the ‘outmost boundary 
… which it is generally believed is set in each country.’520 With this, the court once 
more followed the first verdict while rejecting the claims of the second verdict. 
Moreover, the court found that international human rights set a limit to the 
GDR’s border regime. It referred to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). This treaty was was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. Ratified by 172 states, this legal 
document by no means reflects solely Western concepts of human rights.521 The 
ICCPR had entered into force for both German states on 23 March 1976. Even 
though the GDR had not changed its constitution as a consequence, it was 
nevertheless legally bound one the place of public international law. In the eyes of 
 
519 'Die Übertragung dieser Gesichtspunkte auf den vorliegenden Fall ist nicht einfach, weil die 
Tötung von Menschen an der innerdeutschen Grenze nicht mit dem nationalsozialistischen 
Massenmord gleichgesetzt werden kann.' Revisionsurteil des Bundesgerichtshofs, 3.11.1992, AZ 5 
StR 370/92, BGHSt 39,1 (Mauerschützen I) –, in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds.): 
Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht. Dokumentation in sieben Bänden, vol. 2, sub-vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: 
De Gruyter 2002, pp. 135-55, p. 143. 
520 'äußerste Grenze' ; 'die ihm nach allgemeiner Überzeugung in jedem Land gesetzt ist', ibid., p. 
143. 
521 For the following deliberations of the court on the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and its obligations on the GDR, see ibid., section ‘C’, II, 2 b) cc), pp. 143-147. 
For information on the ICCPR, see Tomuschat, Christian: 'International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Human Rights Committee', in: : Bernhardt, Rudolf (ed.):  Encyclopedia of Public 








the FCJ, this had been confirmed by GDR international law textbooks. The court 
quoted the covenant’s provision that ‘[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, 
including his own.’522 Moreover, the clause specifies that any exceptions of the 
right must be provided by law, and must be necessary to protect ‘national security, 
public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of 
others’.523 The GDR followed this requirement by passing the Paßgesetz (passport 
act) in 1979. But since outbound passages from the GDR were usually prohibited – 
and not merely in single cases –, the FCJ argued that the factual border regime 
violated this human right of the ICCPR. 
Despite acknowledging varying interpretations of the law in different world 
regions, the FCJ claimed a crucial singularity of East Germany’s border regime: 
‘[It] was particularly harsh because Germans from the GDR had a special motive 
for wanting to cross the border into West Berlin and West Germany: they belonged to 
one nation with the people on the other side of the border and were connected to them 
through a variety of family and other personal relationships.’524 
What’s more, the FCJ referred to the ‘right to life’ as enshrined in international 
human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR which states that ‘[e]very human being 
has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.’525 After a wide survey of varying national legal 
orders, the court concluded that the use of lethal force (like firearms) was usually 
limited to situations where life and limb of others were at stake. Therefore, the FCJ 
 
522 Art. 12 (2) ICCPR. 
523 Art. 12 (3) ICCPR. 
524 'Das Grenzregime der DDR empfing jedoch seine besondere Härte dadurch, daß Deutsche aus 
der DDR ein besonderes Motiv für den Wunsch, die Grenze nach West-Berlin und 
Westdeutschland zu überqueren, hatten: Sie gehörten mit den Menschen auf der anderen Seite der 
Grenze zu einer Nation und waren mit ihnen durch vielfältige verwandtschaftliche und sonstige 
persönliche Beziehungen verbunden.' Revisionsurteil des Bundesgerichtshofs, 3.11.1992, AZ 5 
StR 370/92, BGHSt 39,1 (Mauerschützen I) –, in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds.): 
Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht. Dokumentation in sieben Bänden, vol. 2, sub-vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: 
De Gruyter 2002, pp. 135-55, [p. 145]. 






argued that using lethal force with the partial aim of deterring others from fleeing 
the GDR clearly was an arbitrary act and therefore violated the ICCPR’s right to 
life.  
 
As a consequence, the court found that the GDR regulations in question violated 
international human rights treaties to which the GDR was party.  Thus, the FCJ 
believed that no law could justify the fatal shots on Schmidt, as such a legal 
provision had to be considered invalid. According to the FCJ, ‘[e]ven the GDR 
would have had to interpret the justification restrictively on the basis of the 
(international, P.E.) principles’ recognised by the GDR herself.526With this move, 
the FCJ elevated itself to the authoritative interpreter of GDR laws and their relation 
to public international law. Ruling that East German laws had been in violation of 
international obligations of the GDR allowed the FCJ in a next – and arguably quite 
bold move – to develop an interpretation of the GDR border law which was 
consistent with international human rights treaties. The FCJ wanted to test if he 
defendants’ actions could have been warranted by such a human-rights-friendly 
interpretation of GDR laws. 
In developing such a human-rights-friendly reading of GDR law, the court 
applied solely GDR’s own constitution. The judges referred to Art. 89 (2) of the 
GDR’s constitution which gave constitutional law primacy over statutes: no law 
must contradict the constitution itself – a principle very familiar to Western legal 
thought, but not even in Europa universally valid. 527  Beyond this provision, 
however, the court failed to detect a ‘right to life’ in the GDR constitution, whereas 
 
526 '(…) weil bereits die DDR bei Zugrundelegung der von ihr anerkannten Prinzipien den 
Rechtfertigungsgrund hätte einschränkend auslegen müssen', Revisionsurteil des 
Bundesgerichtshofs, 3.11.1992, AZ 5 StR 370/92, BGHSt 39,1 (Mauerschützen I) –, in: Marxen, 
Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds.): Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht. Dokumentation in sieben Bänden, 
vol. 2, sub-vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2002, pp. 135-55, [p. 147]. 






in the case of West Germany, the country was bound to a right to life by Art. 2 
ECHR. Still, the FCJ acknowledged an ‘implicit respect’ of human life inherent in 
GDR law, for example through its obligations under the ICCPR, or in the abolition 
of capital punishment in 1987. In a somewhat questionable equalisation, the court 
ruled that this finding was comparable to the principle of proportionality inherent 
in West German law. In doing so, the FCJ re-introduced the principle of 
proportionality which it had rejected in the lower court's judgement just before. 
Interestingly, given the nuanced debate about parallels between the 'Third Reich' 
and the  GDR in legislative processes (see Chapter 3), the court clearly denied the 
existence of a GDR equivalent to Hitler’s Führerwille528 in the Nazi dictatorship. 
The ‘sheer will of the holders of actual power’ had not been able to ‘create law’.529 
Therefore, the court claimed, it was perfectly legitimate to interpret GDR laws in 
accordance with the country’s constitution and obligations from international law. 
Eventually, then, the FCJ stated that GDR laws had to be interpreted in accordance 
with the human rights to life and free movement530 as well as in accordance with 
the principle of proportionality which the FCJ had come up with just moments 
earlier.  Therefore, qualifying a breach of the border with a ladder as ‘felony’ 
(Verbrechen as opposed to a lesser crime like Vergehen) was seen by the FCJ as 
disproportionate and hence violating even GDR laws if interpreted in a human-
rights-friendly (read: correct) way. But when Schmidt’s actions could no longer be 
classified as a felony, using gunfire against a harmless person such as himself was 
illegal – since § 27 (2) GrenzG permitted shots only prevent crimes which 
 
528 ‘the will of the Führer’. 
529 ‘… der bloße Wille der Inhaber tatsächlicher Macht Recht zu schaffen vermochte.’, 
Revisionsurteil des Bundesgerichtshofs, 3.11.1992, AZ 5 StR 370/92, BGHSt 39,1 
(Mauerschützen I) –, in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds.): Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht. 
Dokumentation in sieben Bänden, vol. 2, sub-vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2002, pp. 135-55, 
[p. 148].  






‘presented itself as a crime’. Using gunfire against Schmidt thus breached § 27 (2) 
of the border code was hence criminal in the view of the FCJ. 
This thought concluded the courts’ inquiry as to whether GDR law could 
plausibly justify the deadly shots in this case. The answer was ‘no’. The defendants' 
actions had not been justified by the border law,531 at least not by the border law as 
interpreted by the FCJ. Eventually, the FCJ concluded that no excuse for the 
defendants could be found in GDR law. They had still committed an illegal act of 
manslaughter – illegal, in the views of the court, according to GDR laws as they 
should have been interpreted at the time of the offence. 
The Question of retroactive punishment532 
The FCJ then addressed the problem of retroactive punishment. This paradigm 
is a complicated predicament in the adjudication of state crime. Its ancient Latin 
formula nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege demonstrates its overriding 
significance for the evolution of European law out of ancient Roman law and the 
paradigm of legal predictability.533 In short, this formula enshrines the prohibition 
of retroactive punishment: a deed can only be sentenced if it was defined as a crime 
at the time when it was carried out. This ancient paradigm has found ints way both 
into Germany’s constitution and into the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 534  Its purpose is to protect citizens against arbitrary criminalisation. 
However, in post-conflict situations, the prohibition of retroactive punishment can 
become an obstacle to prosecuting former tyrants and their aides. The case of the 
GDR is a prime example of this, as state oppression did, arguably, not happen 
 
531 § 27 (2) GrenzG-DDR. 
532 For the following section, see Revisionsurteil des Bundesgerichtshofs, 3.11.1992, AZ 5 StR 
370/92, BGHSt 39,1 (Mauerschützen I) –, in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds.): Strafjustiz 
und DDR-Unrecht. Dokumentation in sieben Bänden, vol. 2, sub-vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: De 
Gruyter 2002, pp. 135-55, pp. 149-52. 
533 On the fundamental importance of legal predictability, see Mock, Erhard: 'Rechtssicherheit', in: 
Staatslexikon der Görres-Gesellschaft, Vol. 4, 7th edition, Freiburg: Herder 1988, 731-733. 






against GDR law, but with its support or at least without opposition from the legal 
branch. At the same time, however, the constitutional protection from retroactive 
punishment was in place and had to be dealt with by courts adjudicating on former 
GDR officials.535 
In contemplating the legal quandary of adjudicating the case at hand while also 
respecting nulla poena, the FCJ acknowledged that international tribunals such as 
the Nuremberg Trials after World War II had weakened the principle. This 
development, the FCJ claimed, had taken place under strong influence of Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence in these trials. German jurisprudence, however, had not 
adopted these developments in the post-war years. The court also noted that 
international law, most notably the ECHR 536  and the ICCPR 537  prohibited 
retroactive punishment as well.  
However, both international regulations also account for acts which at their time 
violated the ‘general principles’ of law as acknowledged by a wide range of states. 
While this could, generally speaking, be interpreted as a clause permitting criminal 
 
535 For this section, see Revisionsurteil des Bundesgerichtshofs, 3.11.1992, AZ 5 StR 370/92, 
BGHSt 39,1 (Mauerschützen I) –, in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds.): Strafjustiz und DDR-
Unrecht. Dokumentation in sieben Bänden, vol. 2, sub-vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2002, pp. 
135-55, section ‘C’, II, 4. 
536 Art. 6 ECHR reads: ‘1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any 
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at 
the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was 
applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 2. This article shall not prejudice the 
trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was 
committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations.’ 
537 Art. 15 of the ICCPR reads: ‘1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account 
of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international 
law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that 
was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the 
commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the 
offender shall benefit thereby. 2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of 
any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal 






prosecution of state crime after the end of tyrannies or wars, the FCJ reiterated that 
these international regulations still had to be subjected to the prohibition of 
retroactive punishment in (West) Germany’s constitution, which enjoys primacy 
over international law in the country's domestic legal order. This limitation of those 
two international treaties was also made clear when West Germany’s Federal 
Government submitted a reservation to Art. 7 (2) ECHR when ratifying the 
document in 1954, clearly stating that it could only be applied within the boundaries 
of Art. 103 (2) GG, the Basic Law’s prohibition of retroactive punishment.538 In 
doing so, the Federal Republic followed an established practice of national 
governments by which they can limit the application of international treaties on 
their country. 
However, in the case at hand, the FCJ concluded that the conviction of Walther 
and Hapke did not violate the prohibition of retroactive punishment. It recounted 
that, for a punishment to be legal under the Basic Law's regulations, the 
punishability had to be determined in legislation.539 In this particular case, the FCJ 
claimed that the punishability of the acts in question had been regulated by GDR 
laws, which the defendants had breached. Because the law at the time when the fatal 
shots were carried out could have been read in a way as to prohibit the deeds in 
question, this legal interpretation of the law meant that the punishability had been 
established in legislation. In summary: As GDR law had already criminalised those 
fatal shots, this trial could not violate the constitutional protection.  
Naturally, however, one could argue that state practice at the time did not 
criminalise the fatal shots and therefore, the FCJ had just been retrofitting GDR law 
in hindsight. The FCJ acknowledged that, but crucially stated that: 
 
538 Bgbl. 1954 II, p. 14.  
539 Art. 103 (2) reads: 'An act may be punished only if it was defined by a law as a criminal 
offence before the act was committed.' ('Eine Tat kann nur bestraft werden, wenn die Strafbarkeit 






‘[t]he expectation that the law will, as in state practice at the time of the offence, 
also be applied in the future in such a way that a justification contrary to human rights 
will be recognised, is not worthy of protection.’540 
So, in conclusion, the FCJ ruled that no justification could be found in GDR law, 
and that the Schmidt case did not violate the prohibition of retroactive 
punishment.541 
Individual Guilt and Appropriate Sentences542 
After confirming the Landgericht’s ruling that Hapke and Walther had killed 
Schmidt with conditional intent, the FCJ also paid tribute to years of indoctrination, 
thereby criticising the earlier judgement: ‘in the light of the defendants’ life and 
environment, it appears inappropriate to reproach them for convenience, legal 
blindness, and the renunciation of one’s own thinking’.543  However, the court 
confirmed the Landgericht’s assessment that even for an ‘indoctrinated person’, it 
was ‘obvious’ that killing an ‘innocent’ person with continuous fire violated any 
‘elementary killing ban’.544 
In a final statement on the mild sentences, the court made some important 
assertions  on the pyramid of responsibility of GDR officials for the border regime. 
It stated that neither the defendants’ training in manual labour nor their school 
education could have promoted their ability of critical thinking. Moreover, they had 
been ‘at the bottom’ of military hierarchy. Hence, ‘in a way, they are also victims 
 
540 ‘Die Erwartung, das Recht werde, wie in der Staatspraxis zur Tatzeit, auch in Zukunft so 
angewandt werden, daß ein menschenrechtswidriger (!) Rechtfertigungsgrund anerkannt wird, ist 
nicht schutzwürdig.’ Revisionsurteil des Bundesgerichtshofs, 3.11.1992, AZ 5 StR 370/92, BGHSt 
39,1 (Mauerschützen I) –, in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds.): Strafjustiz und DDR-
Unrecht. Dokumentation in sieben Bänden, vol. 2, sub-vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2002, pp. 
135-55, [p.151]. 
541 ibid., p. 151f. 
542 For this section, see ibid., pp. 152-55. 
543 ‘Bequemlichkeit, Rechtsblindheit und Verzicht auf eigenes Denken’, ibid., p. 154. 







of the conditions associated with this border’.545 Also, the court claimed it had to 
be acknowledged that functionaries had not been able to be brought before courts. 
The FCJ's ruling in the second Mauerschützen Verdict 
The pending appeal judgement in the Gueffroy case gave the FCJ to specify and 
reaffirm its stance on the border guard cases.546 The high court acquitted Kühnpast 
and ordered Berlin’s Landgericht to assess the level of penalty for Heinrich again. 
Eventually, Heinrich was sentenced to a suspended prison sentence of two years.547 
As for Kühnpast’s acquittal, the FCJ argued that he had ‘repeatedly’ appeared to be 
‘receptive to the call of his conscience’ and it could not be ruled out that he had 
voluntarily missed the victims.548 
This decision enabled the court to strengthen wide parts of its first border guard 
decision in way as to increase its potential as key precedent. Other than the regional 
court's verdict in the Gueffroy case, the FCJ recognised that an order to shoot and, 
if necessary, kill fugitives to prevent escapes had indeed existed. Coming to this 
conclusion, the court showed sensitivity for the actual state practice at the border. 
Commendations and distinctions which were awarded to Heinrich, Kühnpast, 
Schmidt and Schmett were seen as an indication that the death of fugitives was at 
least tolerated, if not intended. Therefore, even though a written order to kill 
fugitives had not been found, the court accepted it had existed. Moverover, the lack 
of any criminal proceedings against the guards were seen as pointing into the same 
 
545 ibid., p. 155. 
546 Revisionsurteil des Bundesgerichtshofs, 25.3.1993, Az. 5 StR 418/92 , BGHSt 39 
(Mauerschützen II), 168, in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds.): Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht. 
Dokumentation in sieben Bänden, vol. 2, sub-vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2002, pp. 72-86. 
547 Erneutes tatrichterliches Urteil des Landgerichts Berlin vom 14.3.1994, Αζ. (527) 2 Js 48/90 Ks 
(3/93), in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds): Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht. Dokumentation, 
Berlin: De Gruyter 2002, pp. 89-101. 
548 ’…empfänglich für den Anruf seines Gewissens…’ Revisionsurteil des Bundesgerichtshofs, 
25.3.1993, Az. 5 StR 418/92 , BGHSt 39 (Mauerschützen II), 168, in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, 
Gerhard (eds.): Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht. Dokumentation in sieben Bänden, vol. 2, sub-vol. 1, 






direction.549 The court thus accepted that preventing escapes even at the price of 
killing a fugitive was a clear order of the superiors, thereby differing from the 
judgement of the regional court, while confirming the assumption of the initial 
verdict in the Schmidt case. A mixture of written orders, subliminal suggestions, 
and actions like commendations had to be understood as a part of an ‘influence 
aimed at creating obedience.'550 
The assumed existence of such an order led the court to assert that Heinrich was 
at the ‘very bottom’ of the military hierarchy and to an extent also a victim of the 
border regime’.551 Also, it had to be noted that ‘those who have deformed the legal 
consciousness of border guards in schools, mass organisations and political 
education cannot be held responsible due to a lack of relevant criminal offences.’552 
The FCJ also reacted to a discussion which had emerged in the previous months 
and would continue for years: why subordinates would be sentenced while leaders 
remained uncharged or not convicted.553 The FCJ noted that ‘[f]or reasons beyond 
[H.s’] control, officials with a greater overview and more differentiated training 
have not yet been held accountable.’554 Therefore, despite upholding the conviction 
of Heinrich for criminally killing Gueffroy with conditional intent, the court 
 
549 Revisionsurteil des Bundesgerichtshofs, 25.3.1993, Az. 5 StR 418/92 , BGHSt 39 
(Mauerschützen II), 168, in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds.): Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht. 
Dokumentation in sieben Bänden, vol. 2, sub-vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2002, pp. 72-86, 
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550 ‘…einer insgesamt auf Gehorsam zielenden Einflussnahme.’, ibid., 82. 
551 'Ganz unten’, ‘Er ist in gewisser Weise auch Opfer des Grenzregimes gewesen.’ , ibid., 85. 
552 ibid. 
553 See the debate about the opening of the NVR case as well as the parliamentary debate in 
chapter 3. 
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39 (Mauerschützen II), 168, in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds.): Strafjustiz und DDR-
Unrecht. Dokumentation in sieben Bänden, vol. 2, sub-vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2002, pp. 






believed that his sentence needed to be milder. The competent Landgericht later 
accommodated this request (see infra).555 
A final decisive ruling was made by the FCJ in ruling that acts ‘grievous bodily 
harm’ (§ 224 StGB, ‘Gefährliche Körperverletzung’) did not warrant a conviction. 
The FCJ dismissed the state prosecutor’s appeal to convict Schmett and Schmidt of 
this. The high court accepted that those two defendants might have believed that 
shots at limbs had been warranted by the border code. In this case, they would have 
been subjected to an ‘unavoidable ban of prohibition’556 which protected them from 
prosecution.557 
* * * 
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the FCJ’s first two verdicts on 
the border guard cases. With these rulings, the court established a default line of 
jurisprudence for all future Border Guard Trials. As this chapter has demonstrated, 
the verdicts’ legal reasoning was complex, multi-faceted, and took into account 
various legal sources. 
The FCJ abandoned legal default opinions of the time of German division 
according to which West German law had criminalised fatal shots in the GDR. 
Instead, the FCJ advanced itself to the role of the authoritative interpreter of GDR 
law. It ruled that in a textual reading, the GDR border law permitted the use of 
gunfire to prevent escapes across the Berlin Wall or the Inner German border. 
However, the FCJ claimed that this textual reading of the law violated higher-
ranking legal considerations. 
 
555 ibid., 77-85. 
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According to the court, a permission of fatal shots against unarmed fugitives 
violated international human rights obligations which the GDR had entered into 
voluntarily. This was substantiated with articles 6 and 12 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantee a right to life and 
free movement, respectively. Moreover, the FCJ referred to the Radbruch Formula, 
a legal concept developed in the wake of the Holocaust. It holds that normally, 
positive law has to be respected, unless this becomes so utterly unacceptable, in 
which case positive law has to give way to supra-positive considerations of justice. 
Once the FCJ had disregarded any justifications from GDR law, it embarked on 
a quest to interpret GDR law in a fashion that the court considered to be consistent 
with the country’s own human rights obligations. Arguably, this endeavour 
presented a weak spot of the whole judgement, as the FCJ separated the pure text 
of the law from all societal and political context of its time. In such an interpretation, 
the FCJ identified a principle akin to the principle of proportionality enshrined in 
(West) German law. The FCJ still accepted that, in some cases, the law might have 
warranted the use of gunfire against fugitives. In this specific case at hand, however, 
it held that the will to prevent an escape of an obviously unarmed and hence 
harmless man could not be warranted by GDR law, if interpreted in accordance with 
human rights standards and the principle of proportionality. Therefore, and this was 
a striking finding, the court found that the GDR border regime had been illegal even 
under GDR law, if only it had been interpreted correctly. 
Given that, in the court’s reading, GDR law and not West German law 
criminalised the acts in question already at the time when they were committed, it 
saw no problem in the ancient legal paradigm and constitutional right of nulla poena 
sine lege – the prohibition of retroactive punishment. It stated that established GDR 
state practice to interpret the law ‘wrongly’ (that is, in a way as to warrant the shots) 






over time. Hence, the expectation to be spared from prosecution for theoretically 
illegal acts would not be protected by the right of nulla poena.  
Finally, in assessing individual guilt of the defendants, the FCJ offered 
interesting contemplations of indoctrination and involvement, guilt and victimhood 
of those serving in the GDR border force. It accepted that the defendant’s practical 
training and their growing up with the Berlin Wall in place did not encourage them 
to learn how to critically challenge their superiors’ orders. ‘In a way’, the court 
concluded, ‘… they are also victims of the conditions associated with this 
border’.558  
 
The court’s line of reasoning is remarkable for taking the GDR seriously as a 
state bound to its own law. The FCJ thereby and explicitly distinguished the GDR 
from the ‘Third Reich’. On the other hand, the reasoning is not entirely convincing. 
The derivation of a principle of proportionality, grounded in international human 
rights obligations, was a bold move of the FCJ. In the GDR’s legal order, 
international law did only then receive direct effect for citizens when the 
Volkskammer adopted it. This had not happened with the ICCPR, as the regional 
court's decision in the Schmidt case had pointed out. Clarifying this is by no means 
a defence of socialist legal principles, as even in West German law, international 
obligations have to be converted into national law before they take effect. The FCJ's 
reasoning therefore marks an example of combining an abstract interpretation of 
legal principles with a hyper-textual reading of the border law. It appears to be 
highly doubtful how any defendant should have been able to force this legal 
situation in order not to commit criminal offences. Compared to this interpretation 
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of the legal situation, the initial verdict in the Gueffroy case which rejected the 
border regime as a whole on grounds of violations of fundamental legal principles 
appears more convincing and even more predictable to non-legally educated minds. 
However, the FCJ’s decision included some important remarks, especially for 
the public. The court’s statement about missing trials against former elites as a 
reason for lowering Heinrich's sentence must be read as a reaction of the judges to 
intense public pressure on the judiciary to go after the likes of Erich Honecker. It 
was therefore also important that the court established that an actual order to shoot 
and, if necessary, kill had been handed down from the state and party leaders to the 
border guards. This assertion was a necessary prerequisite for lower courts to go 
after Erich Honecker, Erich Mielke, and other former leaders. 
By the same token, describing Heinrich, Walther, and Hapke as victims too of 
the border regime, the FCJ attempted to do justice to the actual hierarchy of 
perpetrators and to account for the dilemma in which the courts found themselves: 
having to adjudicate on individual guilt in cases that were an expression of the Cold 
War. Not surprisingly, then, the court implicitly acknowledged the limits of the 
criminal law in adjudicating state crime when it stated that those who were 
responsible for propaganda could not be held accountable for their deeds in the 
absence of relevant provisions in the criminal law.  
The FCJ’s ruling was also groundbreaking in another respect. It essentially 
closed the door for criminal prosecution of acts of bodily injury at the Inner German 
border. In these cases, the FCJ acknowledged that the principle of legal security had 
to override the demand for justice. This was important for the FCJ’s interpretative 
coherence in accepting the validity of GDR law and identifying killings as the one 
exception where legal positivism and legal security had to give way to fundamental 







The First High-Profile Case: The National Defence Council (NVR) Trial  
The case against former members of the GDR's National Defence Council 
(Nationaler Verteidigungsrat, NVR) was the first trial against former GDR leaders 
for the killings at the Wall and at the Inner-German border. It was opened on 12 
November 1992 and concluded on 16 September 1993. While the proceedings were 
opened merely two years after the fall of the Wall, it was, arguably, crucial that by 
then the first Border Guard Trials had been closed for nine months. Given the great 
extent of materials and cases considered in this trial, it is no suprise that it took 
prosecutors slightly longer to collect all relevant material. Also, this trial partially 
rested on the verdicts in the Gueffroy and Schmidt case and on their high court 
confirmations by the FCJ. These important precedents relieved the NVR case from 
answering the basic questions: could re-united Germany's courts adjudicate on state 
acts of the GDR? Had the border regime been warranted by the GDR law? 
However, as chapter 5 argues, this temporal sequence also contributed to an 
impression that 'small men be hanged', while elites be spared. 
Senior figures like Defence Minister Heinz Keßler, his deputy Fritz Streletz (also 
Chief of Staff of the National Defence Army, NVA) and Hans Albrecht, head of 
the SED district of Suhl were among the defendants. However, the court also saw 
some of the most senior figures of the GDR in the dock: Erich Honecker (long-term 
head of state and SED boss), Willi Stoph (President of the Minister's Council) and 
Erich Mielke, notorious head of the Secret Service Stasi.559 However, none of these 
three men could be convicted in the NVR case. On 12 January 1993, the case against 
Honecker had to be closed due to his poor health. This had been ordered by Berlin's 
Constitutional Court on that same day. Honecker, suffering from cancer, had to be 
released immediately and left Germany on that same day for Chile, where he lived 
until his death on 29 May 1994. Despite further attempts by state prosecutors, the 
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trial against Honecker was finally closed in April 1993. Further investigations 
against Honecker for abuse of trust and misappropriation of public funds also had 
to be dropped due to his health. His release sparked severe public outcry (see 
chapter 5).560 Honecker died an innocent man, still riddled with guilt in the eyes of 
the public. The trial against Stoph also had to be closed for health reasons in July 
1993. His health condition also prevented him from being charged for economic 
crimes.561 The case against Mielke was temporarily closed in November 1992, as 
he was simultaneously tried for killing two police officers in Berlin's Bülowplatz in 
1931. In this trial, he was convicted of manslaughter and was sentenced to six years 
in prison. The proceedings for killings at the border had to be finally closed in July 
1998 due to Mielke's poor health. Other proceedings against him for 
misappropriation of public funds, inciting abuse of justice, and other crimes also 
had to be closed before Mielke could be convicted.562 
Keßler and Streletz, however, could be convicted of inciting manslaughter after 
sixty-five court days in September 1993. Keßler received a prison sentence of seven 
years and six months, Streletz of five years and six months. Albrecht was convicted 
of aiding and abetting manslaughter and had to serve four and a half years in 
prison.563 He had been previously convicted of misappropriating public funds as 
well as of illicit possession of firearms.564 Initially, state prosecutors had charged 
the defendants with the killings or bodily injury in sixty-eight cases, but only twelve 
claims of manslaughter or murder were admitted by the judges. Keßler was charged 
in seven cases; Albrecht and Streletz in six. Like in the Politbüro case (see below), 
the judges provided a thorough investigation into the political system of the GDR, 
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portraying the SED's total claim to power and how the armed forces were influenced 
by, and interacted with, political organs. The chain of command was carefully 
reconstructed from the defendants' deliberations in the National Defence Council 
down to actual commands at the Berlin Wall and at the Inner-German border. It was 
made clear that the NVR's decision were authoritative for military orders. 565 In 
order to demonstrate individual responsibilities of Streletz, Keßler and Albrecht, 
the court demonstrated which military orders were taken at what point in time by 
the NVR, and how these were translated into orders of the day on the days of deadly 
events.566 The deaths linked to the defendants had occured between 1971 and 1989. 
Klaus Seifert's death after stepping on a mine on 8 April 1971 was the oldest case. 
He was eighteen years old.567 Hans-Friedrich Franck died on 17 January 1973 after 
causing the explosion of an explosive mine the day before. He was twenty-seven 
years old.568 On 14 July 1974, twenty-six-year-old Wolfgang Vogler was seriously 
injured by an explosive mine in the Harz. He died the next day.569 Wolfgang Bothe 
died from severe brain injury on 11 May 1980, after being injured by an explosive 
mine on 7 April of that year near Halberstadt. He was twenty-eight years old.570 
Frank Mater died on 22 March 1984 after being injured by an explosive mine near 
Mühlhausen.571 The deaths of Horst-Michael Schmidt and Chris Gueffroy from gun 
fire (see above) were the final two cases with which the defendants were charged.572 
The verdict provided insights into the practice of the border regime, albeit not as 
extensively as the Politbüro trial a few years later (see below). The structure of the 
border strip was depicted in great detail, as was the insufficient quality of the rifle 
in use, the AK-47 Kalashnikov rifle. During their shooting practice, they had to fire 
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on targets in the shape of a human body. However, these targets fell over once hit 
anywhere. Hence, according to witness testimonies, most recruits fired on the 
target's trunk to ensure hitting the target. In practice, however, this way of shooting 
leads to significantly greater risks of killing than aiming for legs and feet. Moreover, 
judges heard that recruits were only trained for preventing illegal crossings from 
the GDR into the FRG, not the other way around, both in theory and in practice. 
And when border guards received their daily instructions during the Vergatterung, 
they were repeatedly told that if they fired on an individual 'Grenzverletzer', they 
should always claim that they had seen a further shadow of a person or a gun, or 
that a fugitive's motion towards a border guard could be understood as a direct 
attack on the guard. All these instructions, obviously, served to assure border guards 
that using lethal force was seen as legitimate and that the law could be bent, if need 
be.573  
The court clearly identified what the defendants had known about the border 
regime. In the judges' view, the defendants had been aware that the border regime's 
primary purpose was to deter GDR citizens fleeing the GDR, even at the price of 
using weapons and explosive mines. They argued that the Streletz, Keßler and 
Albrecht had been aware that their work in the National Defence Council 
contributed to fugitives' death. However, they had been 'staunch' members of the 
SED 'who 'endorsed' the party's policies.574 In coming to these conclusions, the files 
of the ZESt played no role, if the verdict's list of consulted evidence is exhausitve.575  
As in all related cases, the regional court then had to assess if West or East 
German criminal law was milder. As usually in these cases, West German law was 
milder with respect to sentences. The important question, however, was if East 
German law would provide any justifications for the acts in question. In the cases 
of those border guards who carried out fatal shots, the decision was: no. How would 
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the court answer this question with respect to former military leaders of the GDR? 
In short: no, justifications could not be found. Regarding the legality of lethal shots, 
the court could point to the FCJ's decisions in the Gueffroy and Schmidt cases (see 
above). Explosive mines and self-firing devices, which were basically the same, 
were a different question. Here, the court concluded that their use was not even 
warranted by the border law. Moreover, other than the use of rifles, mines were 
described as killing randomly: 'The mine does not differentiate between different 
victims, it rather detonates automatically as soon as it is triggered – by 
whomever.'576 That referred especially to women and children who were not to be 
fired at, according to § 27 (4) d) of the Border Law. The court therefore believes 
that under GDR law, the defendants were culpable of instigating murder, which 
would result in a sentence of ten to fifteen years. Under West German law, their 
acts were classified as instigating manslaughter, resulting in penalties between five 
and fifteen years.577 After accepting a series of mitigating circumstances for all 
three defendants, they were convicted of instigating manslaughter and sentenced to 
the aforementioned prison terms, not without noting a series of mitigating 
circumstances which spoke in favour of the defendants: the fact that they were part 
of a system, their helpfulness during the trial or, in Keßler's case, his attempt to 
replace lethal explosive mines with non-lethal weapons.578  
The Federal Court of Justice confirmed the ruling in July 1994, albeit with 
symbolically important modifications. Berlin's regional court had convicted the 
defendants merely of 'instigating' manslaughter. The FCJ, however, ruled that they 
had to be seen as 'indirect perpetrator'. This was in line with the remarks in the FCJ's 
Gueffroy and Schmidt judgements where it had claimed that the border guards had 
not been 'the real culprits'. It was, therefore, only logical that those who bore 
political and military responsibility for the deaths at the Wall be also considered as 
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actual perpetrators. This was widely acknowledged by the press (see chapter 5).579 
In Albrecht's case, this meant that this sentence had to be increased to five years 
and one months in prison.580 
The Federal Constitutional Court's Confirmation in 1996 
It was only a matter of time until Germany's highest court would become 
involved in the Border Guard Trials. The Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) in 
Karlsruhe is Germany's highest court. No court of appeal can revise or dismiss its 
judgements. However, other than the U.S. Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom, it has limited jurisdiction. Its only task is to rule on whether 
individual constitutional rights have been infringed upon, or if certain state acts 
have curtailed competences of other branches of the state. It is also the only court 
which is competent to prohibit and dissolve political parties. It is, however, not a 
supreme court in the sense that it could revise judgements for reasons of substance, 
except when constitutional rights have been violated. Still, 'going to Karlsruhe' has 
become a regular feature not only in trials, but also in political conflicts. 
In the case of the Border Guard Trials, the FCC was called upon to decide if the 
conviction of border guards and their superiors violated the prohibition of 
retroactive punishment (nulla poena) that is enshrined in Art. 103 (2) of the Basic 
Law. As has been shown above, the FCJ had argued that in rare cases of state crime, 
legal certainty had to yield to 'material justice' and that in this cases, the prohibtion 
of retroactive punishment could be weakened. Of course, the FCC could have taken 
a completely different view. But it did not. 
Instead, the judges overcame what seemed like a contradiction in itself: 
upholding the prohibition of retroactive punishment as 'absolute', whilst at the same 
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time restricting its unconditionality.581 This became obvious in the structure of the 
judgement's guideline (Leitsätze), a summary usually prepended to the main 
judgement. Here, the FCC started out by stating that the prohibition of retroactive 
punishment was 'absolute' and needed to be 'strictly formalised'. It added that the 
'strict' principle was justified by the 'special basis of trust which the criminal laws 
bear if they are enacted by a democratic legislature bound by fundamental rights'.582 
This basis of trust was missing, the court argues, if rulers excluded 'the gravest 
criminal injustice' from culpable liability. Therefore, if they invited or encouraged 
acts which 'disdained (…) universally acknowledged human rights in a grave way', 
the protection of legal predictability had to yield.583 
The court subsequently dismissed the constitutional complaints of Hans 
Albrecht, former head of the SED district of Suhl, Defence Minister Heinz Keßler, 
his deputy Fritz Streletz and a fourth unnamed person. In line with previous 
judgements, it held that the plaintiffs had not enjoyed any immunity which could 
protect them from criminal liability. 584  Most importantly, however, the court 
explained comprehensively its ruling – namely, why nulla poena had not been 
violated. Like in the guidelines, the FCC clearly stated that the prohibition of 
retroactive punishment enshrined in Art. 103 (2) of the Basic Law was 'absolute'. It 
was described as a 'manifestation of the rule of law'.585 However, the rule of law 
 
581 Beschluss des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 24.10.1996, Az. 2 BvR 1851/94; 2 BvR 
1852/94; 2 BvR 1853/94; 2 BvR 1875/94, in: Marxen/Werle, Strafjustiz, vol. 2, sub-vol. 2, pp. 
608-641. 
582 'Das strikte Rückwirkungsverbot des Art. 103 Abs. 2 GG findet seine rechtsstaatliche 
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von einem an die Grundrechte gebundenen demokratischen Gesetzgeber erlassen werden.', ibid., p. 
609. 
583 'An einer solchen besonderen Vertrauensgrundlage fehlt es, wenn der Träger der Staatsmacht 
für den Bereich schwersten kriminellen Unrechts die Strafbarkeit durch Rechtfertigungsgründe 
ausschließt, indem er über die geschriebenen Normen hinaus zu solchem Unrecht auffordert, es 
begünstigt und so die in der Völkerrechtsgemein- schaft allgemein anerkannten Menschenrechte in 
schwerwiegender Weise mißachtet. Der strikte Schutz von Vertrauen durch Art. 103 Abs. 2 GG 
muß dann zurücktreten.', ibid. 
584 ibid., p. 630f. 






also included 'the demand for material [or elementary, P.E.] justice as one of its 
guiding principles'.586 The FCC went on to argue that the criminal law restricted in 
this way would usually be used 'under the conditions of democracy, separation of 
powers and a commitment to fundamental rights'.587 However, the judges went on, 
this 'special basis of trust' was absent when a government circumvented positive 
law in order to 'invite or encourage' crimes of the gravest kind which 'disdained (…) 
universally acknowledged human rights in a grave way', the protection of legal 
predictability had to yield to 'material justice.588 The Court likened the case at hand 
with similar conflicts in the adjudication on Nazi crimes and referred to the 
Radbruch Formula by stating the time of Nazi rule had shown that 'the legislature 
can legislate grave "wrong"' which could not command any 'obedience' if it was in 
'intolerable opposition to justice'. 589  This instance of doing the splits, legally 
speaking, was decisive for forming the subsequent legal landscape. 
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of this judgement for the whole 
development of criminal trials against former GDR officials, especially for the 
Border Guard Trials. The FCJ's verdicts were crucial for the establishment of a 
legally watertight approach that could (and subsequently did) serve as a template 
for the adjudication of similar cases. But it was not until the FCC's judgement in 
1996 that it was clear that the whole project of judicial Aufarbeitung would not fail. 
 
586 'Das Rechtsstaatsprinzip umfaßt als eine der Leitideen des Grundgesetzes aber auch die 
Forderung nach materieller Gerechtigkeit', ibid. 
587 'unter den Bedingungen der Demokratie, der Gewaltenteilung und der Verpflichtung auf die 
Grundrechte', ibid., p. 633. 
588 'Diese besondere Vertrauensgrundlage entfällt, wenn der andere Staat für den Bereich schwer- 
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mißachtete. Hierdurch setzte der Träger der Staatsmacht ex- tremes staatliches Unrecht, das sich 
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'materielle Gerechtigkeit', ibid., pp. 633f. 
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In future cases, such as the Politbüro trial, judges, prosecutors, defendants, and 
lawyers knew that the legal basis for the proceedings had been manifested. 
The Politbüro Trial, January – August 1997 
With more than 110 days of trial between 15 January and 25 August 1997, the 
Politbüro trial agaist Egon Krenz, Günter Schabowski and Günther Kleiber was one 
of the longest, if not the single longest, trial against GDR officials. Eventually, 
Schabowski and Kleiber were convicted of minor manslaughter in three cases 
(minderschwerer Fall des Toschlag, § 213 StGB) and were sentenced to three years 
in prison. Krenz was convicted of manslaughter in four cases and received a prison 
sentence of six and a half years.590  
Other than in previous cases, the judges in this case could rely on established 
jurisprudence. However, they also provided extensive findings about the way how 
state institutions and politicians in the GDR interacted. On almost fifty pages, the 
verdict considered the 'power structures' within the GDR.591 Another fifty pages 
were spent on the study of the responsibility of the SED's Politbüro for the GDR's 
border regime.592 For the court's assessment of evidence to be printed, more than 
100 pages were needed. The list of witnesses included such high-ranking former 
GDR officials as Heinz Keßler (Minister of Defence) and his deputy Fritz Streletz. 
Moreover, a former clerk of the Politbüro was heard, a long with Erich Honecker's 
long time secretary and consultant. What is more, other low-ranking members of 
the SED's central committee were questioned, along with 'candidates' to the 
Politbüro, that is, prospective members. With former officers of the border troops, 
including their head Generaloberst Klaus-Dieter Baumgarten, who had been 
convicted of manslaughter in eleven cases and sentenced to six and a half years in 
 
590 Erstinstanzliches Urteil des Landgerichts Berlin, 25.8.1997, Az. (527) 25/2 Js 20/92 Ks (1/95), 
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prison in 1996.593 
In its verdict, the court described the international political situation and 
extensively studied structures of the SED and of the GDR's public administration. 
For example, the verdict asserted that: 
'Every citizen of the GDR was exposed to complex, systematic, and recurring political 
paternalism and manipulation by the political organs of the SED, which began in 
kindergarten and accompanied them through school and into professional life. An 
essential instrument in this was the so-called political education [Politunterricht]'.594 
It also made clear how the SED's Politbüro decisions were central to any 
staffing decisions in public positions, even though in the GDR's parliament, the 
People's Chamber, the SED only had 127 seats out of 500.595 In setting out how key 
SED politicians also occupied all other important offices of state, the verdict made 
plain how inextricably the party was intertwined with all areas of politics and public 
life in the GDR. For example, the Secretary-General of the SED's Central 
Committee was also head of the National Defence Council and head of the Council 
of State (Staatsrat), the collective body that was the country's head of state. 
Moreover, the National Defence Council was solely staffed with SED members. In 
1989, of seventeen members of the Council, twelve were also members of the SED's 
Politbüro, including two of the defendants in this case: Egon Krenz and Günter 
Kleiber.596 This all served to say that the SED – and most importantly its steering 
committee, the Politbüro – were the real centre of power in the GDR, and all other 
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institutions gravitated around it. Therefore, the Politbüro's resolution of 14 January 
1958 was important for army and border troops. It stated that '[e]very commander, 
every superior must be aware that he is first and foremost a political functionary 
and carries out his work on behalf of the Party of the Working Class'.597 
In line with this detailed historical scrutiny, the judges also reconstructed the 
chain of command from the top political leadership down to border guards at the 
bottom of the hierarchy. Annually, the National Defense Minister issued the 'Order 
No. 101' for the border troops. Their head transformed this order into an 'Order No. 
80' for the three border commandos. This was translated into 'Order No. 40' for the 
border regiments, which again subsequently issued 'Orders No. 20' which were 
translated into the daily Vergatterung. The court argued that 'all acts' of the border 
troops, including the use of firearms against fugitives, were 'based on this chain of 
command'.598 This assertion was crucial for the verdict and the bigger project of 
holding political leaders to account, as it proved their responsibility for the acts in 
question. 
The regional court also attempted to disprove claims that the GDR's border 
regime resembled West German state practice, a claim repeatedly made by the 
defendants. For instance, it argued that the spring-guns installed at the Inner 
German border fence were purely meant for harming those who crossed the border 
from East to West and had not military purpose. Moreover, since they could be seen 
from the West and since no signal wire was installed on the Western side of the 
border, the court assumed that it did not aim at protecting the border from Western 
invasions. Likewise, during shooting practice, future border guards were merely 
trained to hit a target in the shape of a human being. They were not specifically 
trained to cause non-life-threatening wounds. From this, and from further remarks 
on the legal situation, on the indoctrination of recruits and from standing 
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commands, the court derived that killings of fugitives were at least accepted, as the 
weapons and strategies used were able to inflict incalcuable damage to fugitives.599 
The judgement also tried to refute claims that GDR leaders had no knowledge 
of the border practice. The verdict set out that any casualties at the Wall or border 
were immediately reported to the Defence Minister and the Secretary-General of 
the SED's Central Committee. 600 These senior figures were not as helpless as they 
occasionally claimed. For instance, the court argued that Honecker adhered to the 
removal of spring-guns in 1984 and 1985, despite criticisim from the USSR.601 
Likewise, after Gueffroy's death in February 1989, Krenz demonstrated his 
willingness and ability to change the border regime, despite being only deputy to 
Honecker. On 3 April 1989, Krenz ordered the chief of the border troops that in 
future, firearms could strictly only be used when self-defence required this.602 The 
court credited Krenz for his actions, but also interpreted them as evidence that it 
was not impossible for the defendants to change the practice at the border. 
To establish the defendants' guilt, the court carefully traced the genesis of 
commands for the border regime. Subsequently, the judges (re-)constructed a chain 
of command from general Politbüro commands to specific commands given to 
individual border guards on the day of a fatal shooting. For example, the court 
depicted a decision of the National Defence Council of 2 February 1984 to keep the 
border commands unchanged. The judges then traced this order through the chain 
of commands and concluded: 'As a result of these decisions, 20-year-old Michael-
Horst Schmidt was killed in the early morning hours of 1 December 1984 by shots 
fired by border guards.' 603  Even though state prosecutors had submitted some 
dozens of cases to the court, the chamber deduced the defendants' guilt only in four 
 
599 ibid., p. 687-700. 
600 ibid., p. 705. 
601 ibid., p. 688. 
602 ibid., pp. 706-09. 
603 'Infolge dieser Entscheidungen wurde in den frühen Morgenstunden des 1. Dezember 1984 der 






cases: in the above-mentioned Schmidt case, in the case of Michael Bittner's death 
on 24 November 1986,604 Lutz Schmidt's death on 12 February 1987,605 and lastly 
in the case of Chris Gueffroy.606 
The court checked the acts in question both under East German law and under 
West German law, as the TGR mandated. In the light of the jurisprudence 
established in previous cases, including the NVR-case, this was no significant 
challenge. The court found that under GDR law, the defendants had incited murder 
(§112 [1] StGB-DDR. It claimed that without the Politbüro's resolutions, neither 
the chain of commands nor the daily Vergatterung had existed which eventually led 
to the deaths in question. This would have resulted in prison sentences of ten to 
fifteen years.607 Under West German law, they were find guilty of manslaughter 
(Totschlag) or manslaughter in a minor case (minderschwerer Fall des Totschlags), 
respectively. Following the FCJ's revision judgement in the NVR-case, they were 
classified as indirect perpetrators, not merely as institgators. Still, West German law 
was milder and the defendants were hence convicted according to it.  
In the case of all three defendants, the court chose relatively mild sentences. 
Krenz received a prison sentence six and a half years, made up of two years for the 
death of Michael-Horst Schmidt in 1984 (by the National Defence Council's 
decision of 2 February 1984) and six years for the killings of Michael Bittner, Lutz 
Schmidt and Chris Gueffroy (by the National Defence Council's decision of 25 
January 1985). These sentences were combined and reduced for mitigating 
circumstances.608 The judges credited him for trying to reduce killings at the border 
by ramping up the Hinterland wall. The court also accepted his testimony that the 
killings of fugitives had been his 'personal defeat in life'.609 Moreover, the chamber 
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acknowledged as mitigating that Krenz had adhered to his policy of reducing the 
use of firearm until he became Secretary-General of the SED's Central Committee 
(ZK) in autumn 1989. After that, he had prohibitied the use of firearms at the border 
save in cases of self-defence. Lastly, the court credited Krenz with his 'non-violent 
behaviour', aimed at finding 'political solutions' during autumn 1989. This had had 
a 'significant' effect on the level of his penalty.610 
Likewise, the judges identified extenuating circumstances for Schabowski who 
had received three years in prison. The court credited him with precipitating the 
overthrow of Honecker 'conspiratorially [with Krenz] and at personal risk', which 
had paved the way for the 'easing and abolition' of the border regime. The court 
believed he played 'a major role in the peaceful course of the "Wende"'.611 The 
chamber finally acknowledged a further series of mitigating circumstances in 
favour of all three defendants. It argued that the defendants had been involved in a 
'totalitarian machinery of power' and that their 'room for manoeuvre' had been 
limited. 612  Moreover, it was argued in their favour that they had merely 
'perpetuated' – not erected –  the border regime.613 Lastly, the court acknowledged 
that they had precipitated the killings not for 'selfish' reasons, but for 'misconceived 
public interest'.614 Kleiber was therefore also sentenced to three years in prison.615 
The Federal Court of Justice entirely confirmed the regional court's decision on 
 
610 ibid., p. 883f. 
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p. 883. 
612 'totalitärer Machtapparat', 'Handlungsspielraum' ibid., p. 880-82. 
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8 November 1999, remarkably one day before the tenth anniversary of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall.616 Krenz also applied to the Federal Constitutional Court, arguing 
that his conviction had violated the prohibition of retroactive punishment (Art. 103 
[2] Basic Law). The FCC rejected to hear the case, referring to its previous 
judgements on the legality of the border guard cases. This was the end of Krenz's 
journey through Germany's judicial appeals process.617 
The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 
After the appeal to the FCJ had been lost and Krenz's complaint to the FCC had 
been to dismissed, three former senior figures of the GDR decided to puruse their 
last chance: to apply to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
Strasbourg. Former Defence Minister Heinz Keßler, his deputy Fritz Streletz and 
former head of state and government, Egon Krenz, claimed the Federal Republic 
had broken international law, that is, the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), by convicting them of manslaughter. 
The ECHR is an international treaty between the member states of the Council 
of Europe. It was drafted in the aftermath of World War II and has become one of 
the first and most progressive international human rights instruments in the world. 
Under the convention system, states are obliged to guarantee the fundamental rights 
and freedoms laid down in the convention. Citizens and companies of member 
states can apply to the ECtHR if they believe that their rights have been infringed 
upon by a member state. However, this is only possible once all domestic legal 
remedies have been exhausted.618 
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The only way that Keßler, Streletz and Krenz could apply to the ECtHR was to 
claim that their conviction had violated fundamental rights laid down in the ECHR. 
They claimed that their convictions had violated the prohibition of retroactive 
punishment. This was not only protected in the German constitution (see above), 
but also in Art. 7 ECHR. This provision reads:  
'1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international 
law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than 
the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.  
2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act 
or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.' 
Paragraph 1 of this article is bascially in line with the prohibition of retroactive 
punishment that is also guaranteed in Germany's Basic Law. Paragraph 2, however, 
goes beyond the regulations of the German constitution in allowing for criminal 
prosecution of grave violations of ius cogens, that is, the most fundamental 
principles of international law. This usually includes genocide, slavery, and other 
acts that would be considered a severe violation of human rights. When acceeding 
to the Council of Europe in 1950, the FRG also became a party to the ECHR. In the 
instrument of ratification, the Federal Government, however, submitted a 
reservation that paragraph 2 of Art. 7 could only be applied in so far as it would not 
violate the protection against punishment without law in West Germany's 
constitution. That is to say that (West) Germany's prohibition of retroactive 
punishment even goes beyond the level of protection offered by the ECHR.619 
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The applicants (as the defendants were now correctly referred to, being the 
parties who applied to the court) claimed that the acts for which they had been 
sentenced had not been defined as crimes in the GDR's penal code at the time when 
the acts were committed. Therefore, the applicants believed that their conviction 
violated the prohibition of retroactive punishment. Germany's Federal 
Constitutional Court had already dismissed the same claim, but from the point of 
view of the defendants, the application to the ECtHR at least offered another chance 
to appeal against their sentences. They also claimed that the border regime had been 
'essential' for the preservation of the GDR and that their conviction was – in the 
words of the court – an 'ex post facto interpretation of the GDR's criminal law' 
which reflected not so much a gradual change in the application and interpretation 
of the law, but a total refusal to accept any justifications for the acts in question that 
could be found in GDR law.620 Defending the FCC's ruling and the previous courts' 
convictions, Germany's Federal Government rejected the applicants' claims and 
contended that it had been perfectly forseeable to the defendants that in the case of 
a regime change within the GDR, their acts would be prosecuted. 621  In their 
argument, the Federal Government played down the question of whether the ICCPR 
had been transposed into GDR domestic law or not; this had been a weak spot in 
the FCJ's ruling, and the Government – or their lawyers – seemed to tacitly 
acknowledge this. 
The ECtHR's chamber noted that the case at hand was not an 'ordinary' criminal 
case, but had a 'special feature' in dealing with the 'transition between two states 
goverened by two different legal systems'.622 By acknowledging this, the chamber 
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explicitly acknowledged the political dimension of the case. Still, it followed the 
line of argument of German courts in assuming that the principle of proportionality 
and the obligation to preserve human life had been enshrined in GDR statutory and 
constitutional law.623 The court then considered the GDR's state practice and also 
took into account that the GDR had understandable reasons for protecting its border 
vigorously as its very existence had been 'threatened by the massive exodus of its 
own population'.624 However, the chamber argued that the legal and constitutional 
priniples as well as the international view of the right to life as 'the supreme value 
in the hierarchy of human rights' should have been superior to these 
considerations. 625  The Schießbefehl, along with anti-personnell mines and 
automatic-fire systems were described as 'flagrantly' infringing 'the fundamental 
rights enshrined' in the GDR constitution.626 In making the case as to why the 
applicants bore personal and criminal responsbility, the chamber also referred to § 
95 of the GDR's criminal code which provided that those who were responsible for 
violations of human or fundamental rights should be held criminally responsible, 
irrespective of statutory law. As to the difference between state practice and positive 
law, the court claimed that the applicants could not refer to state practice as an 
indicator for the correct legal understanding of the time, as they had been those who 
had been responsible for state practice. Thus, no justification could be derived from 
their own practice.627 
Interestingly, the ECtHR made ample reference to other post-socialist 
transformations in its judgement and to predicaments usually faced by 
transformative processes. It thus argued that it was 'legitimate' for a 'state goverend 
by the rule of law' to prosecute former regime perpetrators. For this sake, it was also 
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allowed to re-interpret historic law in the light of the rule of law.628 State practices 
such as the GDR's border regime, the court continued, 'which flagrantly infringes 
human rights and above all the right to life, the supreme value in the international 
hierarchy of human rights' could not be protected by the ECHR.629 In the judges' 
view, as leaders of the GDR, the applicants had 'created the appearance of legality 
emanating from the GDR’s legal system but then implemented or continued a 
practice which flagrantly disregarded the very principles of that system'. In this 
light, protecting them from punishment would undermine the ECHR's purpose, 
namely 'to ensure that no one is subjected to arbitrary prosecution, conviction or 
punishment.'630 With this remark, the Strasbourg court favoured 'material justice', 
to quote the FCC, over procedural accuratesse, thereby reflecting a more politicised 
approach of adjudication than German courts would normally do. 
The ECtHR therefore concluded that the applicants' convictions did not violate 
the ECHR, as the punishability of the acts in question had not been determined 
retroactively. In a final statement, the court even touched upon the question of 
whether the acts had constituted crimes against humanity but refrained from 
pondering this idea any further as the questions of the case could be answered 
otherwise.631 
The idea of judging the GDR border regime not on the grounds of positive law, 
but on the basis of higher legal considerations, that is, supra-positive law, was also 
prevalent in the three concurring judgements submitted by judges.632 Judge Egils 
Levits made a strong case for understanding the law in authoritarian systems as part 
of the ruling system. He argued that the 'interpretation and application of the law 
depend on the general political order' and that the law was merely a 'sub-system' 
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thereof.633 Confronted with the question of whether a democratic system could re-
interpret the law of a demised non-democratic regime, he argued in the affirmative, 
claiming that 'democratic states' had no alternative but to apply 'previous law, 
originating in a pre-democratic regime' in accordance with their democratic views. 
Doing otherwise would damage the ordre public of the democratic state. 634 
Arguably, his concurring opinion reflected legal as well as political considerations 
when claiming that the use of law 'according to socialist or other non-democratic 
methodology (…) should from the standpoint of a democratic system be regarded 
as wrong'. 635  He went on to claim that the 'universality of human rights and 
democratic values' would be 'well understood in the world' at least since the 
Nuremburg Trials and therefore were 'forseeable for everybody'  – thereby 
invalidating claims that the applicants could not have been aware of any future 
change in the application of the law.636 
Lastly, Judge Levits warned against taking the law of authoritarian regimes too 
seriously. He correctly argued that in the case at hand, the conclusions had been 
based on positive law of the GDR. In his view, that was possible because the legal 
texts were 'well-formulated in a language which was similar to the language' of 
democracies governed by the rule of law. However, Levits warned that the rule of 
law was 'not the real intention of the non-democratic regime of the GDR'. Rather, 
the law had a 'rather (…) propagandistic character'.637 While Judge Levits argued it 
was perfectly legal and legitimate for the FRG to apply the GDR's law in a new 
way, he asserted that 'newly established democracies' should not be constrained in 
their attempt to 'deal with the "legacy"' of former authoritarian regimes. Levits 
believed that they should 'not depend solely on the wording of the legal norms of 
the non-democratic regimes, formulated in the first place not for legal but for rather 
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for propagandistic purposes'.638 This claim perfectly summarised the predicament 
faced by the German courts in the Border Guard Trials: to adjudicate on state crime 
of a perished regime which might have been legal at the time, but most certainly 
violated any common sense and every human rights catalogue written with the 
blood of millions in the twentieth century. 
Summary 
As for legal considerations, the question of the punishability of fatal shots at 
fugitives was the most pressing problem of the Border Guard Trials. After all, GDR 
border guards claimed that they had acted under orders and in accordance with the 
law of the time. Citizens from East and West Germany partially shared that view, 
as letters to the Federal President demonstrate (see chapter 5). Early on, it was 
contested whether and how those deeds in question had been punishable. In fact, 
this contestation goes all the way back to the establishment of the ZESt in 1961, 
certainly to the debates since the Hanke verdict in 1963. In the case of the border 
guard cases, the first two verdicts differed widely in their approach to establishing 
the punishability.  
In the first verdict, the Gueffroy case in early 1992, Berlin’s regional court relied 
on supra-positive or natural law considerations to establish why the court was 
competent to punish Ingo Heinrich and Andreas Kühnpast. The Radbruch Formula 
was a key stone in these considerations. This legal principle, first formulated by 
German law professor Gustav Radbruch in 1946, holds that where the positive law 
and supra-positive legal considerations collide, positive law usually has precedence. 
However, in grave situations where following positive law would entail severe 
injustice, the ‘incorrect law’ must yield to justice. In short, this principle allows for 
courts to disregard positive law, e.g. in dictatorship, to substantiate criminal 
 






proceedings against state crime that may have been warranted by statute in an 
authoritarian regime. 
In its second verdict in the Schmidt case also in early 1992, Berlin’s regional 
court (if, however, a different chamber) took an entirely different route to establish 
punishability. Where the first verdict had relied on extensive considerations of 
supra-positive law, this second verdict utilised used a hyper-positive reading of 
GDR law, enriched with the principle of proportionality. In this case, the court 
argued that the punishability had been established even in GDR law, if only 
interpreted correctly. At the same time, this chamber outrightly rejected the use of 
the Radbruch Formula. 
 
When new legal challenges emerge, it is no surprise that lower courts come to 
diverging results in their jurisprudence. It is then the mandate of high courts to 
provide legal guidance and to ensure a coherent and consistent application of the 
law. Called upon to do so in 1992 and 1993, the Federal Court of Justice partially 
rejected and partially acknowledged both previous rulings from Berlin's regional 
court. By and large, the court confirmed the verdicts and – most importantly – 
confirmed that ‘criminal’ acts at the Inner German border and at the Berlin Wall 
were indeed punishable. It came to this conclusion largely by relying on positive 
GDR law, enriched with considerations of supra-positive law, especially the 
Radbruch Formula. In the FCJ’s view, the GDR border law itself had not been 
consistent with obligations of the GDR under international law and especially under 
human rights treaties such as the ICCPR. In its judgement, the FCJ elevated itself 
to the authoritative interpreter of GDR law, thereby opening the door for criticism 
– namely,  ignoring the legal reality in the GDR.  
The FCJ's decisions provided much-needed legal clarity and guidance for future 
trials. The judges detailed reasoning paid off when the matter came before the 






rendering this judgement, the FCC managed to square the circle of limiting the 
extent of nulla poena while decisively claiming the opposite and declaring the 
prohibition of retroactive punishment 'absolute'. It did so by linking this legal 
paradigm to the legitimacy of democratic legislatures, thereby abandoning pure 
legal positivism in favour of a normative approach. 'Material justice', the judges 
found, was paramount. The legal tool which helped this conclusion be reached was 
the Radbruch Formula, a legal paradigm developed in the wake of World War II to 
enable criminal trials against Nazi perpetrators. This paradigm, a lubricant in the 
interpretation of the constitution, once more established a connection between Nazi 
crimes and socialist state crime, albeit courts and politicians were careful not to 
equate the scale of crimes and the gravity of the dictatorships. This judgement was 
echoed by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Being an 
international court, the ECtHR went further into the realm of international law than 
German courts which had, essentially, decided the cases based on domestic law. 
The ECtHR's judges identified the transitional and hence political nature of the 
trials against former regime perpetrators, while supporting the findings of the 
German courts. The Court's decision, but even more one concurring judgement 
discussed whether GDR leaders had committed crimes against humanity, 
establishing a link between German domestic legal debates and the emergence of 
international criminal law since World War II. 
The trials against former members of the National Defence Council (1992-93) 
and of the Politbüro (1995-97) saw some the most prominent former leaders of the 
GDR in the dock. In these trials, a step-by-step link was established between 
individual political acts of the defendants and fatal incidents at the border. 
Likewise, the courts demonstrated that the defendants were part of the official 
channels of reporting when a fatal incident at the border had occurred. The verdicts 
provided a detailed portrayal of the power relations between institutions of the GDR 
and established the SED's Politbüro as the centre of power, and the NVR as the 






implemented. With demonstrating that spring-guns usually only prevented border 
crossing from East to West, not vice versa, and that the aim of the shooting training 
was merely to hit the 'target', not to learn how only to hit limbs, the courts also 
refuted the claim that the GDR was protecting its border like any other state. With 
these detailed arguments, Berlin's regional court punished the military leaders 
Keßler and Streletz and political leaders Albrecht, Krenz, Schabowski and Kleiber 
for specific political acts, for the failure to oppose the border regime, and in some 
cases for issuing orders. They were not, however, punished for being members of a 
perished regime. This was no victor's justice. 
In the NVR case, the judiciary came under heavy criticism for suspending the 
proceedings against Honecker, Stoph and Mielke. In all cases, this had to be done 
due to the defendants' very poor health conditions. However, given the law and 
interventions of Berlin's Constitutional Court, the judges had no other choice than 
to let them off the hook. This also helped to protect the ongoing proceedings against 
Keßler, Streletz, and Albrecht and to shore them up against claims of political show 
trials. Still, in the eyes of the public, Honecker's release clearly undermined the 
legitimacy of trials and convictions of rank-and-file border guards. In this light, an 
adjustment made by the Federal Court of Justice upon revision in the NVR case 
was important. It declared that military and political leaders were not merely 
instigators to manslaughter, but principal perpetrators. This could be understood as 
an attempt to transfer their political responsibility into criminal culpability. Still, 
the regional court and the FCJ credited all defendants for cooperation and Krenz 






5. Transitional Justice and Public Opinion  
In the summer and autumn of 2019, a tense debate on East Germany’s 
transformation following German re-unification held the country in its grip. In the 
face of state elections in Brandenburg and Sachsen on 1 September 2019 and in 
Thüringen on 27 October 2019, the country examined why – apparently – East 
Germany’s political and mental landscape differs so vastly from that of West 
Germany.639 In the run-up to these elections, an Allensbach poll revealed a stark 
difference in political loyalty of East Germans and West Germans to the Federal 
Republic. When asked if they identify primarily as German or West German, 
seventy-one per cent of responders in West Germany said they identified as 
German; only twenty per cent thought themselves primarily West German. In the 
former East, merely forty-four per cent of respondents viewed themselves as 
German, while fourty-seven per cent identified primarily as East German.640 With 
almost fifty per cent of respondents in East Germany cultivating a specific regional 
identity related to an sunk authoritarian regime, it seems plausible to assume that 
political support – or legitimacy – of the political and social system of the Federal 
Republic is capable of improvement.641 And regularly, commentators have blamed 
 
639 Most recently, see Der Spiegel's special edition on the thirtieth anniversary of the fall of the 
Wall, which is entitled: 'Ziemlich beste Deutsche. Warum es uns so schwerfällt, ein Volk zu 
werden'. See Der Spiegel No. 39a, 25 September 2019. On the alleged media bias to the detriment 
of East Germany, see Mark Siemons: 'West-Komplex. Blinder Fleck: Wie ticken eigentlich die 
Beobachter des Ostens', in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 1 September 2019, p. 33; 
See also an interview with the former president of the Treuhand, Birgit Breuel: Inge Kloepfer: 
'"Westdeutsche hätten das nicht durchgehalten." Birgit Breuel im Interview', in: Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 14 July 2019, online available at: 
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July 2019, p. 8. 
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the specific way in which German re-unification was achieved on a economic, 
political, and legal level for this lack of self-identification with and popular support 
of the re-united country's public order. 
In this chapter, it will be asked how the public has viewed criminal trials in 
context of wider experiences of transformation during the 1990s. In mixing 
qualitative and quantitative examinations, this chapter explores how the wider 
public in Germany has thought about criminal trials as a transitional justice 
measure: did they perceive trials as fair and appropriate, or did they see them as 
victor's justice? Did they think they would foster German re-unification – or deepen 
divisions? To what extent did commentators in newspapers contemplate the 
challenges and quandaries of this form of transitional justice? Is it, perhaps, even 
possible to study the role these trials played in the overall process of German re-
unification, to what they may have been 'successful' as a transitional justice measure 
aimed at providing the new order with legitimacy and restoring 'justice' with respect 
to past injustices? 
Posing these questions is ultimately to ask about the legality, legitimacy and 
success of the 'border guard trials', and of post-Socialist criminal trials in a wider 
sense. The aim of this study, however, is not to pass judgement on the legality of 
past judicial practices, but to understand and depict them.  And when debating the 
'success' of using the criminal law as a means to 'overcome' Socialism, this study 
deploys a strictly consequentialist approach. This means asking if the trials may 
have helped equip the new body politic with legitimacy. As sketched out above, 
'legitimacy' or 'political support' are understood and used as descriptive terms 
referring to popular support for specific actions of the state, as well as to the whole 
body politic and the wider social order in a more diffuse way. Providing such 
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popular support or legitimacy is arguably a fundamental task of transitional justice 
measures in post-conflict or post-tyranny situations.642 
In this light, this chapter argues that from the outset, the use of the criminal law 
against former GDR officials faced public opposition. Press commentators and the 
wider public were especially sceptical of criminal proceedings against 'ordinary' 
border guards and other subordinates. Courts attempted to develop a systematic 
approach which took into account individual levels of responsibility for the border 
regime as a whole and acknowledged that 'ordinary' border guards where, in a way, 
'also victims' of the border. However, this taxonomy was not overly successful in 
securing public support for criminal trials. It will be demonstrated how public 
dissatisfaction was amplified by the temporal imbalance between early trials against 
'foot soldiers' and later proceedings against the GDR's military and political elites. 
Arguably, this particular experience of frustration was then intermingled with 
broader transformative experiences, such as vast unemployment, rising levels of 
‘everyday crime', social changes, and revelations about the extent of Stasi crimes. 
Against this backdrop, dissatisfaction about the border guard trials served as a 
perpetual and reiterative reminder of various frustrating cultural, economic and 
social experiences. Therefore, if considered as measures of transitional justice, 
criminal trials against former GDR officials have failed to achieve their aim of 
supporting the new political order with legitimacy. Instead, they have contributed 
to a growing dissatisfaction with the way German unity was shaped during the 
1990s.  
 
642 On legitimacy, see Considine/Afzal, Legitimacy; Blatter, Legitimacy; Beetham, David: 
'Legitimacy', in: International Encyclopedia of Political Science, vol. 5, edited by Bertrand Badie, 
Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Leonardo Morino, London et al: Sage 2001, pp. 1414-1425; Easton, 
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Examining societal ramifications of transitional processes on a macro level is a 
challenging endeavour, to say the least. More likely, perhaps, it is a challenge that 
cannot be mastered. However, this cannot be an excuse not to try. In this light, this 
chapter aims at adding some pieces to a puzzle which, in all likelihood, will never 
be finished. But, as with archeological artefacts or palimpsests, sometimes, pieces 
of a puzzle can help us to imagine a wider picture which still sheds some light into 
previously dark corners of our knowledge. To this end, a mix of primary sources 
will be studied. Press comments of a small sample of regional newspapers will be 
analysed with regard to their view on decisive court decisions. These will be one 
newspaper each from East and West Berlin (Berliner Zeitung and Berliner 
Morgenpost, respectively). Moreover, the regional newspapers from Erfurt 
(Thüringer Allgemeine) and from Vechta in rural West Germany (Oldenburgische 
Volkszeitung) will be presented. Secondly, a series of citizens' letters to the Federal 
President from the early 1990s will be qualitatively examined.  
A burdened Beginning: Setting the stage for the Border Guard Trials 
Unemployment is one of the faces of German reunification. After the fall of the 
Wall, and even more so after German re-unification, hundreds of thousands of 
citizens of the GDR or reunited Germany’s Neue Länder, respectively, lost their 
jobs. Many more feared they would do so and this fear, probably, made them endure 
all sorts of frustrations in their job in order to keep it. In 1990, West Germany’s 
unemployment rate was slowly recovering from more than half a decade of high 
unemployment, with 1985 showing the peak of 9.3 per cent of West Germans being 
unemployed. This had fallen to 7.2 per cent in 1990.643 
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There was no such thing as unemployment in the GDR, at least not officially. 
Everyone had a job, even if it meant sitting around rather uselessly in a control room 
or taking a nap. In 1991, the first reported official figure for unemployment in East 
Germany showed remarkable 10.2 per cent, while only 6.2 per cent of the civil 
population were unemployed in West Germany at the time. Over the coming years, 
figures in both parts of the country soared up to more than nineteen per cent in the 
East in 1997 and 1998, and more than ten per cent in the West during these years.644 
While forced unemployment is always distressing, at least for most of us, East 
Germany’s situation was specific. Here, unemployment was at the risk of being 
strongly related to re-unification, casting a shadow onto the formerly desired union 
of the states and personal and economic freedom. And while German re-unification 
as such can not be held accountable for an economic situation mainly caused by a 
bankrupt state and economic system, re-unification might very well have been 
blamed for it.645 
Unemployment and social uncertainty were two of the major themes running 
through East Germany’s most prominent illustrated magazine, SUPERIllu, which 
has often been hailed as the ‘voice of the East’. 646  A frustration born out of 
experiences of or fear for personal deprivation was further amplified by open 
property questions. The GDR had expropriated former house and land owners, be 
it for the benefit of state property or because they had fled the country. Some of 
these properties were then sold to other citizens. In 1990, the GDR’s Volkskammer 
had passed a law regulating such questions of contested properties. According to 
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this, the return of expropriated properties enjoyed preference over compensations. 
This was a recipe for social unease between former and current landowners.647 
Against this backdrop, revelations about the luxurious lifestyle of former leaders 
continued to ramp up public debate, as it had done since the first revelations in 
October 1989. 648  What sparked particular outrage was Alexander Schalck-
Golodkowski’s life after reunification. From 1975 to 1989, he had been state 
secretary in the GDR’s ministry for foreign trade. From 1976, he was also member 
of the economic commission in the SED’S Politbüro. From 1996 onwards, he was 
the head of Koko (‘Kommerzielle Koordinierung’), an office designed for handling 
secret deals with the West in order to secure the GDR’s supply with hard currencies. 
After he had fled the GDR in December 1993, no trial against him could be open 
until 1995. Several investigations related to his acts as the head of KoKo had to be 
closed.649 His private re-location to the picturesque Tegernsee in Oberbayern might 
have struck some East Germans as a perversion. 
Probing questions about when Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski could be 
criminally charged were one of the constant themes running through virtually 
almost every issue of SUPERIllu in 1991. 650  As is the style of an illustrated 
magazine, SUPERIllu continued its chase for former elites. Potentially criminal or 
corrupt acts of Honecker were exposed651, and a series revealed crimes of Politbüro 
 
647 On the difficult diplomatic negotiations about expropriations, see Elbe, Frank/Kiessler, 
Richard: A Round Table with Sharp Corners. The diplomatic Path to German Unity, Baden-
Baden: Nomos 1996, 170-77; Dahn, Daniela: Wir bleiben hier oder wem gehört der Osten. Vom 
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2003. 
648 Bock, Systemwechsel, 81-86. 
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members from a book.652 Other texts revealed the story, intended to spark outrage, 
of a Stasi colonel who had become a lawyer after reunification; a text on ‘the gentle 
fall of the red gods’, which portrayed alleged economic privileges which former 
elites enjoyed after reunification; or an attempted deal where contaminated soil 
from West Germany was meant to be dumped in the East, thereby potentially 
prompting feelings of being treated as second-class citizens among East 
Germans.653 Prejudice and distrust left their mark on Inner German relations, as a 
few testimonials of East Germans on West Germans (‘Wessis’) show: they describe 
their fellow citizens from the West as ‘arrogant and snobbish’, as ‘unkind, selfish, 
greedy for money’, as ‘unreliable’, ‘treating us like second-class people’.654 In a 
similar manner, an opinion poll of Forsa Institute on behalf of Berliner Morgenpost 
showed in January 1992, one third of East Berliners thought that ‘West-Berliners’ 
arrogance’ is an obstacle for actual unity in the city.655 
In a lead story on the first anniversary of German re-unification, SUPERIllu took 
stock of the process and came to mixed results. Both citizens as well as celebrities 
mentioned unemployment and low pensions as a cause of frustration, they also 
expressed delight at the freedom gained or in the light of personal career 
advancements.656 
‘The long arm of justice’ 
Not suprisingly, the first border guard case against the alleged slayers of Chris 
Gueffroy provoked intense debates. Some two weeks before the trial was opened, 
SUPERIllu published a micro survey of citizens’ views on the upcoming trial. The 
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text claimed: 'The long arm of justice is now grabbing the border guards who chased 
refugees with their weapons. But again it looks like only the little ones have to 
pay.’657 Some of those surveyed supported the trials against Ingo Heinrich, Andreas 
Kühnpast, Peter Schmett and Mike Schmidt; others thought that they had acted 
under orders and should be able to leave the court as free man. All commentators, 
however, thought that it was paramount to hold to account those who bore political 
and military responsibility for the Inner German border. 
The use of the word ‘again’ in the aforementioned quote probably serves as a 
semantic tool to spark outrage about a perceived line of similar events which might 
not have been all too long in early 1991. Oh the other hand, the headline refers to a 
perception that former elites like Honecker and Schalck-Golodkowski, whose 
actions had received extensive coverage in 1991, remained uncharged, while 
‘ordinary men’ had to stand trial at a time when many East Germans learnt a hard 
economic lesson about the reality of reunification. The idea that only ‘small men’ 
had to pay the price for overcoming Socialism did not seem all that alien. This was, 
perhaps, not an ideal starting point for trials of transitional justice. In September 
1991, a representative opinion survey showed that only a few months into the very 
first border guard trial, fifty-five per cent of Germans in East and West advocated 
to close the proceedings; in East Germany, two thirds of respondents thought this 
way.658  
When Heinrich and Kühnpast were convicted on 20 January 1992 (and Schmidt 
and Schmett were acquitted), the press reacted cautiously. In West-Berlin’s rather 
conservative Berliner Morgenpost, Rudolf Stiege commented that the verdicts were 
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‘extraordinarily differentiated’.659 He expressed slight doubts if the verdicts could 
withstand revision. However, he also made clear that this case had not seen ‘the real 
culprits’.660  
This notion was widely shared. In Thüringer Allgemeine, one report suggested 
that the trial had not been able to ‘free itself from the accusation that the wrong men 
had been charged.’661 In this paper’s comment, Ingo Linsel welcomed the verdict’s 
notion that every individual had to check their conscience. At the same time, the 
author wondered why Erich Honecker then could have visited Bonn in 1987 without 
being arrested. In the light of the verdict, he argues, GDR citizens could have seen 
an implicit acceptance of the ‘existing order’ in all those handshakes between 
Honecker and West German politicians.662 Concluding, Linsel also drew a parallel 
to Gerhard Klopfer, asking how he could remain free when there was a ‘core area 
of the law’ which could never be violated, as the verdict against Heinrich et al. had 
argued. 663  The SS-Gruppenführer Klopfer had been a participant of the 
Wannseekonferenz in 1942, where the total annihilation of European Jews had been 
resolved. He was never convicted for this. This comment reflected a series of 
prominent assumptions: that Honecker’s state visit to Bonn had legitimised the 
GDR and that a line had to be drawn from the Border Guard Trials to the so-
perceived failed or neglected prosecution of Nazis. Thüringer Allgemeine also 
commented that this was ‘another verdict… on the assessment of the GDR’.664 In 
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perhaps slightly over interpreting this sentence's semantics, it is striking how the 
author equates a verdict against four individuals (two of whom had been acquitted) 
with an evaluation of the former GDR as a whole. He concluded that the current 
legal approach threatened to ‘narrow down guilt onto citizens in the East’.665 In his 
view, the relatives harsh sentences of three years and six months in prison for Ingo 
Heinrich had to be seen as ‘scorn’ when former leaders had to defend themselves 
merely in bagatelle cases: ‘Nothing could cripple the sense of justice in the East any 
more.’666 
East Berlin’s daily newspaper Berliner Zeitung shared a certain degree of caution 
against the verdict, which would ‘surely not be the last verdict’.667 Commentator 
Hans-Werner Neubacher conceded that the defendants had never had a life ‘without 
the Wall and in real freedom’ and had been ‘systematically indoctrinated’.668 While 
this would not free them from ‘moral responsibility’, Neubacher found that the 
verdict failed to address these normative challenges.669 He believed that this trial 
had predominantly been pushed as a legal precedent in order to charge Erich 
Honecker and his allies with instigation of criminal acts. However, the commentator 
complained that so far, ‘the last links' of the long chain of command had been 
‘burdened with all guilt’, thereby also criticising the judicial branch for prosecuting 
gunmen while allegedly sparing former elites.670 Oldenburgische Volkszeitung’s 
Jörg Respondek also thought that the order guards were ‘merely the last and 
weakest link of a long chain’. He believed that, if the verdict was to survive revision, 
‘raise the bar’ for Erich Honecker and others all the more.671 
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Allgemeine, 21 January 1992. 
666 ‘Nichts könnte das Rechtsempfinden im Osten mehr verkrüppeln.’, in: ibid. 
667 ‘sicher nicht das letzte Urteil’, in: Berliner Zeitung, 21 January 1991. 
668 ‘ein Leben ohne Mauer und wirkliche Freiheit…’, ‘systematisch indoktriniert’,  ibid. 
669 'moralische Verantwortung’, ibid. 
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Apparently, reluctant commentators hit the nail on the head for many readers. 
An Allensbach poll presented only days after the verdict showed waning public 
support for the Border Guard Trials. While in West Germany in August 1990, fifty-
one per cent of respondents had said they saw gunmen at the border as marginally 
guilty underlings ('minderbelastete Befehlsempfänger'), the figure had soared up to 
sixty-one per cent of West Germans in February 1992.672 In East Germany, seventy-
seven per cent of respondents thought that same way, while only nine per cent saw 
them as ‘criminals’ (West: twenty per cent).673 
 
Merely days later, the second verdict against border guards was handed down 
(see chapter 4). Udo Walther and Uwe Hapke were both sentenced to a suspended 
prison sentence of eighteen and twenty-one months. This trial already received less 
attention, as papers merely reported and did not print any comment. However, in its 
report, the Berliner Zeitung described the opinion of the court as ‘balanced’.674 
Journalists recognised that in the second case, the court had come to a different 
reasoning. While in the first case, the presiding judge had mainly relied on supra-
positive legal norms, in this second case, the presiding judge Ingeborg Tepperwien 
ruled that the killing of unarmed fugitives was illegal even under GDR law. The 
press acknowledged that this verdict paid more tribute to the actual conditions of 
service at the Wall and border.675 
This second verdict, however, also strengthened public demands to get the ball 
rolling in the prosecution of former GDR elites. This second verdict especially put 
Berlin’s judicial branch under pressure to go after them. Not doing so would 
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become ‘more questionable, not to say more embarrassing’ by the day.676 Still, one 
day later, when the trial against former SED head of the Erfurt district, Gerhard 
Müller, was opened, Thüringer Allgemeine’s Karl-Heinz Schmidt acknowledged 
that the penal law was an imperfect measurement to do justice to the ‘crimes’ of 
elites: ‘But there is no other measurement’.677 
Citizens’ Reactions 
As the first case against GDR border guards, the Gueffroy trial understandably 
made it into almost every front page of newspapers. Its relevance can also be seen 
in prompting private letters written to the Federal President by citizens. Restoring 
to this means has been seen in a line of continuity with pre-modern states, where 
subjects could plea to their sovereign in personal matters.678 In the case of the GDR, 
Eingaben have been described as 'channeled form of social protest', the content of 
which was only known to the regime and could not cause protests to spread. 
Therefore, petitioners usually did not have to fear disadvantages.679 In re-united 
Germany, the Federal President has no power to revise administrative or judicial 
decisions. However, the right to pardon lies with him for cases where criminal 
proceedings fall within the competence of federal prosecutors 
(Generalbundesanwalt).680 Moreover, citizens write to the federal president with 
questions, wishes, complaints and pleas. According to official information, the 
president makes ‘full use of all possibilities of influence’ in justified cases, 
including involving appropriate institutions or charity organisations.681 Hence, for 
some citizens, writing letters to the federal president was also seen as an appropriate 
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means to ventilate their views on the transformation of and in East Germany, 
including criminal trials. 
However, the numbers of letters written to the president remained quite low. 
Only some thirty letters were sent to Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker in 
Spring 1991 and Winter 1992, when media coverage of the Gueffroy case was 
extensive. While a majority of letters were posted from writers in East Germany, 
they were also sent from the former West. Most letters opposed the trials as a means 
of  ‘coming to terms with the past’, even though a few letters were supportive or 
discussed the matter in a well-balanced manner. 682 
 
Three major themes run through these documents. The first leitmotif in these 
letters related to the factual validity of GDR law and orders regulating the border 
regime. Sometimes, the internationally accepted sovereignty of the GDR was 
invoked; more often, the authors mentioned that even the Federal Government had 
courted the GDR leaders with state visits in Bonn.683 Here, the social relevance of 
Honecker’s long-desired state visit to Bonn became obvious. In the wider 
population, it helped to establish a sense of proper recognition of the GDR by the 
FRG.684 
The second major theme as the well-known notion of a ‘command emergency’ 
(Befehlsnotstand). This term describes a legal dilemma in which a subordinate is in 
a quandary to either break the law by executing an unlawful order, or by breaking 
the law by defying an order. It had been well-known, so it was argued in these 
letters, that for a border guard, intentionally missing a fugitive citizen would have 
meant a prison sentence or harsh disciplinary measures.  However, given the 
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findings that Kühnpast was only bullied for refusing to use his gun, and that the 
lack of precision of the standard rifle AK-47 was well-known, doubts as to if this 
was true are allowed.685 Another variation of this argument saw the border guards, 
in this case young men, as victims of comprehensive propaganda, so that they would 
not have had any choice but to follow their orders. In short, many saw the 
ideological and disciplinary circumstances as having a mitigating effect on the 
guards’ guilt.686 This notion was later also uttered by the Federal Criminal Court 
(FCJ) in its high court rulings on the legality of the verdicts against H. and others.687 
The third and biggest theme in these letters referred to the expression of hanging 
the small men and letting the big men run. It was widely criticised that the executing 
border guards had been put on trial and sentenced, whereas state and party leaders 
remained uncharged and unchallenged by the time the first verdict was handed 
down in early 1992. In fact, the NVR case (which also saw Honecker in the dock) 
was not opened until November 1992, and the FCJ itself noted in its judgements 
against rank-and-file border guards of November 1992 and March 1993 that the 
failure to charge and convict superiors was considered to have a mitigating effect 
on sentences for subordinates.688 The reason for the judiciary’s failure to bring 
former state leaders before a court earlier than late 1992 was investigations against 
them were much more complex and hence time-consuming than investigations 
against one-time offenders such as the border guards (see Part III). The bigger share 
of these letters fundamentally criticise the first trial (i.e. the Gueffroy case) for those 
various aforementioned reasons; but it is not the paradigm of using the criminal law 
as a means of transitional justice as such which was challenged by these citizens. It 
was the implementation, not the principle, that drew so much criticism. 
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However, a few letters rejected the idea of criminal prosecution altogether. A 
few quotes illustrate how this position was often linked with more general criticism 
of the processes and adjustments which had been following German reunification. 
One particular author complained that the leaders remained uncharged and thought 
that the trials were inappropriate: 
‘I'm not a lawyer, I'm a simple person, but from the East and that unfortunately often 
reduces the quality today. But I already feel today's judgement as a new injustice, as 
the evil pose of the victors over the vanquished.’689 
In this quote, we can already sense the writer’s perception of a general 
degradation, a sense of inferiority imposed onto him and other East Germans by the 
allegedly merciless victors of the Federal Republic. He also wrote the following 
lines which are potentially paradigmatic for feelings of many East Germans: 
'Every day I can/must hear/read, often from early in the morning to evening in most 
media, what an outstanding state the old FRG and what hard-working people its 
citizens were and in contrast what a miserable state this GDR was and what miserable 
sourpusses and loafers most of the people living in it for 40 years have been. For some 
tabloids there were and are only SED and Stasi criminals, recorders, stupid followers, 
women forced to work and children pumped full of phrases, …'690 
Another citizen expressed his disrespect for the new state and his perception that 
the whole population of the former GDR was being prosecuted and punished. He 
asked the President to end ‘the witch trials against GDR citizens.’ 691  This 
expression reveals a sweeping equalisation of those prosecuted border guards with 
 
689 ‘Ich bin kein Jurist, ich bin ein einfacher Mensch, allerdings aus dem Osten und das mindert 
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the whole GDR and her citizens. These ‘show trials’, he continued, were proof that 
the GDR citizens had been betrayed by reunification.692 It could not be expected 
that he would be faithful to the Federal Republic, if the public expected the border 
guards to dishonour their oath of allegiance as GDR soldiers. He concluded by 
asking the President to reverse the judgements and to refrain from future trials in 
order to enable the Germans to peacefully grow together.693 These two letters reflect 
an astonishing equation of the trials against border guards with the GDR and its 
population in general. It becomes obvious that in the views of some, the border 
guard trials triggered feelings of general devaluation of East Germans and their past 
experiences through many facets of the legal, political, economic, social, and 
cultural transformation that took place during the 1990s. 
 
The standard alternative suggested by most writers was either to only prosecute 
state and party leaders, or to leave criminal prosecution be altogether. One particular 
author suggested an interesting alternative to criminal trials: instead of prosecuting 
those border guards who had shot and killed, he suggested to issue formal 
commendations for those who rejected to follow their orders as border guards.694 
One letter stood out from the crowd by making a case for criminal prosecution. 
In a very differentiated piece, this person argued that criminal prosecution was 
necessary for German reunification to become a success. There could be no justice 
if those responsible would not be charged. Not to do so would mean yet another 
denigration of the dead. The writer also rejected the legal positivist notion that was 
being used to defend the GDR border regime. In conclusion, it was written: 
‘Wir im Osten brauchen die Betsätigung (sic!), daß es Recht gibt. Wir brauchen die 
Gewißheit, daß Unrecht, hinter welcher Pseudogesetzlichkeit es sich auch verstecken 
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mag, seinen gerechten Richter findet, sonst nimmt der neue Anfang schweren 
Schaden…’695 
Contrary to the claims of fears of many of these citizens that the state and party 
leaders would be spared, it is important to note that questions of how to go after 
Erich Honecker and others were soon at the centre of the public debate. Practical 
problems, however, prevented this from being realised initially. Also, quite soon 
the courts developed a legal taxonomy of sentences which usually saw a suspended 
prison sentence of up to twenty-four months for firing border guards, and higher 
sentences for superiors and state and party leaders (see chapter 4). 
However, when those first three dozen letters were written in 1991 and 1992, 
their writers could not have known that courts would indeed try to accommodate 
their request for a system of sentences that would take into account the degree of 
personal responsibility for the border regime. In fact, from that moment’s 
perspective, the prospect of trials against Honecker and the like seemed far away, 
though it did start on 12 November 1992, only nine months after the first verdicts 
against border guards. 
'Schauen sie, Herr Bundespräsident, die Menschen in den östlichen 
Bundesländern haben es nicht leicht. So vieles ist neu, soviel macht unsicher, 
manches sogar Angst. Die Zukunft schwebt mit einer Menge Ungewissem über den 
Köpfen der Menschen hier, die Gegenwart bietet nur wenig Grund zur Freude. Und 
eine Vergangenheit gibt es entweder nicht mehr (weil es den Staat nicht mehr gibt), 
oder sie wird kriminalisiert. Sie sind oberster Repräsentat eines Systems, das jetzt 
auch für hier gilt. Vielleicht können Sie uns helfen, die Spielregeln besser zu 
verstehen.' (BArch B 122 / 56083, p. 50-52), written in Berlin on 20 January 1992. 
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Early High Court Confirmations, November 1992 – March 1993 
Briefly before the Honecker case was opened in Berlin, the FCJ delivered its 
first landmark ruling. Its decision on 3 November 1992 (Mauerschützen I) provided 
desperately needed legal certainty. It confirmed the ruling of the regional court by 
and large. The press saw this confirmation as a important for the upcoming trial 
against Honecker and others, the so-called NVR case. Thüringer Allgemeine 
pointed out that the confirmatory FCJ ruling was decisive, as the case at hand was 
listed as one of the charges against the NVR members in that upcoming important 
trial in order to proof ‘his [Honecker’s; P.E.] guilt for homicide’ at the border.696 
The verdict, which acknowledged the defendants as ‘victim of the border’,697 was 
read as a statement that the convicted were not the ones in charge of the border 
regime.698 However, Berliner Zeitung’s commentator had reservations about the  
verdict: he believed that a ‘fierce argument’ would continue in a question which 
‘moved many Germans’, until the Federal Constitutional Court could come to a 
decision.699 In his view, some questions remained open regarding the limits of the 
validity of GDR law for German courts and if border guards had been able and 
responsible for interpreting GDR laws in the right way. In West German 
Oldenburgische Volkszeitung, a report on the FCJ ruling was placed prominently 
on page two, but did not prompt any comment.700 
In the following months, media coverage of ‘border guard cases’ mainly 
concentrated on the proceedings in the NVR case, while public attention for trials 
against border guards dropped. When the FCJ delivered its second ruling on the 
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border guard cases in the Gueffroy case on 25 March 1993, substantially less 
coverage could be observed, even though the court partly dismissed the original 
judgements.701 SUPERIllu, however, welcomed the partially successful revision as 
a ‘sudden u-turn of the judiciary’.702 By the magazine’s own account, it had covered 
the legal costs of the appeal process for the defendant Peter Schmett, because ‘(…) 
we were convinced that one cannot charge the small men while the big men run 
free.’703 Evidently, in the view of the public, it was high time that the ‘real culprits’ 
for the GDR’s misery belonged in the dock. 
A Turning Point: The Challenges to prosecute ‘the real culprits’, 1992- 1994 
The opening of the Honecker case naturally saw another peak in media coverage. 
As former head of state, Erich Honecker was only the most senior state leader on 
trial in this case. The other defendants were former Stasi head Erich Mielke, former 
Prime Minister Willi Stoph, former Defence Minister Heinz Keßler and his deputy 
Fritz Streletz as well as former head of the SED district of Suhl, Hans Albrecht. 
The opening of the trial was the moment commentators and citizens had been 
waiting for: the moment when ‘the real culprits’ had to stand trial, even though by 
then former Stasi head Erich Mielke was already facing a trial for murdering two 
police officers in 1931. Eventually, Mielke could only be convicted of this double 
murder, all other charges had to be dropped due to his poor health.704 It seemed 
clear to commentators that the trial against Honecker, Mielke etc. was bound to be 
a disappointment for some. As Thüringer Allgemeine’s Ingo Linsel thought, the 
trial would raise high expectations, but it would also demonstrate ‘the limits … of 
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judicial Aufarbeitung’.705 Still, he insisted that if the border guards remained the 
only convicted culprits, ‘justice is on his head’.706 
Likewise, Oldenburgische Volkszeitung’s Wolfgang Kupczyk conceded that it 
would be difficult to proof individual guilt and that therefore, only ‘ludicrous 
sentences’ would be handed down. 707  Still, opening the case was a ‘moral 
obligations towards the victims’, as the deeds in question, despite being hard to 
prove, were in their effects deeply inhuman.708 For this author, the trials had to be 
seen as ‘a signal to take global action against state-mandated injustice’. 709 
Therefore, it was necessary to replace ‘inhuman national regulations with 
internationally mandatory’ norms to hold ‘criminal dictators’ around the globe 
accountable.710 
Given these high expectations, it is not surprising that huge public outrage 
accompanied Erich Honecker’s release in January 1993 due to health reasons. 
Honecker immediately left Germany for Chile where he lived in a government 
campus until his death in May 1994.711 SUPERIllus chief editor, Jochen Wolff, 
called the judges who had ordered Honecker’s release and the closing of the 
proceedings ‘insensitive and perverse.712 In his view, the Rechtsstaat had ‘disgraced 
itself immortally’713 This development was, of course, a welcome invitation for 
SUPERIllu to print abundantly illustrated stories about Honecker’s new home in 
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Chile – ‘and at home: Rage, Rage, Rage!’714 In a smaller piece on the side of the 
page, SUPERIllu quoted Horst Schmidt, father to victim of the Wall Michael 
Schmidt, where he expressed his ‘uncanny rage’ about Honecker’s liberation.715 
West German Oldenburgische Volkszeitung, on the other hand, emphasised 
solely Honecker as puppet master of the deadly border, while neglecting the focus 
on economic crimes such as corruption and misappropriation of public funds. Here, 
two conflicting comments were presented. While one commentator admitted to his 
own rage about Honecker’s liberation, he defended the act as expression of the rule 
of law: ’In our liberal view, the law just is no class or revenge justice. (…) But I'd 
rather be angry about this Rechtsstaat than be suspected of confusing justice with 
morality.’716 Another commentator, however, perceived the previous day of when 
all charges against Honecker had been dropped as ‘a difficult day for the 
Rechtsstaat, a black day for justice.’ 717  In his view, this development would 
endanger the continued NVR case, as all defendants would now solely blame Erich 
Honecker for everything. In letters to Federal President von Weizsäcker, citizens 
also uttered their frustration over Honecker's release and expressed that they could 
no longer view trials against rank-and-file border guards as just and demanded their 
pardoning.718 
In Berliner Morgenpost, Bruno Waltert believed that Honecker's release would 
damage public trust in the rule of law. He argued that the court's decision made it 
difficult to punish border guards. He claimed that when political leaders such as 
Honecker went off without punishment, their subordinates should be treated equally 
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– 'This, too, is a piece of the rule of law – even a decisive one.'719 These remarks 
again demonstrate how the press was at least partially driven by outcome 
expectations and how important trials against leaders were in order to justify trials 
against border guards. In the world of legal proceedings, the NVR case had little to 
do with verdicts against Ingo Heinrich and the like. In political reality, however, 
those two could not be separated from each other.   
 
With extensive media coverage of the verdicts in the NVR case, a shift of public 
interest away from trials against individual border guards towards high-profile 
cases against former leaders can be observed. When the verdict in the NVR case 
was pronounced in 1993, the trials against Erich Honecker, Erich Mielke and Willi 
Stoph had been severed and subsequently been terminated due to the ill health of 
the defendants. Hence, only three persons sat on the defendant’s bench in 
September 1993. One was the former Minister of National Defense, Heinz Keßler. 
He received a prison sentence of seven years and six months for instigating 
manslaughter. Fritz Streletz, former deputy Defense Minister and head of the 
general staff, was also convicted of instigating manslaughter. He was sentenced to 
five and a half years prison sentence. Lastly, Hans Albrecht, former SED head of 
the Suhl district, was sentenced to four and a half years for instigating manslaughter. 
In the appeal before the FCJ, all three were convicted of manslaughter rather than 
just instigation. Albrecht’s sentence was increased to five years and one month.720 
The verdict in the NVR case was greeted by the press with a mixture of 
scepticism and satisfaction. Berliner Morgenpost’s commentator Jan von Flocken 
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thought that the verdict sent a ‘self-contradictory message’ in sentencing the 
defendants, but releasing them from custody. 721  In this, he suggested ‘Judge 
Salomon’ could have been the godfather of the ruling, as it was ‘appropriate and 
follow[ed] elementary commands of justice’. 722  However, he deemed it 
dissatisfying that Egon Krenz was not in the dock and Erich Honecker had had to 
be released early. 723  Other commentators saw the ruling as evidence that the 
criminal law was not sufficient in addressing the aftermath of the GDR dictatorship. 
Berliner Zeitung’s Werner Neubacher believed that the sentences were appropriate, 
as those pulling the levers bore responsibility for the use of weapons against 
fugitives. However, he also acknowledged that ‘conflicts between law and justice’ 
would continuously have to be addressed.724 Yet, the law itself would not suffice in 
ascertaining ‘true guilt for the developments of the Cold War’.725 This notion was 
shared by Thüringer Allgemeine’s commentator Karl-Heinz Schmidt who thought 
that the criminal law was an insufficient tool in addressing state crime even legally 
because ‘injustice nested in political spheres’.726  Yet, the author demonstrated 
sympathy for potential disappointment of the bereaved of victims of state crime 
about ‘excessively low sentences’.727 West German Oldenburgische Volkszeitung 
apparently saw no need to comment on the verdict.728 
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Repeated reports about the termination of proceedings or investigations against 
former GDR greats (such as Erich and Margot Honecker) prompted outrage and 
frustration about the question, why border guards were successfully being 
sentenced, while those greats were often able to roam freely. In March 1994, 
SUPERIllu published a double page on ‘'Honecker's sidekicks in court (...) – Why 
are they all getting off so easy?’729 The series showed prominent people such as the 
acquitted Rudi Strobel, head of the Stasi’s department for mail control, or former 
head of government Hans Modrow, who had received a fine for electoral fraud. 
This was accompanied by an interview with the former president of the 
Oberlandesgericht Braunschweig (Higher Regional Court), Rudolf Wassermann. 
He accused mild verdicts against former GDR greats of ‘a certain blindness towards 
what the GDR had done to the people’. 730 However, he also acknowledged that 
limitations of freedom to travel or ‘ordinary Stasi tyranny’ could not be brought 
before a criminal court.731 Asked if the difference between the people’s ‘sense of 
justice’ and the criminal law could endanger the Rechtsstaat, he claimed that if 
functionaries be punished inappropriately low, East Germany’s population could 
neither develop a ‘sense of justice’ would nor a ‘moral renewal’.732 SUPERIllu kept 
pushing for harder sentences for former elites, while remaining critical of trials 
against former border guards. However, when the Landgericht Berlin delivered the 
second verdict against Ingo Heinrich, this did not prompt significant reporting or 
commentary by the papers.733 
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This was, of course, different when the FCJ confirmed the verdicts against the 
NVR members Streletz and Keßler and tightened the punishment against Albrecht 
in July 1994. Legally important, the FCJ differed from the regional court in seeing 
the NVR members not only as instigators and assistants to manslaughter, but as 
indirect perpetrators.734 Commentators praised the verdict for its clear message, 
while acknowledging that it came late. Berliner Zeitung’s Brigitte Fehler argued 
that the mild sentences and detailed reasoning proved that the Rechtsstaat was no 
‘instance of revenge’.735 She thought that the verdict was an answer to resignation 
about an perceived imbalance in the prosecution of GDR state crime, and a reply to 
Bärbel Bohley’s ‘sarcasm’.736 Earlier, Bohley had coined the phrase: ‘We wanted 
justice, but we received the rule of law’.737 
In the view of Thüringer Allgemeine’s Ingo Linsel, the FCJ’s ruling ended the 
‘incomprehensible’ state where border guards had been sentenced to jail while 
former leaders remained free.738 Linsel saw the verdict as an indirect conviction of 
Honecker, Stoph and Mielke, against whom the proceedings had been closed due 
to health reasons. The author praised the FCJ for providing ‘far more convincing’ 
evidence that political leadership must never dare to violate basic norms and human 
rights.739 In his comment, the symbolic interpretation of the ruling as a reference to 
the late Honecker’s guilt was obvious as well as a critique of the judiciary for 
bringing leaders no earlier to justice. 
 
734 ‘Mittelbare Täterschaft’ instead of ‘Anstiftung’, see chapter 4. 
735 ‘keine Instanz für Rache’, Berliner Zeitung, 27 July 1994. 
736 ‘Sarkasmus’, ibid. 
737 A source for Bohley’s statement has not been found to date. However, the phrase is regularly 
attributed to her, e.g. by the Federal President Joachim Gauck in: Bundespräsidialamt: 
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Oldenburgische Volkszeitung’s commentator Jörg Respondek also interpreted 
the verdict as a ‘posthumous conviction of Erich Honecker’, but was full of praise 
for the judges’ decisions.740 For him, the ruling was ‘a prime example of the only 
correct way of coming to terms with the past in Germany’.741 He lauded that former 
GDR leaders would face prison sentences and thought the verdict as a decisive step 
‘on the way to the ultimate achievement of Germany’s inner re-unification’.742 
The Federal Constitutional Court’s Decision in the eyes of the Public, 1996 
The Federal Constitutional Court's decision that trials against border guards and 
former elites did not violate the Basic Law's prohibition of retroactive punishment 
was met with praise. Berliner Morgenpost's Dieter Opitz viewed the decision as an 
'impressive victory of the Rechtsstaat' in a situation where it had to reconcile 
'written law, a sense of justice and [material, P.E.] justice'. 743  In Thüringer 
Allgemeine, Thomas Rothbart showed his surprise about this decision after 'all the 
mishaps' of the past years, clearly referring to Honecker's release. However, despite 
his satisfaction with the ruling, he argued that many injustices of the GDR 'cannot 
be grasped with legal means'. 744 
In the Berliner Zeitung, Dieter Schröder expressed his hope that further verdicts 
against marksmen ('Todesschützen') could be achieved, while unorthodoxly 
claiming that prison sentences for military leaders were not as important. He also 
noted that an international court hardy could have come to another decision than 
the FCC; but in his eyes, an international verdict might have been 'more elegant', as 
 
740 ‘posthumer Schuldspruch gegen Erich Honecker’, Oldenburgische Volkszeitung, 27 July 1994. 
741 ‘Musterbeispiel für einzig richtigen Weg der Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland’, ibid. 
742 ‘auf dem Weg zur endgültigen Verwirklichung der inneren Einheit Deutschlands’, ibid. 
743 'eindrucksvoller Sieg des Rechtsstaates, dem die häufig schwierige Aufgabe auferlegt ist, 
geschriebenes Recht, Rechtsempfinden und Gerechtigkeit in Einklang zu bringen', Berliner 
Morgenpost, 13 November 1996. 
744 'all den Pannen', 'Doch vieles ist mit juristischen Mitteln nicht faßbar.' Thüringer Allgemeine, 






it would have 'ruled out any suspicion of vengeance from the outset'.745 This was 
one of only few comments which contemplated the possibility of subjecting GDR 
state crime international courts or tribunals. 
Late Justice: The Politbüro Trial, 1995-1999 
After the regional court's judgement in the Politbüro trial, which saw Egon Krenz 
sentenced to six and a half years, and Günter Schabowski and Günther Kleiber both 
sentenced to three years in prison, commentators of our sample newspapers were 
by and large positive. Writing in Thüringer Allgemeine, Thomas Rothbart argued it 
had been high time for the mail culprits to be brought to justice. In his view, the 
verdict demonstrated a ‘rechtsstaatliches Augenmaß’. 746  Writing in a more 
sceptical tone, Oldenburgische Volkszeitung’s Wolfgang Fechner believed that the 
acting court had been judging on ‘a fine line between right and wrong’.747 Still, he 
claimed it was right for Krenz and others to be convicted as they had ‘condoned 
cowardly murder’ at the Wall and the Inner German border. Thus, in his view, the 
verdict was neither revenge nor victor’s justice.748 
The notion that such a trial was a challenge for a criminal court was widely 
shared by commentators. Writing for Berliner Morgenpost, Rudolf Stiege stated 
that the past could not be ‘mastered’ with the criminal law.749 Still, he commended 
the Rechtsstaat for ‘trying to do its duty (…) in a sea of legal, political and 
psychological difficulties’.750 Berliner Zeitung’s Christian Bommarius interpreted 
 
745 'Aber vielleicht wäre ein solches Urteil eleganter gewsen, weil es von vornherein den 
Racheverdacht ausgeschlossen hätte', Berliner Zeitung, 13 November 1996. 
746 This appears to be a non-translatable phrase suggesting that a proportionate judgement had been 
delivered, see Thüringer Allemeine, 26 August 1997. 
747 ‘schmaler Grat zwischen Recht und Unrecht’, Oldenburgische Volkszeitung, 26 August 1997. 
748 ‘feigen Mord an Mauer und Stacheldraht geduldet’, ibid. 
749 ‘Die Vergangenheit kann nicht mit strafrechtlichen Mitteln aufgearbeitet werden’, Berliner 
Morgenpost, 26 August 1997. 
750 ‘In einem Meer von juristischen, politischen und psychologischen Schwierigkeiten hat der 






the ruling as a ‘modest triumph of human rights’ over state crime: ‘To date, a life 
in prison followed a murder, and a place in the book of history was the reward for 
hundreds or thousands counts of murder.’751 He also thought the case had shown 
the limits of the criminal law’s suitability in coming to terms with the past. He used 
this occasion to put the border guard cases in the context of international debates 
about sanctioning state crime. In his view, the Politbüro case had highlighted that 
‘(…) to date, there is no binding international criminal law sanctioning crimes 
against humanity’.752 
 
Fittingly, the FCJ delivered its confirmatory decision in the Politbüro case on 8 
November 1999, in time for papers to comment on the verdict in the issue covering 
the 10th anniversary of the fall of the Wall. Through this coincidence, the ruling 
received a great deal of attention and was, perhaps, something like a preliminary 
endpoint of the border guard cases, even though the European Court of Human 
Rights’ ruling was still to come, as were some trials against border guards. Berliner 
Morgenpost’s commentator Oliver Michalsky called the FCJ’s confirmatory vote 
‘fair and measured’.753 He believed the judgement would do well for the public’s 
sense of justice, especially after the ‘many’ verdicts against border guards. For him, 
the sentences were neither too harsh nor too mild. He decisively rejected any claims 
of former PDS politicians that ‘the West’ tried to ‘delegitimise’ the GDR; in his 
view, the former republic had delegitimised itself and history had judged Egon 
Krenz and his comrades.754 Berliner Zeitung’s Christian Bommarius praised the 
FCJ for not attempting to adjudicating on ‘subversion and arbitrariness, terror and 
 
751 ‘Bisher stand auf einen Mord lebenslang, auf hundert- oder tausendfachen Mord hingegen ein 
Eintrag ins Geschichtsbuch.’, Berliner Zeitung, 26 August 1997. 
752 ‘(…)  bis heute gibt es kein verbindliches internationales Strafrecht, das staatliche Verbrechen 
gegen die Menschlichkeit sanktionierte’, ibid. 







bugging’. In his view, decades of a dictatorship could not be ‘mastered’ by the 
criminal law.755 In his view, the role of the Rechtsstaat was not to ‘charge systems 
and to judge ideologies’, but to assess individual guilt. This, Bommarius argued, 
marked the limits of the rule of law.756 He also argued that the criminal law could 
satisfy victims of the GDR; this could only be done by state action such as 
compensations for wrongful imprisonment or disadvantages suffered in the 
GDR.757 A stark divide in coverage was obvious: the Oldenburgische Volkszeitung 
merely printed one report on page 1, Thüringer Allgemeine and Berliner Zeitung 
both dedicated background stories to the trial, but also to the history of Border 
Guard Trials, to the GDR’s chain of command, and to voices of victims’ relatives.758 
The last Hurrah: The verdict of the European Court of Human Rights 
Egon Krenz’s last chance lay in Straßburg, with the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR). The Court’s decision marked the last peak of press coverage of 
criminal trials against former GDR officials, as this was the end of all high-profile 
cases. The events invited commentators not only to share their opinion on the 
judgement at hand, but also to review the trials against elites and border guards 
altogether. After the verdict, Egon Krenz’ claimed that he had gotten his judgement, 
but not his rights. Hans Modrow, honorary chairmen of the PDS and at the time a 
Member of the European Parliament also dismissed the ECtHR’s judgement as 
‘political’ and ‘disillusioning’. 759  Thüringer Allgemeine’s Manfred Maahs 
dismissed the claims. He argued that in the GDR, Krenz and his comrades would 
have received much harsher sentences. He believed that not upholding the 
judgement against Krenz would have been a ‘mockery’ for the victims. 760 
 
755 ‘(…) Vergeblichkeit, Zersetzung und Willkür, Terror und Bespitzelung strafrechtlich zu 
beurteilen.’ ; ‘aufarbeiten’, Berliner Zeitung, 9 November 1989. 
756 Der Rechtsstaat ‘klagt nicht Systeme an und verurteilt keine Ideologien’, ibid. 
757 ibid. 
758 See Thüringer Allgemeine and Berliner Zeitung, 9 November 1999. 
759 Thüringer Allgemeine, 23 March 2001. 






Commenting for Berliner Zeitung, Christian Bommarius, he defended the whole 
concept of criminal trials against GDR officials. Not to prosecute them would have 
been a ‘retroactive surrender to the GDR regime’s crimes, a relinquishment of 
human rights by the judiciary, and the discreditation of the revolution of 1989’.761 
In his view, the ECtHR’s international character confirmed that the verdicts against 
Krenz and others were no case of victor’s justice. In his words, there had rarely 
been a ‘better day for human rights’.762 
Opinion Polls 
After German re-unification, the political and economic order faced different 
levels of political support among the population. As we will see below, former GDR 
citizens were significantly more critical of certain political circumstances than their 
West German counterparts.763 Opinion polls from the mid-1990s suggest that the 
political system of the Federal Republic had failed to gain legitimacy among East-
German citizens. A comprehensive poll conducted in 1995 suggests significant 
dissatisfaction with political outcomes and therefore indicates a lack of ‘output 
legitimacy’ as early as 1995. In that year, fifty-three per cent of East Germans 
described the social system of re-united Germany as ‘unjust’, while only twenty-
eight per cent of West Germans subscribed to that view. Among those East Germans 
who viewed the FRG as ‘unjust’, forty-one per cent indicated that ‘social injustice’ 
was the main driver in their perception.764 The frustration about the current system 
was even greater when it came to protection against crime: eighty-eight per cent of 
respondents in the former East said they believed that protection against crime was 
better in the GDR that in re-united Germany.765 
 
761 ‘(…) die nachträgliche Kapitulation vor den Verbrechen des DDR-Regimes bedeutet, die 
Preisgabe der Menschenrechte durch die Justiz und nicht zuletzt die Diskreditierung der 
Revolution von 1989’, Berliner Zeitung, 23 March 2001. 
762 ibid. 
763 Gabriel, Einstellungen. 







Where a new political system fails to deliver satisfying outcomes, that is, where 
no ‘output legitimacy’ can grow, a support of the political system grounded in the 
way political preferences are being processed, can hardly emerge (‘input 
legitimacy’).766 In fact, the same comprehensive Allensbach poll has suggested that 
in February 1995, 41 per cent of East Germans agreed to the following statement:  
‘I am firmly convinced that our society is inexorably heading for a major crisis. We 
cannot solve these problems with the current political possibilities. We can only do 
that if we fundamentally change our political system.’767 
This suggests a major alienation of significant parts of East Germany’s society 
from the body politic. In the West, by contrast, thirty per cent agreed to the 
statement. Likewise, support of the majority principle differed in East and West: In 
the former GDR, only thirty-six per cent of respondents said that democratic 
decisions of a municipal council (such as building a factory) had to be respected at 
all times, whereas forty per cent said that council decisions could be opposed by 
citizens, if need be by force.768 In the West, a similarly high thirty-nine per cent 
thought that continued opposition against majority votes were legitimate, while 
forty-four per cent thought that majority votes had to be respected.769 However, it 
must be noted that since 1982, West Germany had also seen a significant decline in 
support of the majority principle. 
 
766  Gabriel, Einstellungen, p. XXY. 
767 ‘Ich bin fest davon überzeugt, daß unsere Gesellschaft unaufhaltsam auf eine ganz große Krise 
zusteuert. Mit den derzeitigen politischen Möglichkeiten können wir diese Probleme nicht lösen. 
Das schaffen wir nur, wenn wir unser politisches System grundlegend ändern.’, Noelle-Neumann, 
Rechtsbewußtsein, 150. 








Figure 1: ‘Can you please tell me for each of the following points whether you 
think this is okay in any case, or under no circumstances, or somewhere in 
between.’ (Source: Noelle-Neumann, Rechtsbewußtsein, 145.) 
 
Data also show a gradual but constant erosion of values with regard to money 
and benefit taking. In 1990, ninety per cent of East Germans thought that fare 
dodging was not acceptable at all; eighty-eight per cent found it unacceptable to 
evade taxes, and sixty-nine per cent thought that keeping found money or lying for 
one’s one benefit were not okay. These approval rates declined significantly over 
the next five years. As the data show, the erosion of such values was clearly more 
advanced in West Germany by 1981 than in East Germany by 1990. This suggests 
that the erosion of social values might not have been linked to East Germany’s 






during the 1990s.770 So, when we conclude that by the mid-1990s, the ‘system’ of 
re-united Germany was already lacking political support among the population of 
East Germany, what had this to do with transitional justice measures? 
 
A major opinion poll on the success of transformative measures presents a 
differentiated picture. In November 1996, Allensbach conducted a representative 
opinion poll asking Germans what they believed had helped or hindered German 
unity.771 In this poll, fifteen per cent of West Germans and only eight per cent of 
East Germans believed that criminal trials against ‘ordinary border guards’ had 
helped German unity. By contrast, fifty per cent of West Germans and sixty-two of 
respondents in the East believed that these proceedings had hindered unity.772 
Furthermore, only thirty-nine per cent of East Germans perceived a suggested ‘lack’ 
of trials against former leaders as an obstacle to German unity. By contrast, sixty-
three per cent of West Germans thought so. This allows two interpretations. Firstly, 
it might well be that verdicts in the NVR case as well as other senior cases now no 
longer suggested an imbalance in trials to the detriment of rank-and-file border 
guards. By 1996, the claim that only ‘small men’ be hanged was no longer accurate. 
Secondly, and more likely in the light of the other figures, is the assumption that in 
1996, using criminal law was seen as a problematic measure of transitional justice. 
Other measures, such as the BStU, was not seen critically. Forty per cent in East 
and West Germany thought positively about its contribution to unity, while only 
 
770 Noelle-Neumann, Rechtsbewußtsein, 145.  
771 The question asked was: ‘Wenn Sie einmal auf die Entwicklung in Deutschland seit dem Fall 
der Mauer zurückblicken: Was ist vorteilhaft, was hat bislang die Einheit gefördert, und was hat 
belastet, ist schädlich für die Einheit, und was spielt keine Rolle?’  
Opinion poll: ‘Einheitsstützen – Einheitshemmnisse’, in: Allensbacher Jahrbuch für Demokratie 
1993-1997, Bd. 10, ed. by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher, München: K.G. Saus 







seventeen or twenty-one per cent respectively saw it negatively. It was neither seen 
as a big obstacle to German unity, nor as a big factor behind it.773 
 
However, data from social sciences suggest that the law – in a wider sense – 
seemed to play an important role in the wider public’s perception of German unity. 
In the light of these data, the law has failed to play an integrative role after German 
re-unification.774 Fifty per cent of West Germans believed that the ‘immediate’ 
adoption of West German law had helped German unity, while sixty-one per cent 
of East Germans thought it was impeding unity. This was despite the fact that in 
socially sensitive issues like abortion, former GDR regulations (which were more 
liberal) remained in force until a consensual criminal law reform could be agreed 
upon in Bundestag. Moreover, fifty-eight per cent of East Germans agreed that it 
was an obstacle that the Basic Law – (West) Germany’s constitution – had not been 
revised in the process of or after reunification. Likewise, public opinion on criminal 
jurisprudence and the protection from crime suggest that the law failed to offer an 
integrative narrative to East Germans. In 1995, sixty per cent of East Germans said 
they were ‘dissatisfied’ with ‘our laws and the jurisprudence’.775 Only sixteen per 
cent in the former East were satisfied, whereas in the West, thirty-six per cent 
indicated they were dissatisfied and forty-seven per cent said they were satisfied.776 
Likewise, fifty-four per cent of West Germans perceived themselves as ‘protected’ 
by the law and though that ‘on balance, one can live safely in Germany’, thirty-six 
 
773 ibid. 
774 Opinion poll: ‘Einheitsstützen – Einheitshemmnisse’, in: Allensbacher Jahrbuch für 
Demokratie 1993-1997, Bd. 10, ed. by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher, München: 
K.G. Saus 1997, p. 558f. 
775 ‘Sind Sie mit unseren Gesetzen und der Rechtsprechung in Deutschland alles in allem zufrieden 
oder nicht zufrieden?’ 
776 Tabelle 1, Geteiltes Rechtsbewusstsein in West und Ost, in: Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth: 
‘Rechtsbewußtsein im wiedervereinigten Deutschland’, in: Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 16 






per cent disagreed. In the East, the picture was reversed: merely sixteen per cent 
felt safe, while a remarkable seventy-two per cent indicated they felt unsafe.777 
Regarding police, the figures were even worse. Seventy-six per cent of East 
Germans were dissatisfied with the protection offered by police, only thirteen per 
cent were satisfied. While West Germany also saw forty-four per cent saying they 
were dissatisfied, at least forty-three per cent felt protected.778 In the same vein, 
fifty-two per cent of East Germans agreed that ‘felons are better protected than 
ordinary citizens’.779 In the West, this figure was only thirty-six per cent.780 These 
findings were confirmed by another poll in 2001 when fifty-three per cent of 
respondents in East Germany claimed that ‘laws and regulations’ had ‘worsened’ 
after re-unification. Even eighty-eight per cent believed that the protection against 
crime had ‘worsened’.781 
Likewise, questions about human rights reveal stark differences between 
Germans in the former West and East, once again suggesting that the law and the 
idea of ‘Rechtsstaat’ had not been able to integrate two societies within five years 
after re-unification. When asked which political system had protected human rights 
and human dignity better, ninety per cent of West Germans favoured the FRG, only 
one per cent thought the GDR had been the more credible advocate for human 
rights. In the East, the picture was much more blended. Here, only thirty-five per 
cent thought the FRG a human rights stronghold, while twenty-one per cent still 
thought so of the GDR.782 The same poll also asked respondents what human right 
would come first to their mind. Out of 180 replies, thirty-five East Germans 
 
777 Noelle-Neumann, Rechtsbewußtsein, 124. 
778 Noelle-Neumann, Rechtsbewußtsein, 124. 
779 ‘Manche sagen: ‘In unserem Staat wird ein Verbrecher besser geschützt als die normalen 
Bürger.’ Finden Sie, das trifft zu, oder trifft das nicht zu?’ Noelle-Neumann, Rechtsbewußtsein, 
125. 
780 Noelle-Neumann, Rechtsbewußtsein, 125. 
781 Allensbacher Jahrbuch für Demokratie 1998-2002, ed. by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and 
Renate Köcher, München: K.G. Saur 2002, p. 515. 






mentioned a ‘right to work’, whereas thirty-two per cent of West Germans referred 
to ‘freedom of opinion’ and ‘freedom of speech’. These two specifications were the 
most frequently made statements in those two respective groups of respondents. 
To sum these aforementioned findings up: by the mid-1990s, the criminal law as 
a means of transitional justice had largely lost public support, in West and East, but 
more so in the former GDR. However, not all forms of transitional justice were seen 
so negatively, as somewhat indifferent responses to the work of the BStU have 
shown. At the same time, the failure to adopt a new constitution as a powerful 
political symbol, as well as the perceived lack of legal certainty and protection 
against crime suggest that the new social and political order had failed to gain 
substantive support among East Germans. ‘The law’ – in its widest sense – had 
failed to become an integrative power, despite politicians’ claims that the East 
Germans would have longed for the West German Rechtsstaat (see chapter 2). 
The least favourable results, however, were measured in the field of the 
economic transformation, where Germans – and especially East Germans – were 
particularly critical of how re-unification had been handled. Sixty-seven per cent of 
East Germans thought that the restitution of expropriated properties had hindered 
German unity (West Germans: forty-eight per cent).783 Seventy-seven per cent of 
East Germans claimed that German re-unification suffered from discontinuing 
social welfare ‘achievements’ of the GDR (West Germans: fifty-three per cent).784 
The way how the Treuhand had privatised East German companies and the alleged 
failure to protect East German businesses against competition from the West were 
seen especially critical by East Germans (eighty-three and seventy-nine per cent, 
respectively).785 
 
783 Opinion poll: ‘Einheitsstützen – Einheitshemmnisse’, in: Allensbacher Jahrbuch für 
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As a preliminary conclusion, it seems fair to say that the policies of transitional 
justice were not dismissed in total, but restitutions, the use of the criminal law, and 
the adaption of the Basic Law were received with criticism by East Germans. 
However, it is important to note that economic measures of the post-socialist 
transformation gained much less support and provoked significantly more 
opposition.  
Summary  
The press generally welcomed criminal trials as a measure of transitional justice, 
but remained distanced towards proceedings against 'foot soldiers'. Verdicts against 
former leaders were commented sympathetically. However, it was criticised that 
these verdicts came relatively late. Moreover, Honecker's release drew fundamental 
criticism. This demonstrates the conflicts between the requirements of criminal 
proceedings on the one hand, and outcome expectations of the public on the other. 
While press comments regularly acknowledged that the limits of the criminal law 
in 'overcoming' Socialism, some texts also linked those trials against rank-and-file 
border guards to the public's sense of justice. This reflects that the 'border guard 
cases' were no mere technical application of the criminal law, but a conglomerate 
of proceedings in need of legitimacy and justification. 
Citizens' reactions from 1991 and 1992 revealed frequent dissatisfaction with the 
fact that border guards such as Ingo Heinrich had been charged, while proceedings 
against Honecker and the likes had not been opened yet. Courts eventually 
developed a taxonomy of sentences which accommodated public demands for 
punishing political and military leaders much more severely than 'ordinary' border 
guards. But, as demonstrated above, this taxonomy suffered from two flaws. Firstly, 
it was never communicated as a strategy, but had to be understood by studying the 
jurisprudence. Secondly, the taxonomy became obvious only over the course of 
time, as more and more verdicts were handed down. Given that the proceedings 






style of legal communication would have been inconsistent with the character of 
the legal system. But it came at the price of a de-politicisation of a profoundly 
political process, the question of how to deal with the legacy of a dictatorial past. 
The lack of political resolution and public communication of this central aspect of 
transitional justice may have undermined the cause of integrating East Germans 
into the new society which was so overwhelmingly dominated by West German 
culture and politics.786  However, it needs to be noted that few letters also suggested 
alternative forms of transitional justice, including commending those former GDR 
officials who had refused orders which – in their views – constituted political 
crimes. 
In any case, representative opinion polls show that by the mid-1990s, the 
paradigm of criminal justice had been largely dismissed by Germans in the former 
East. This was especially true for trials against 'ordinary' border guards. Moreover, 
the law, the Basic Law and even terms like 'Rechtsstaat' had become important 
categories of identity construction and the negotiation of value conflicts. Largely 
differing polling results between East and West Germany also suggested a 
continued fracturing in political views in the re-united country. 
What is the meaning of the so-called border guard cases for the process of Inner 
German unity, then? As measures of transitional justice, the trials against former 
GDR officials failed to deliver legitimacy and political support for the new state. 
While arguably, the economic transformation was an even heavier strain on East 
Germany's 'collective soul', the trials themselves also provoked opposition and 
rejection, especially among the East-German population. Moreover, repetitive 
 
786 Gerhard Sälter has even argued that there might have been a grand strategy behind this, that the 
only reason the border guards were prosecuted might have been to be able to get to Krenz, Mielke 
and so on. Cf. Sälter, Rechtsstaat. However, this implies too much of a coordinated attempt – after 
all, legal affairs fall into the competence of states,  and the 'border guard cases' were carried out in 
state courts and by state prosecutors. There was neither a Federal authority coordinating this nor 






media coverage may have served as a perpetual reiteration of a normative de-
valuation of the GDR and a demarcation of its 'wrongful nature'. Some citizens' 
reactions as well as press comments suggest that in the eyes of some, this was 
generalised into an outright degradation of their past lives and their experiences. 
Against the backdrop of a grave economic situation and a frustrating social and 
economic transformation, it might have been important to develop strategies to win 
public support for the new state and system, to create legitimacy among East 
Germans. Towards this end, a more integrative strategy of reconciliation and 
symbolic appreciation might have been more helpful in supplying support for an 
otherwise already stressful transformation. Criminal prosecution of state leaders 
could still have been part of this if it had been part of a larger and politically defined 
consensus on how to 'master the past'. The de-centralized and de-politicised trials 
that took place instead were not only dogmatically problematic, but also politically 








This study set out to historicise the border guard trials as an instance of post-
Socialist transitional justice. It asked how the proceedings were historically framed 
by attempts to 'come to terms' with the Nazi past, and ideologically shaped by Cold 
War confrontations and ideologies. Moreover, this dissertation examined the 
political and societal echoes of these trials and located them in the wider context of 
post-dictatorial transitional justice tools deployed in East Germany after the end of 
the SED regime. 
Chapter 1 has shown that using the criminal law against former GDR officials 
was institutionally foreshadowed by West Germany's Zentrale Erfassungsstelle der 
Landesjustizverwaltungen (ZESt) in Salzgitter.  Founded as a reflex response to the 
construction of the Wall, the ZESt became an important institutional precursor of 
the Border Guard Trials. Designed to keep track of all 'state crimes' of the GDR for 
future criminal prosecution in the West, the office soon became an embodiment and 
permanent institutional expression of West German normative positions during the 
Cold War, i.e. the total rejection of the GDR's existence and state practices, 
especially at the Inner-German border. The debate on the legal basis of the office's 
work, growing in intensity between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s, became a focal 
point for competing Cold War conceptions of illegality and state crime not only 
within West Germany, but also in the system conflict between the Federal Republic 
and the German Democratic Republic. After re-unification, the office's 40,000 
investigative files, a product of diplomatic necessities and a 'conservative' 
ideological hegemony, were transformed into an unforeseeably powerful legal 
resource, overshadowed, perhaps, only by the significant ideological framing which 






However, criminal prosecution of GDR officials also took place in a line of 
continuity of legal action and public demands in the GDR between 1989 and 1990, 
as chapter 3 has demonstrated. In written demands, citizens most notably called for 
investigations into cases of voter fraud, corruption, and the misappropriation of 
public goods for private luxuries, thereby showing specific priorities of justice 
clearly different from the ones embodied in the ZESt's work and prevalent in the 
jurisprudence after re-unification. Despite severe transformations and various 
challenges, the GDR's judiciary demonstrated responsiveness to public demands by 
convicting fifteen former leaders and issuing eleven penalty orders. In other words: 
these early judicial attempts were a strategy of reckoning that was demanded and 
conducted by East Germans themselves, and not a case of West German victor's 
justice. Rather, these trials were a procedural expression of the intention of GDR 
state prosecutors that the criminal law could and ought to play a role in the 
reckoning with former elites – albeit not necessarily with rank-and-file officials 
such as border guards. 
These potentially conflicting approaches as to who ought to be the target of 
criminal trials in a transitional justice-sense were not resolved politically, as chapter 
2 has argued. In the light of an overwhelming political consensus after re-
unification, no deliberate political decision in favour of using the criminal law as a 
transitional justice tool was taken. Rather, the necessity of criminal proceedings 
was seen as an almost unquestionable axiom. On a political and symbolic level, and 
in the absence of a genuine political resolution, the legislative proceedings on the 
extension of limitation periods served as a 'surrogate debate' on the paradigm of 
criminal prosecution as a transitional justice tool. The passing of both bills therefore 
has to be understood as a retroactive justification and legitimisation, as an act of 
legal enabling and political contestation of this form of transitional justice. These 
parliamentary debates encapsulated a political resolution in favour of criminal 
trials; but they were held after the first verdicts had been delivered by the judiciary. 






political will, disguised as inevitable factual necessity. Because although the use of 
criminal trials was claimed to be inevitable, it was not. As some remarks have 
demonstrated, other forms of revolutionary tribunals had been possible, not to 
mention a 'forget and forgive' gesture, or a ban on criminal prosecution. 
Eventually, it was resolved that for all political crimes in the GDR, limitation 
periods would not begin before 3 October 1990, and that minor crimes would not 
lapse before 31 December 1995, medium-heavy crimes not before the end of 1997. 
These regulations included 'minor' crimes such as trespass or invasion of privacy 
which may not have been as gruesome as killings but were still essential for the 
running of the dictatorship. Likewise, it was agreed to include certain forms of 
economic crimes in East Germany after re-unification, as these were believed to 
have contributed to the economic difficulties experienced by many Germans in the 
former East. 
In justifying the draft legislation, legislators referred to an alleged legal common 
sense, suggesting that the outcomes of criminal trials had to be intelligible to the 
wider public and that the popular will should be taken into account, at least to a 
certain degree. In these demands, technical-legal considerations became deeply 
intertwined with fundamental political views and normative claims. Moreover, 
legislators in favour of criminal trials and extending limitation periods echoed early 
verdicts. They also claimed that criminal courts were merely enforcing GDR law, 
thereby downplaying any challenges to the legitimacy of the proceedings. Those in 
favour of this argument did usually not, however, explain why the re-united country 
should care to enforce laws of a state which was described as an 'Unrechtsstaat'. 
How deeply these debates were historically framed was made evident in ample 
references to (West) Germany's attempts to 'come to terms' with the Nazi past after 
1945. Even though most speakers made clear that they did not wish to equate the 
'Third Reich' with the GDR, a subtle invocation of the paradigm of ‘totalitarianism’ 
and a certain degree of comparability are hard to dismiss. This argument was 






speakers grew increasingly sensitive in making this point. A specific way of 
referencing National Socialism was to point out that after what was perceived as a 
failed prosecution of Nazi perpetrators, the GDR's 'Aufarbeitung' presented a 
‘second chance’ of ‘mastering’ a German dictatorship. Repeatedly, speakers 
warned that Germany should not repeat the mistake of ‘sweeping the past under the 
carpet’. The perceived failure of ‘mastering’ the Nazi past therefore advanced to a 
strong argument to 'get it right' this time. By contrast, warnings that a criminal-
justice-based approach could adversely affect East Germany's transformation and 
integration into re-united Germany were only uttered by the PDS, who argued that 
widespread fears of criminal prosecution could distress East Germans who were 
burdened with a frustrating economic transformation even further.  
A Bündnis 90/Die Grünen-speaker was the only parliamentarian who vindicated 
criminal trials with reference to emerging international human rights regimes since 
World War II. It will be a fruitful field of research to examine what impact these 
debates, as well as the jurisprudence, in re-united Germany have had on 
international legal and diplomatic debates on state crime, for example the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Another question 
for future research is to what extent the paradigm shift in Germany’s jurisprudence 
on former KZ guards, as witnessed since the Demjanjuk Trial in 2009, has been 
influenced by transitional justice practices and debates after the end of the GDR. 
Chapter 4 has examined how German courts tried to navigate in difficult waters 
in the Border Guard Trials. Their jurisprudence had to satisfy diverging demands 
of different societal ‘systems’. For the legal system, jurisprudence had to be 
thoroughly substantiated and sealed against legal challenges such as the prohibition 
of retroactive punishment. At the same time, public expectations of the outcome 
had to be accommodated, at least to a certain extent, if the judiciary did not want to 
provoke allegations of letting former GDR perpetrators off the hook. And 
politicians formulated the expectation that criminal trials should contribute to the 






reunification trials put emphasis on investigating and prosecuting killings at the 
border and abuse of justice. Chapter 3, on the other hand, has demonstrated that 
pre-reunification trials have focused on elite crimes such as voter fraud and 
economic crimes. Where GDR state prosecutors predominantly charged former 
leaders, re-united Germany's judiciary also extensively prosecuted subordinates. 
Before the GDR acceded to the FRG, just over 100 persons had been charged for 
state crimes. These were mainly state elites, senior party figures, and trade union 
leaders. By contrast, between German re-unification in 1990 and 2005, re-united 
Germany’s judiciary investigated no less than 100,000 individuals, with 1,737 of 
them being eventually charged.787 These differences were an expression of different 
justice priorities. After re-unification, criminal investigations and trials were no 
longer a tool to vent the public’s frustration about the schemes of ousted rulers; they 
advanced to a potential threat to many former GDR officials whose staunch or tacit 
work had been decisive for the survival of the GDR.788  
Subsequently, this research project has used criminal trials against former GDR 
border guards and their superiors, including state and military leaders, as a case 
study into the judicial practice of transitional justice after German re-unification. 
Towards this end, a small sample of test cases has been analysed with respect to 
how the judiciary has attempted to develop a coherent and legally watertight 
jurisprudence, while taking into account expectations from the public and the 
political sphere. The key challenge was to establish why the acts had been illegal 
and hence punishable, as well as to invalidate claims that convictions violated the 
prohibition of retroactive punishment (nulla poena). The first two verdicts in early 
1992 encapsulated a conflict over the legal foundations of these trials which echoed 
competing views on the legitimacy of the GDR itself. The very first judgement 
disregarded GDR law and relied solely on natural law justifications for the 
 
787 Figures according to Marxen/Werle/Schäfter, Strafverfolgung. 
788 Weinke thoughtfully asks what the point of criminal trials as a transitional justice measure may 






conviction. This included a reference to the Radbruch Formula. This legal principle 
had been developed in the wake of the Shoah in order to justify criminal convictions 
of regime perpetrators. It suggests that where positive law has been used to 
legitimise grave state crime, it must yield to 'justice' and be disregarded.  The second 
verdict rejected this line of continuity from the 'Third Reich' to the GDR, and 
instead took positive GDR law very seriously. In a hyper-textual reading of legal 
provisions, it concluded that killings at the border had been illegal even under GDR 
law. 
This conflict over competing conceptions of illegality in the realm of state crime 
was resolved by the Federal Court of Justice (FCJ) in November 1992. It confirmed 
the judgements insofar as the defendants had been convicted. The FCJ used an 
integrative approach that relied on a textual reading of GDR law, a consideration of 
international human rights obligations of the GDR, and on the Radbruch Formula. 
The choice for this comprehensive approach to the main question was honoured in 
1996 and 2001 when the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) and the European 
Court of Human Rights ruled that the convictions did not violate the prohibition of 
retroactive punishment as it is enshrined in Art. 103 (2) Basic Law and Art. 7 (1) 
ECHR. 
On a symbolic level, the trials against former military and party indicated that 
former military and political elites were also liable for killings at the border. In this 
light, the FCJ's decision which ruled that those leaders had not merely instigated 
manslaughter, but were perpetrators themselves, was important. With these 
decisions, and over the years, it became obvious that the courts tried to 
accommodate individual levels of responsibility with a systematic taxonomy of 
sentences. However, this taxonomy became visible only in hindsight. Moreover, 
due to the complexity of investigations against former leaders, courts were faster to 
charge rank-and-file border guards than elites. With decreasing media coverage 
over time, this had a distorting effect on the courts' ability to communicate a tacit 






proceedings against Honecker had to be terminated due to their poor health, leaving 
behind a furious public. 
The courts acted in a way which tried to do justice to the political dimension of 
the trials. Their acknowledgement that border guards such as Ingo Heinrich and 
others were ‘in a way also victims’789 of the border or the FCJ’s intervention that 
identified senior leaders as perpetrators – as opposed to their initial conviction of 
instigating manslaughter – can be understood in such a way as to accommodate the 
public’s expectations that ‘foot soldiers’ should not be the only ones punished for 
the injustices of Germany’s socialist dictatorship. The courts’ attempt to establish 
a taxonomy of sentences falls into the same category. In this context, the Radbruch 
Formula can be seen as a tool to help the FCJ deliver the outcome that common 
sense was considered to demand. In the challenge of mastering the Border Guard 
Trials, this legal principle served as a 'lubricant' to ensure the desired outcome.790  
While the jurisprudence was grosso modo coherent, it was far from being 
uncontested, as Chapter 5 has shown. In a mixed-methods-approach, this chapter 
has studied how public opinion on the ‘border guard cases’ and transitional justice 
has evolved, and what ramifications can be identified. Towards this aim, a sample 
of regional newspapers has been examined, citizens’ reactions have been studied, 
and opinion surveys have been analysed. All in all, nothing indicates that criminal 
trials against former GDR officials can be seen as a stabilising moment in East 
Germany’s transformation. Judging from the sources scrutinised, chapter 5 has 
argued that the criminal law, in conjunction with other aspects of the 
 
789 Revisionsurteil des Bundesgerichtshofs, 3.11.1992, AZ 5 StR 370/92, BGHSt 39,1 
(Mauerschützen I) –, in: Marxen, Klaus / Werle, Gerhard (eds.): Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht. 
Dokumentation in sieben Bänden, vol. 2, sub-vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2002, pp. 135-55, 
[p. 155]. 
790 The notion of a legal concept as a 'lubricant' has previously been used to describe the role of the 
'margin of appreciation' in the jurisprudence on the European Convention of Human Rights, see 
Macdonald, Ronald St. J.: 'The Margin of Appreciatixon', in: Macdonald, Ronald St. J./Matscher, 
Franz/Petzold, Herbert (eds.): The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, 






transformation, has failed to equip the new political, social and economic order of 
re-united Germany with political support among the population in the former GDR.  
The press generally welcomed criminal trials. Proceedings against rank-and-file 
border guards, however, were seen with some critical distance. Nevertheless, 
convictions of state and military leaders were warmly welcomed, despite some 
criticism over the late point in time. Honecker’s release, however, provoked a lot 
of criticism, as did the relatively late conviction of other leaders such as Krenz, and 
Streletz. Press comments also highlighted how trials against former leaders were 
related to proceedings against their inferiors in a general sense of justice and 
legitimacy. These texts exemplified that in public perception, trials against GDR 
officials were not a purely technical application of the criminal law, but a 
conglomerate of measures that was in need of justification and legitimacy. 
Journalists usually designated the limits of the criminal law in achieving 
Aufarbeitung of the past, but they mostly deemed it without alternative, anyway. 
Citizens’ reactions in the form of letters to authorities were surprisingly rare. 
Only about three dozen letters were written to the Federal President in 1991 and 
1992, when the first trials were opened and closed. 791  Some letters supported 
criminal trials against border guards such as Ingo Heinrich and others, while many 
opposed them. The three major themes in this argument were the apparent 
international recognition of the GDR during the Cold War, even by the FRG; the 
notion of a legal dilemma when subordinates are confronted with an illegal military 
order; and the reproach that the judiciary would let big men run while hanging the 
small men. In 1991/92, these claims could legitimately have been made since low-
ranking border guards were the first to be charged, and because the prosecution of 
GDR officials took place within the ordinary judiciary, not within a revolutionary 
 
791 By contrast, the broadcast of the TV-series ‘Holocaust’ provoked about 10,000 letters to the 
TV-station WDR. A selection of these has been published by Lichtenstein, Heiner/Schmid-Ospach, 







tribunal of some sort. Therefore, the de-centralised judiciary was unable to 
communicate into the political arena if it pursued any strategy – which, arguably, it 
did, as the previous chapters have shown. When we contrast expectations as 
expressed by journalists and citizens with the argumentative style of the examined 
judgements, a tension becomes obvious between the requirements of the rule of law 
on the one hand and political calls for material justice on the other hand. This was 
the quandary in which the border guard cases were conducted. 
An analysis of various polling data suggests that political support (or legitimacy) 
for the new system of the Federal Republic has remained low since the mid-1990s. 
Frustrating experiences of the economic transformation of East Germany, including 
mass unemployment, arguably constituted the most important cause for this in the 
early 1990s. However, chapter 5 has also shown that the law – in a broad sense – 
has been an important instance in the negotiation of value conflicts and, possibly, 
an important category of identity construction. Importantly, surveys have also 
shown that the ‘border guard cases’ were seen as an obstacle to German unity. By 
late 1996, the paradigm of criminal justice as a transitional justice policy had been 
largely dismissed by most East Germans. This study has therefore argued that 
criminal trials have served as a constant and reiterative reminder of transformative 
experiences which were perceived as degrading. Rather than delivering legitimacy, 
they contributed to undermining political support for the new system.  
The border guard trials, as well as concomitant public and political debates 
provided a prism through which it became visible how politicians, courts, and the 
public have engaged with the potentially divisive tension between serving 'justice' 
and enabling 'reconciliation'. The project of a criminal reckoning with former GDR 
officials was inextricably intertwined with German efforts to 'master' the Nazi past. 
The precedent of West Germany's Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung of National 
Socialist crimes was crucial in forming verdicts and in determining who would be 
tried, and for which acts. Likewise, the West German precedent was a frequent 






pitfalls of using arguments from the 1940s and 1950s, and qualified them 
accordingly. 
It was, moreover, framed by residuals of Cold War ideology, and shaped by 
institutional and legal continuities embodied in the ZESt. However, criminal trials 
against GDR officials were also an expression of political preferences expressed 
during the GDR's revolutionary period, and a continuation of judicial practices of 
the period from November 1989 to October 1990. Tropes of ‘victors’  
justice’ and carpetbaggery notwithstanding, the use of criminal law as a measure of 
transitional justice originated (also) within East German society and was sustained 
and championed by the GDR’s citizenship. This leading role of the GDR's own 
citizens in re-establishing an independent judiciary, and in the cases discussed here, 
is remarkable, as it demonstrates that the transitional justice tools deployed since 
1989 were also shaped by East German agency. It is also remarkable because the 
law had been an instrument of repression in the GDR. It had been complicit with 
(even more sinister) forms of exercising the power to rule. It is therefore noteworthy 
that GDR citizens still turned to the judiciary to remedy the situation in the autumn 
and winter of 1989 and 1990. 
In re-united Germany's process of post-socialist transitional justice, the criminal 
law regulated inherently political questions by transposing them into the legal 
sphere. However, the place where this happened was the ordinary judiciary, 
governed by statutory law and procedural requirements. Thus, inherently political 
questions were 'factored out' with the help of a 'fiction of normalcy' (K. Stengel), 
that was fostered by the use of 'ordinary' law. This way, the transitional context of 
these trials could be held at a distance, at least in the jurisprudence. As a 
consequence, the political system did not have to engage in the potentially divisive 
question of how to deal with the leaders (and perpetrators) of a former regime but 
could these decision on to the courts. However, the political dimension of these 
trials was perfectly obvious to politicians, journalists and the press, as this study 






The proceedings were undoubtedly seen and assessed in the wider context of 
transformative processes which East Germany experienced in the 1990s. In this 
context, the trials have not been a boost to public support for the new legal, social, 
and political system, but a liability. On 20 January 1992, when the verdict against 
Heinrich and Kühnpast was handed down, one citizen of Berlin put these 
entanglements into polite, yet plain words. For the sake of purity, they are 
reproduced in German: 
'Schauen sie, Herr Bundespräsident, die Menschen in den östlichen Bundesländern 
haben es nicht leicht. So vieles ist neu, soviel macht unsicher, manches sogar Angst. 
Die Zukunft schwebt mit einer Menge Ungewissem über den Köpfen der Menschen 
hier, die Gegenwart bietet nur wenig Grund zur Freude. Und eine Vergangenheit gibt 
es entweder nicht mehr (weil es den Staat nicht mehr gibt), oder sie wird 
kriminalisiert. Sie sind oberster Repräsentant eines Systems, das jetzt auch für hier 
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